



CHINA

# UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF R2P IMPLEMENTATION 2023



Asia-Pacific Centre for the  
Responsibility to Protect



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# CHINA

A trend showing a decline in effective atrocity prevention and human rights protection continues in China for its 2023 assessment. Over the past few decades, China has made significant progress in reducing the incidence and risk of atrocity crimes, but it continues to perform weakly in relation to human rights, civil society, and accountability. Like many other states in the region, China performs most poorly ('Very Weak') with respect to the adoption of R2P specific policy mechanisms due to the fact that it has not yet appointed an R2P Focal Point, nor does it appear to incorporate atrocity specific analysis into its foreign aid and defence policies. China also confronts significant challenges with respect to its national resilience to atrocity crimes. In particular, it performs poorly with respect to human rights and the protection of civil society freedoms. Of particular concern is evidence of declining media and civil society freedom and the arbitrary arrests and detentions.

China's international record continues to be mixed. On the positive side, it is an increasingly important contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping missions, including missions with robust protection of civilians mandates, but it has yet to support the Kigali Principles. China is amongst the world's top financial contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations, having significantly increased support for peacebuilding over the last decade through the adoption of 'developmental peacebuilding'. China provides troops, police and advisors to numerous peacekeeping operations with a protection of civilian mandate and is in the top contributors of female police peacekeepers.

It is an active participant in international debates on R2P, both in the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and Security Council, although it has mostly opposed issues regarding R2P.

It voted against numerous Human Rights Council Resolution, including those made with reference to human rights in Syria, Burundi, and South Sudan.

China remains unwilling to support prevention and protection measures that do not enjoy the It has looked to limit the scope of the Human Rights Council's work, especially on country situations and including those where atrocity crimes are committed. China has not yet adopted specific R2P or atrocity prevention measures.

China has fallen a point in its index score compared to 2022.

Thematic Area	Indicator	Assessment	Notes
Basic Compliance	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes.	Fair Unchanged	While many Chinese citizens benefit from the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping, many feel the full force of the authorities' power if they step out of sync with officially sanctioned doctrine. This covers social, political, and religious aspects of Chinese life. In areas such as Xinjiang and Tibet, ethnic minorities within these areas continue to be subject to human rights violations that may amount to atrocity crimes.
	Reduction of atrocity crime risks.	Weak Unchanged	Xi Jinping has consolidated his leadership within China, and repression and violence at the hands of State authorities has continued unabated. Uighurs and other Turkic minorities in Xinjiang continue to be subject to crimes against humanity and potentially genocide. Acquiescence to Party doctrine in all aspects of life is paramount, and deviation and resistance to it is met with strong reprisals from the State. This has created an environment rife with atrocity crime risk.
	Dealing with past atrocities.	Very Weak Unchanged	There is no update for this Indicator. Impunity runs rampant within China, and past atrocities are neither officially recognised nor commemorated.
Policy Mechanisms	Appoint national R2P Focal Point.	Very Weak Unchanged	There is no R2P Focal Point in China.
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships.	Very Weak Unchanged	There is no evidence the Chinese government considers atrocity risks in its analysis of conflicts or through its development assistance.
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect.	Very Weak Unchanged	No domestic mechanisms are in place within China to uphold the government to its responsibility to protect.
International Human Rights Obligations	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law.	Fair Unchanged	There is no update for this Indicator. China has still yet to ratify the <i>Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court</i> , the <i>Arms Trade Treaty</i> <sup>1</sup> or the <i>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</i> . <sup>2</sup>
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court.	Very Weak Unchanged	There is no update for this Indicator.
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles.	Very Weak Unchanged	China still does not have a national human rights institution. Hong Kong's Equal Opportunities Commission was given a 'C' rating in the past by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI). This rating has since stopped being used, and Hong Kong does not appear on the member list of GANHRI. <sup>3</sup>
	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on the elimination of discrimination.	Very Weak Decrease	The decline of human rights within China in the last several years has increased as President Xi Jinping has consolidated his power in the Chinese Communist Party. Discrimination too is rife, with

<sup>1</sup> The territories of Macau and Hong Kong, administered by China, have ratified the Arms Trade Treaty. United Nations Treaty Collection, 2023. 8. *Arms Trade Treaty*, [https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg\\_no=XXVI-8&chapter=26#EndDec](https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-8&chapter=26#EndDec).

<sup>2</sup> China signed the ICCPR in 1998 but has yet to ratify it.

<sup>3</sup> GANHRI, 2023. *Members*, <https://ganhri.org/membership/>.

ethnic minorities,<sup>4</sup> women, and those in the LGBTIQ+ community most severely affected.

In October 2022 at the 20<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, Xi Jinping began a third term as party leader. Such a move was unprecedented in Chinese history since the time of Mao Zedong, and this move consolidates Xi's power in China after years of ever-tighter restrictions and increasing repression of civil liberties.

The institution of draconian “zero-COVID” policies throughout China in 2022 severely harmed human rights of many Chinese, and there were protests throughout the country, including one where Xi Jinping was called a dictator to be removed as soon as possible. The response to such protests by the authorities was swift and typical, yet China dropped its “zero-COVID” policy towards the end of 2022 after the protests.<sup>5</sup>

As it stands, the repression of civil liberties and freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion, amongst others, will continue under the ever-stronger rule of Xi Jinping for the foreseeable future. While this may domestically stabilise China, it also maintains a high chance of atrocities being committed in the country.

For its part, China maintains it is protecting and promoting human rights within China and abroad. The country determines human rights are “for all” and are “indivisible”. Yet, it also believes the “...right of all countries to independently choose one’s own path of human rights development should be respected”, without the meddling of foreign powers.<sup>6</sup>

Participate in international peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the UN Human Rights Council.

Strong  
Unchanged

There are no significant updates for this Indicator, as China will undertake its next UPR in November 2023.

It currently has an additional late report for international human rights treaty bodies (for the CERD). This is in addition to its two other late reports which remain outstanding for both the CRC and CAT.<sup>7</sup>

Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations.

Weak  
Unchanged

There remains no standing invitation by China to UN Special Rapporteurs. A swathe of visits has been requested by the UNOHCHR, yet many remain inactive or in limbo after reminders.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Most people on the receiving end of China’s crackdown on human rights include those living in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia.

<sup>5</sup> China has continued to repress human rights, and there are many facets to this issue within China. For more detailed information, see: Amnesty International, 2023. *China 2022*, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china/report-china/>; Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2023. *China: Events of 2022*, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china#e81181>; Freedom House, 2023. *Freedom in the World 2023: China*, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2023>.

<sup>6</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2023. *Following a Chinese Path of Human Rights Development and Contributing China’s Strength to Global Human Rights Governance*, [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt\\_665385/zyjh\\_665391/202302/t20230228\\_11032426.html](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/202302/t20230228_11032426.html).

<sup>7</sup> United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNOHCHR), n.d. *Late and non-reporting States*, [https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/\\_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/LateReporting.aspx](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/LateReporting.aspx).

<sup>8</sup> UNOHCHR, n.d. *View Country visits by Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council since 1998*, <https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewCountryVisits.aspx?visitType=all&country=CHN&Lang=en>.

China did acquiesce to the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights to visit in May 2022, the first such visit in 17 years. In the report published later that year, the UNOHCHR found there were credible reports of widespread human rights violations in Xinjiang which may constitute crimes against humanity.<sup>9</sup>

Ensure equal access to justice.	Weak <b>Unchanged</b>	<p>The judicial system within China is warped by the omnipresence of the CCP, who oversees the conduct and appointment of judges and the workings of court operations. Violation of due process in the courts is commonplace, and guilt is presumed in most cases by the prosecution, accompanied by a very low percentage of acquittals.<sup>10</sup></p> <p>The CCP has also, over several years, launched campaigns that utilise State institutions to work together to suppress or correct undesired behaviour in the Chinese population. One such ‘campaign-style’ justice movement was deployed against organised crime. Such a campaign even had arrest quotas for local jurisdictions to fulfil. Unsurprisingly, such a campaign resulted in many wrongful arrests. However, in a few cases, it did result in the overturning of convictions against legitimate businesses.<sup>11</sup></p> <p>More recently, China has cracked down on human rights lawyers and those defending members of civil society.<sup>12</sup> Arbitrary arrest, torture, and ill-treatment of such detainees, as well as many others, are common within China’s judicial system.</p>
Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.	Very Weak <b>Unchanged</b>	There is no update for this Indicator. There remains no evidence of China possessing laws that criminalise any atrocity crime.
Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism.	Weak <b>Unchanged</b>	There is no recent evidence to suggest China’s counter extremism and counterterrorism efforts have changed drastically, or for the better. Most of their efforts are focused on the province of Xinjiang and the Muslim population there. Chinese efforts in this region are in two complementary areas: the construction and maintenance of camps for re-education and assimilation of the Uighur population, and the development of a surveillance state throughout Xinjiang. <sup>13</sup>

<sup>9</sup> United Nations, 2022. ‘China responsible for “serious human rights violations” in Xinjiang province: UN human rights report’. *UN News*, 31 August. Available at:

<https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1125932#:~:text=The%20report%20published%20on%20Wednesday,are%20allegations%20of%20individual%20incidents>. The full report can be read here: UNOHCHR, 2022. *OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China*,

<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf>. You can also read the Chinese rebuttal of the report here: Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, 2022. *Fight against Terrorism and Extremism in Xinjiang: Truth and Facts*, [https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/ANNEX\\_A.pdf](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/ANNEX_A.pdf).

<sup>10</sup> Freedom House, 2023. *Freedom in the World 2023: China*, ‘F. Rule of Law’; U.S Department of State, 2023. *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)*, ‘E. Denial of Fair Public Trial’, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/>.

<sup>11</sup> For more detailed information that campaign, see: Cohen, Jerome, A., Chi Yin, 2022. ‘The Complexities of China’s Struggle for Justice’. *The Diplomat*, 12 May. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/the-complexities-of-chinas-struggle-for-justice/>.

<sup>12</sup> Article 19, 2023. *China: Global call against renewed crackdown on human rights lawyers*, <https://www.article19.org/resources/china-global-call-against-renewed-crackdown-on-human-rights-lawyers/>.

<sup>13</sup> For a concise overview of the situation in Xinjiang, see: Maizland, Lindsay, 2022. *China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang*, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights>.

Contrary to official Chinese narratives, the camp system in Xinjiang have been characterised as internment and even concentration camps by rights groups, journalists, and the testimony of escaped Uighurs. Evidence of torture, enforced sterilisation, sexual abuse and other human rights abuses has been gathered by such groups, and are used by the Chinese government in a way to eliminate Uighur identity, and therefore, terrorism in Xinjiang. UNOHCHR's assessment of the region, as mentioned in a previous Indicator, has found potential evidence of crimes against humanity in these camps.

The Xinjiang region has become a surveillance state within a surveillance state, with Chinese authorities using cutting-edge technology to monitor every aspect of Uighur lives. This includes the use of biometric data, facial recognition technology, and AI to monitor the population and instances of extremist behaviour. What can constitute extremist behaviour is broad, with Uighurs detained and punished simply by following Islamic practices such as praying and fasting for Ramadan.<sup>14</sup> China has continued to dismiss claims of human rights abuses, claiming operations within Xinjiang are in accordance with international law and international counterterrorism norms.<sup>15</sup>

China has also continued to advocate for counterterrorism efforts bi- and multilaterally. This includes through the UN<sup>16</sup> as well as through regional dialogues with Pakistan and Iran.<sup>17</sup> Their efforts have also included joint counterterror exercises with Pakistan and Tajikistan around the increased instability in Afghanistan following the U.S withdrawal.<sup>18</sup>

China has indeed had problems with extremism and terrorism within Xinjiang, as well as instances of terrorist attacks against Chinese interests in Pakistan and Central Asia. Yet, their broad and intrusive counter-extremism strategy has a 'scorched earth' bent to its implementation, resulting in grave human rights abuses and most likely atrocity crimes.

Enact and implement laws protecting vulnerable groups,

Weak  
Unchanged

There is very little change regarding gender norms and dynamics within China. Sexual and gender-

<sup>14</sup> Maizland, Lindsay, 2022. *China's Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang*; Hale, Erin, 2023. 'China flags Uighurs as "extremist" for having Quran, report says'. *Al Jazeera*, 4 May. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/4/chinas-uyghurs-face-interrogation-for-having-quran-report-says>; Clarke, Michael, 2021. *Turning Ghosts into Humans: Surveillance as an Instrument of Social Engineering in Xinjiang*, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/turning-ghosts-into-humans-surveillance-as-an-instrument-of-social-engineering-in-xinjiang/>. See also: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2022. *Episode 3: China's Approach to Countering Terrorism with Raffaelo Pantucci*, <https://open.spotify.com/embed/episode/0ZXJjDIUUHSxIWJMABs9Co>.

<sup>15</sup> U.S Department of State, 2022. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: China (Hong Kong and Macau)*, 'Countering Violent Extremism', <https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2021/china/>.

<sup>16</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2022. *Remarks by Ambassador Zhang Jun, China's Permanent Representative to the UN, at the Security Council High-Level Debate on "Counter Terrorism in Africa"*, [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjw\\_663304/zwjg\\_665342/zwbd\\_665378/202211/t20221112\\_10973113.html](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjw_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/202211/t20221112_10973113.html).

<sup>17</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2023. *The First Meeting of the China-Pakistan-Iran Trilateral Consultation on Counter-Terrorism and Security Held in Beijing*, [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjbxw/202306/t20230614\\_11096165.html](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202306/t20230614_11096165.html).

<sup>18</sup> U.S Department of State, 2022. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: China (Hong Kong and Macau)*, 'International and Regional Cooperation'.

	<p>particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence.</p>		<p>based violence (SGBV) as well as discrimination and harassment are widespread and seen as commonplace.<sup>19</sup> High profile cases of alleged sexual assault against women by powerful or well-known men have seen the accusers, rather than the accused, be subjected to scrutiny by the judiciary and censorship apparatus on Chinese social media.</p> <p>Likewise, high profile examples of SGBV such as the discovery of a trafficked woman shackled in a village and a violent attack in a restaurant in Tangshan have been downplayed by authorities. The gendered nature of the violence was minimised, with comments and support for the victims being censored.<sup>20</sup></p> <p>A new amendment to the <i>Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests</i> came into effect in 2023, to help "...eliminate gender discrimination in the hiring processes and to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace".<sup>21</sup> While laws and some judicial processes have continued to improve their responses to SGBV in China, the entrenched gendered norms within societal discourse remain a barrier to significant change.</p>
	<p>Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law.</p>	<p>Very Weak <b>Unchanged</b></p>	<p>There is no new information about this Indicator. China does cooperate with the UNHCR office in Beijing, but still does not have a policy or infrastructure in place to deal with refugees and asylum seekers. It continues to send asylum seekers fleeing North Korea back into that country.<sup>22</sup></p>
<p>Domestic Implementation</p>	<p>Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience.</p>	<p>Very Weak <b>Unchanged</b></p>	<p>There is no evidence to suggest China under Xi Jinping has undertaken an assessment of atrocity risk and resilience.</p>
	<p>Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society.</p>	<p>Very Weak <b>Unchanged</b></p>	<p>China remains one of the most repressive States in the world, even more so in the last few years under Xi Jinping's consolidated leadership. Freedoms of assembly, association, religion, and speech are all heavily curtailed and regulated. Dissent, rare as it is, is quickly and emphatically crushed by the authorities, whether in an online environment or physically, as was the case with protests over the government's "zero-COVID" policy.<sup>23</sup></p> <p>The media landscape in China is solely controlled by the State, with widespread online surveillance also limiting online expression and reporting different to the State-approved narrative. Reporters Without Borders places China at 179/180 on its World Press Freedom Index, citing the country as "...the world's largest prison for journalists, and its regime conducts a campaign of repression against</p>

<sup>19</sup> U.S Department of State, 2023. *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)*, 'Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses: Women'.

<sup>20</sup> Stevenson, Alexandra, Zixu Wang, 2022. 'Battling Violence and Censors, Women in China Become "Invisible and Absent"'. *The New York Times*, 6 September. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/06/business/china-women-metoo.html>; Mao, Frances, 2022. 'Tangshan and Xuzhou: Fury and questions over China's treatment of women'. *BBC News*, 24 June. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-61906803>; Wong, Brian, 2022. *The Long Road to Ending Gendered Violence in China*, <https://usali.org/usali-perspectives-blog/the-long-road-to-ending-gendered-violence-in-china>.

<sup>21</sup> Amnesty International, 2023. *China 2022*, 'Women's rights'.

<sup>22</sup> U.S Department of State, 2023. *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)*, 'Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties: e. Protection of Refugees'.

<sup>23</sup> HRW, 2023. *China: Events of 2022*; Freedom House, 2023. *Freedom in the World 2023: China*.

			journalism and the right to information worldwide. <sup>24</sup>
	Ensure a legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector.	Weak Decrease	While the Chinese government does control the operations of the security services, <sup>25</sup> these services carry out pervasive human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests and detentions, disappearances, and torture. Extrajudicial killings were also reported, particularly in Xinjiang, but details are withheld by the government. <sup>26</sup>
	Ensure the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets examples of inclusiveness.	Weak Unchanged	In early 2023, evidence arose of overseas police stations located in a number of countries that are operated by regional police bureaus in China. While ostensibly set up to help international Chinese communities with administrative issues, there is evidence they have been used to harass and intimidate Chinese dissidents and foreign nationals for speaking out against China. <sup>27</sup> Such acts, although denied by the Chinese government, are illegal and show a worrying trend of how far the current Chinese government is willing to go to maintain control over their citizens and international reputation. There is continued efforts to enforce Mandarin as the sole language of China, eroding the usage of other local languages. This is especially common in areas with large ethnic minorities, such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia. <sup>28</sup>
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas.	Fair Unchanged	Academic freedom in China has become non-existent, with “Xi Jinping Thought” overriding any critical academic inquiry. Self-censorship was commonplace, as were instances of students and academics being reported on by government informers if they deviated or were critical of doctrine. This also included students studying overseas and foreign academics. <sup>29</sup> There is little update for this Indicator. China’s efforts, as a non-signatory to the <i>Rome Statute</i> , revolve around Uighur fighters and terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have made diplomatic overtures to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to inhibit the actions of Uighur fighters. <sup>30</sup>
Bilateral and Multilateral Relations	Participate in international, regional, and national discussions	Fair Unchanged	China participated in the 2023 UN General Assembly Plenary Debate on R2P, where they aligned themselves with the Group of Friends of the

<sup>24</sup> Reporters Without Borders, 2023. *China*, <https://rsf.org/en/country/china>.

<sup>25</sup> These services include the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the People’s Armed Police.

<sup>26</sup> U.S Department of State, 2023. *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)*, ‘Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person: A. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings’.

<sup>27</sup> Al Jazeera, 2023. *Investigating China’s Secret Overseas Stations*, <https://www.aljazeera.com/program/101-east/2023/6/1/investigating-chinas-secret-overseas-stations>; Purbrick, Martin, 2023. *The Long Arm of the Law(less): The PRC’s Overseas Police Stations*, <https://jamestown.org/program/the-long-arm-of-the-lawless-the-prcs-overseas-police-stations/>.

<sup>28</sup> Freedom House, 2023. *Freedom in the World 2023: China*, ‘Civil Liberties: D. Freedom of Expression and Belief’; U.S Department of State, 2023. *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)*, ‘Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses: Children’.

<sup>29</sup> See: HRW, 2021. “They Don’t Understand the Fear We Have”: How China’s Long Reach of Repression Undermines Academic Freedom at Australia’s Universities, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/06/30/they-dont-understand-fear-we-have/how-chinas-long-reach-repression-undermines>.

<sup>30</sup> Rakisits, Claude, 2022. *Afghanistan: China’s Challenging Relationship with the Taliban*, <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/afghanistan-chinas-challenging-relationship-taliban/>; Gul, Ayaz, 2023. ‘China Asks Afghanistan’s Taliban to Address Terrorism Worries’. *VOA*, 6 May. Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/china-asks-afghanistan-s-taliban-to-address-neighbors-terrorism-worries/7081901.html>.



on the further advancement of R2P.

Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect.

Weak  
**Unchanged**

Charter of the United Nations. This Group, while supporting atrocity crime prevention in principle, considers R2P to be a divisive principle that undermines the integrity of sovereign States in the international system.<sup>31</sup>

China remains the only permanent Asia Pacific member of the United Nations Security Council. It also is a current member of the UN Human Rights Council until the end of 2023. Outside of the Security Council, it has either abstained or voted against resolutions that reference R2P.

#### UN Security Council Resolutions:<sup>32</sup>

- 2021: S/RES/2605: **abstained**.
- 2021: S/RES/2612: **yes**.
- 2022: S/RES/2625: **abstained**.
- 2022: S/RES/2633: **abstained**.
- 2022: S/RES/2659: **abstained**.
- 2022: S/RES/2666: **yes**.
- 2023: S/RES/2677: **yes**.

#### UN General Assembly Resolutions:<sup>33</sup>

- 2021: Terrorism and human rights A/RES/76/169: **adopted without vote**.
- 2021: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea A/RES/76/177: **adopted without vote**.
- 2021: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/RES/76/228: **no**.
- 2022: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions A/RES/77/218: **abstained**.
- 2022: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea A/RES/77/226: **adopted without vote**.
- 2022: Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar A/RES/77/227: **adopted without vote**.
- 2022: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/RES/77/230: **no**.

#### UN Human Rights Council Resolutions:<sup>34</sup>

- 2021: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/HRC/RES/48/15: **against**.
- 2021: Technical assistance and capacity building in the field of human rights in the Central African Republic A/HRC/RES/48/19: **adopted by consensus**.
- 2022: Advancing human rights in South Sudan A/HRC/RES/49/2: **against**.

<sup>31</sup> GCR2P, 2023. *Summary of the 2023 UN General Assembly Plenary Meeting on the Responsibility to Protect*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/summary-2023-r2p-debate/>.

<sup>32</sup> GCR2P, 2023. *UN Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements Referencing R2P*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/un-security-council-resolutions-and-presidential-statements-referencing-r2p/>. (Voting records for UN resolutions can be found here: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/?ln=en>.)

<sup>33</sup> GCR2P, 2022. *UN General Assembly Resolutions Referencing R2P*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/un-general-assembly-resolutions-referencing-r2p-2/>. (Voting records for UN resolutions can be found here: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/?ln=en>.)

<sup>34</sup> GCR2P, 2023. *UN Human Rights Council Resolutions Referencing R2P*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/un-human-rights-council-resolutions-referencing-r2p/>. (Voting records for UN resolutions can be found here: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/?ln=en>.)

- 2022: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea A/HRC/RES/49/22: **adopted by consensus.**
- 2022: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/HRC/RES/49/27: **against.**
- 2022: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/HR/RES/50/19: **against.**
- 2022: Human rights and transitional justice A/HRC/RES/51/23: **adopted by consensus.**
- 2022: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/HRC/RES/51/26: **against.**
- 2022: Situation of human rights in Burundi A/HRC/RES/51/28: **against.**
- 2022: Technical assistance and capacity-building in the field of human rights in the Central African Republic A/HRC/RES/51/37: **adopted by consensus.**
- 2023: Advancing human rights in South Sudan A/HRC/RES/52/1: **against.**
- 2023: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea A/HRC/RES/52/28: **adopted by consensus.**
- 2023: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/HRC/RES/52/30: **against.**

Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging and ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy.

Weak  
**Unchanged**

China continues to assist States in its near abroad to manage and contain security issues that affect China, yet these are not conducted with atrocity prevention in mind. China’s aid to Myanmar’s junta comes with the caveat of stamping out transborder crime impacting Chinese citizens.<sup>35</sup> Yet they have also kept ties with several militia groups to persuade them to stymie support for pro-democracy forces in the country.<sup>36</sup> As such, Chinese influence in Myanmar has done little to stop violence and atrocity crimes being committed against the civilian population.<sup>37</sup>

China has continued to engage with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in their struggle against Uighur militants and Islamic State, as both groups have the potential to impact Chinese security. Again, while humanitarian aid is provided, most aid involves economic development, including bringing Afghanistan into the Belt and Road Initiative.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Tower, Jason, 2023. *China’s Metastasizing Myanmar Problem*, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/07/chinas-metastasizing-myanmar-problem>.

<sup>36</sup> Freeman, Carla et al. 2023. *Five Takeaways from China’s Latest Diplomacy*, ‘4. China is no longer hedging in Myanmar’s civil war’, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/05/five-takeaways-chinas-latest-diplomacy>.

<sup>37</sup> Such crimes have been carried out by Tatmadaw personnel utilising Chinese and Russian weapon systems. Reuters, 2023. ‘UN expert says Russia, China, sending deadly aid to Myanmar’s military’. *ABC News*, 18 May. Available at: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-05-18/china-russia-aid-myanmar-military-un-report-says/102361482>.

<sup>38</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2023. *China’s Position on the Afghan Issue*, [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx\\_662805/202304/t20230412\\_11057785.html](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202304/t20230412_11057785.html); Bloomberg, 2023. ‘China’s Belt and Road to enter Afghanistan in Taliban’s victory’. *The Japan Times*, 7 May. Available at: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/05/07/world/taliban-china-aid/>.

			According to leaked U.S intelligence reports, China has agreed to secretly provide “lethal aid” to Russia to use in its ongoing war against Ukraine. <sup>39</sup> While no evidence suggests it has done so (at time of writing), that it continues to defend Russian aggression and the commission of war crimes against Ukrainians bodes ill for its support of international atrocity prevention.
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention.	Weak Unchanged	No evidence could be found that offered a significant update for this Indicator. China’s positions of influence in international and regional organisations appears to have less to do with atrocity prevention and more to do with furthering its global influence in an unstable and multipolar world. <sup>40</sup> While potentially beneficial in some respects, its track record on human rights and its authoritarian governance structure could foster an erosion of safeguards that prevent atrocity crimes.
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations.	Fair Unchanged	There is no new evidence for this Indicator. While China continues to engage with regional bodies and its Belt and Road Initiative, it does so primarily to further its strategic geopolitical goals and to compete with the United States. China has been effective in brokering talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia, <sup>41</sup> and developing closer ties with Southeast Asian countries, <sup>42</sup> albeit primarily on a bilateral basis, rather than through ASEAN. China’s direct involvement with the military junta in Myanmar shows a willingness to bypass ASEAN’s efforts to foster peace through regional consensus.
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities.	Very Weak Unchanged	There was no new evidence found for this Indicator.
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships.	Weak Unchanged	China continues to provide humanitarian aid to many countries globally. This includes aid in areas such as health and education, <sup>43</sup> yet there is no specific mention of atrocity prevention measures. A recent promise of China to implement a system cataloguing its development aid <sup>44</sup> could be useful in the future to determine how much of what aid it gives to recipient countries.
United Nations, prevention, Peacekeeping, and assistance	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P.	Weak Unchanged	No new information could be found for this Indicator. While China continues to support R2P in principle, it has continued to shape discussions around the norm to matters of State sovereignty and ensuring any atrocity prevention measures have the consent of the host government. <sup>45</sup> Such a stance is

<sup>39</sup> DeYoung, Karen, Missy Ryan, 2023. ‘Russia says China agreed to secretly provide weapons, leaked documents show’. *The Washington Post*, 13 April. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/13/russia-china-weapons-leaked-documents-discord/>.

<sup>40</sup> For an expansive overview, see: Council on Foreign Relations, n.d. *China’s Approach to Global Governance*, <https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/>.

<sup>41</sup> John, Oliver B, 2023. *China takes centre stage in Middle East diplomacy*, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/04/11/china-takes-centre-stage-in-middle-east-diplomacy/>; Iqtait, Anas, Nasser Khmour, 2023. *China’s Growing Role in Middle East Diplomacy: Navigating Regional Tensions*, <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/chinas-growing-role-in-middle-east-diplomacy-navigating-regional-tensions/>.

<sup>42</sup> Chong Ja, Ian, et al. 2023. *Has Xi’s Diplomacy been Effective in Southeast Asia?*, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/04/06/has-xi-s-diplomacy-been-effective-in-southeast-asia-pub-89472>.

<sup>43</sup> Yuan, Jingdong, Fei Su, Xuwan Ouyang, 2022. *China’s Evolving Approach to Foreign Aid*, p. 17 – 20, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/sipripp62.pdf>.

<sup>44</sup> Mandon, Pierre, Martha Tesfaye Woldemichael, 2023. *Has Chinese aid benefited recipient countries?*, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/has-chinese-aid-benefited-recipient-countries/>.

<sup>45</sup> Foot, Rosemary, 2021. *Beijing’s Official Perspectives on R2P: It’s the State That Needs Supporting*, <https://ecr2p.leeds.ac.uk/beijings-official-perspectives-on-r2p-its-the-state-that-needs-supporting/>.

		problematic in places where the government is the main perpetrator of atrocity crimes.
Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system.	Very Weak Unchanged	There is evidence that China undermines the UN's idea of human rights for its own interpretation. This includes determining UN human rights reports to be politically motivated through an anti-China bias. <sup>46</sup> As such, they do not actively support the UN's role in strengthening human rights and atrocity prevention.
Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes.	Very Weak Unchanged	There is no evidence to suggest China supports preventive measures for atrocity crimes beyond a vague rhetorical level.
Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping operations (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate).	Strong Unchanged	China currently has 2,273 personnel deployed on nine UN peacekeeping operations. <sup>47</sup> The majority are deployed to South Sudan on UNMISS, which has a protection of civilians mandate.
Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping.	Fair Unchanged	China continues to develop peacekeeping capabilities through the UN by hosting forums with other peacekeeper-contributing countries and UN initiatives that strengthen peacekeeper mandates and their personal safety during deployments. <sup>48</sup>
Support the Kigali Principles.	Very Weak Unchanged	There is no update for this Indicator.
Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention.	Very Weak Unchanged	There is no update for this Indicator. As a permanent member of the UNSC, China does not support UNSC veto restraint.

<sup>46</sup> China also initially tried to prevent the publication of the UNOHCHR report into Xinjiang (see previous Indicator). Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, 2021. *Joint statement of 68 countries at the Interactive Dialogue on High Commissioner's annual report at the 47<sup>th</sup> session of the Human Rights Council*, [http://geneva.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/dbdt/202106/t20210624\\_9103595.htm](http://geneva.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/dbdt/202106/t20210624_9103595.htm); International Service for Human Rights, 2022. *China: analysis against the 'objective criteria' for Human Rights Council action*, <https://ishr.ch/defenders-toolbox/resources/china-analysis-against-the-objective-criteria-for-human-rights-council-action/>.

<sup>47</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, 2023. *Troop and Police Contributors*, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>. (China can be selected from the drop-down menu.)

<sup>48</sup> Fung, Courtney J., 2023. *China's Small Steps into UN Peacekeeping Are Adding Up*, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2023/05/chinas-small-steps-into-un-peacekeeping-are-adding-up/>; Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, 2023. *Remarks by Ambassador Dai Bing at the General Debate of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, [http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/chinaandun/202302/t20230222\\_11029285.htm](http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/chinaandun/202302/t20230222_11029285.htm).