



INDONESIA

UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF R2P
IMPLEMENTATION 2023



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INDONESIA

Although declining since its assessment in 2022, Indonesia is still a relatively strong implementer of R2P. It performs strongest in relation to its own track record in reducing atrocity crimes and their risks, the establishment of a relatively robust domestic human rights regime overseen by a National Human Rights Commission, and in its contribution to multilateral efforts to protect civilians through UN peacekeeping and support for greater activism by the UN Security Council. In terms of human rights, the Indonesian Constitution and sector-specific regulations prohibit discrimination and ensures citizens equal rights and equal access to judicial institutions. Indonesian civil society is one of the largest and most active in the region.

However, there is evidence that civic space is decreasing. Critically, the situation in West Papua remains serious. In West Papua, human rights violations, including potential atrocity crimes, remain common.

Human rights defenders, particularly those that speak out against corruption and West Papua, are subject to harassment by the security forces and through the use of defamation laws and other intimidation tactics. The Sexual Violence Prevention Bill was also taken off the government's priority list in 2021.

Further, there remain significant gaps in Indonesia's commitment to international law. In particular, it has not yet ratified the Genocide Convention, Geneva Protocols, Refugee Convention, Arms Trade Treaty, or the Rome Statute. This constitutes a significant protection gap.

Indonesia is particularly strong in foreign assistance and peacekeeping; the State has formed partnerships with others for technical assistance and capacity-building purposes, and continues to be one of the most significant contributors to peacekeeping in the region, contributing to nearly all of the peacekeeping missions that have had a protection of civilians mandate.

Whilst Indonesia has not overtly invested in tools to encourage states to fulfil their responsibility to protect, it has played a constructive human protection role in mediating a number of conflict situations in the past, and has continued to undertake limited efforts in regards to the violence in Myanmar post-coup.

Like many governments, Indonesia is weakest when it comes to the adoption of explicit policy mechanisms to support the implementation of R2P. It has failed to appoint a Focal Point despite calls for one to be appointed. Despite its strong peacekeeping record, it is not yet a signatory to the Kigali Principles.

Its index score has dropped by two points compared to 2022.

Thematic Area	Indicator	Assessment	Notes
Basic Compliance	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes.	Fair Decrease	Indonesia remains a regional power in the Asia Pacific, and its recent stint in the UN Security Council and UN Human Rights Council has allowed it to showcase its international commitments to peace, security, and human rights. The country remains a democracy, yet observers and civil society organisations within the country have pointed out the decline in human rights protections in recent years, ¹ particularly during the pandemic. Credible reports also detail serious human rights abuses in the conflict in Papua, Central Papua, Highland Papua, South Papua, and West Papua Provinces, including “unlawful civilian deaths or harm, torture, and physical abuses”. ² Human rights violations and potential atrocity crimes also remain an issue in the provinces of Papua and West Papua. Despite these problems, overall the majority of Indonesians are protected from the commission of atrocity crimes.
	Reduction of atrocity crime risks.	Very Strong Unchanged	Despite its current democratic backsliding and human rights record, the risk of widespread atrocities occurring in Indonesia at present remains low.
	Dealing with past atrocities.	Weak Unchanged	There is little update of Indonesia reconciling with its past crimes and atrocities, particularly the killings of communists in the 1960s. Indonesia’s actions in West Papua remain contentious as well, with little concrete action take to investigate past killings, despite calls from civil society to do so. ³
Policy Mechanisms	Appoint national R2P Focal Point.	Very Weak Unchanged	Indonesia is yet to appoint an official to act as the country’s R2P Focal Point, ⁴ despite calls in the past by civil society organisations for one to be appointed.
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships.	Very Weak Unchanged	There is no evidence of Indonesia incorporating atrocity crime risk dynamics into conflict analysis or development assistance. Indeed, in response to atrocity crimes committed against the Rohingya in Myanmar, Indonesia did little to pressure Myanmar’s government into upholding its R2P. Instead, the country took a ‘soft’ diplomatic approach to the crisis, placing an emphasis on humanitarian assistance to Rohingya communities and maintaining dialogue with the military regime. While this enabled Indonesia to act in accordance

¹ Epa, Konradus, 2021. ‘Widodo criticized for rights violations in Indonesia’. *UCA News*, 21 October. Available at: <https://www.ucanews.com/news/widodo-criticized-for-rights-violations-in-indonesia/94647>.

² U.S Department of State, 2023. *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Indonesia*, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/415610_INDONESIA-2022-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf.

³ Harson, Siktus, 2021. ‘New hope dawns for justice over Indonesia’s past crimes’. *UCA News*, 3 December. Available at: <https://www.ucanews.com/news/new-hope-dawns-for-justice-over-indonesias-past-crimes/95208>; KontraS, 2021. *Briefing note on selected human rights issues in Indonesia*, <https://kontras.org/en/2021/05/25/briefing-note-on-selected-human-rights-issues-in-indonesia/>.

⁴ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), 2020. *Members of the Global Network of R2P Focal Points*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/members-of-the-global-network-of-r2p-focal-points/>.

			with the ‘ASEAN Way’, it has drawn criticism from domestic human rights groups and was at odds with the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation, which was pushing for greater measures to prevent atrocities against the Rohingya. ⁵
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect.	Very Weak Unchanged	There are no domestic mechanisms within Indonesia that make the government accountable for upholding R2P. A pervasive culture of impunity and lack of political capital in dealing with past atrocities, which has existed within Indonesia for years, leaves little room for accountability for human rights or atrocity prevention. ⁶
International Human Rights Obligations	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law.	Fair Unchanged	Indonesia remains a signatory to seven of the twelve key human rights treaties relevant to R2P, with no further updates on the other five. The treaties it has not signed or ratified are the <i>Geneva Protocol I</i> , the <i>Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide</i> , the <i>Arms Trade Treaty</i> [ATT], the <i>1951 Refugee Convention</i> and its <i>1967 Protocol</i> , and the <i>Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court</i> .
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court.	Very Weak Unchanged	Indonesia remains neither a signatory nor State party to the <i>Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court</i> . ⁷ There is no cooperation between the country and the ICC, and there are no signs that the country will sign the <i>Rome Statute</i> anytime soon. ⁸
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles.	Very Strong Unchanged	Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) maintains its ‘A’ accreditation ranking according to GANHRI. ⁹
	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on the elimination of discrimination.	Weak Decreased	In January 2023, Indonesia signed into law a new criminal code. The law is due to come into effect in 2026, and may seriously imperil rights to freedom of speech, belief, and association, as well as the rights of women, religious minorities and LGBTQI+ people. ¹⁰ Freedoms of expression, assembly, association, and movement were generally respected by Indonesian authorities, with the exception of those in Papua and West Papua, where human rights violations, including potential atrocity crimes, remain

⁵ Why Indonesia decided to act in a more neutral way, despite strong calls for intervention in the name of Muslim solidarity, is due to a range of competing factors that influenced the country’s reaction from the grassroots to the international level. For an in-depth discussion on Indonesia’s approach to the Rohingya crisis in the context of R2P, see: Smith, Claire Q., and Susannah G. Williams, 2021. ‘Why Indonesia Adopted “Quiet Diplomacy” over R2P in the Rohingya Crisis: The Roles of Islamic Humanitarianism, Civil-Military Relations, and ASEAN’. *Global Responsibility to Protect*, vol. 13, no. 2-3, p. 1-28, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350014881_Why_Indonesia_Adopted_'Quiet_Diplomacy'_over_R2P_in_the_Rohingya_Crisis_The_Roles_of_Islamic_Humanitarianism_Civil-Military_Relations_and_ASEAN; cf. Frederika, Maria, 2021. ‘R2P in Indonesia’s Response towards the Myanmar Crisis’. *kontekstual*, August 2021. Available at: <https://kontekstual.com/r2p-in-indonesias-response-towards-the-myanmar-crisis/>.

⁶ KontraS, 2021. *Policy Brief: Indonesia’s Cherry-picking Stance on Responsibility to Protect*, <https://kontras.org/2021/06/09/policy-brief-indonesias-cherry-picking-stance-on-responsibility-to-protect-2/>.

⁷ International Criminal Court (ICC), n.d. *The States Parties to the Rome Statute*, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx#I.

⁸ Chatham House, 2018. *Recommitting to International Criminal Justice and Human Rights in Indonesia*, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2018/04/recommitting-international-criminal-justice-and-human-rights-indonesia>; Parliamentarians for Global Action, 2022. *Indonesia and the Rome Statute*, <https://www.pgaction.org/ilhr/rome-statute/indonesia.html>.

⁹ This means Komnas HAM is fully compliant with the Paris Principles. Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), 2021. *Members*, <https://ganhri.org/membership/>.

¹⁰ Human Rights Watch, 2024. *Indonesia: Events of 2023*, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/indonesia>.

common.¹¹ Indonesia's actions in West Papua remain a point of contention across the whole country, with much of Indonesia's human rights criticisms emanating from the actions it has undertaken in those provinces.¹²

Participate in international peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the UN Human Rights Council.

Strong
Unchanged

Indonesia passed the periodic monitoring of the promotion of human rights on November 9, 2022, in the fourth UPR round session, where the Indonesian Government reported on its recent achievements in fulfilling human rights. Notably, they mentioned the passing of the Omnibus Law on the Job Creation Law, the Sexual Violence Crime Act, infrastructure development and an increased budget for autonomous areas in Papua, as well as their handling of COVID-19.

However, Indonesia's report was broadly criticised in the review, with seven states explicitly raising the issue of West Papua, and nine raising tangential issues without explicit reference to West Papua.¹³

It has four reports regarding UN treaties that it is party to that are overdue, down from six. They pertain to the CAT, CERD, and optional protocols for the CRC.¹⁴

Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations.

Strong
Unchanged

There remains no standing invitation given by Indonesia to UN mandate holders to visit the country. While a significant number of previous visits by Special Rapporteurs have been fulfilled, the majority are yet to be enacted.¹⁵

Ensure equal access to justice.

Strong
Unchanged

While Indonesia's constitution and laws provide broad provisions for equal access to justice, fair public trials and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, exceptions have been noted by local observers. Judges and judiciaries are susceptible to corruption and other forms of misconduct, and this has impaired proper judicial procedures.¹⁶

There are also some accounts of excessive force by police during detention and interrogation of suspects.

Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Fair
Unchanged

There is no evidence of progress on further criminalisation of the four atrocity crimes within Indonesia as they are set out in international law. *Law 26/2000* on the Human Rights Court maintains

¹¹ UN News, 2020. *UN human rights office worried by killings in Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua*, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/11/1078832>; CIVICUS, 2018. *West Papua, Indonesia: Failure to implement human rights protections in law contributes to violations*, <https://www.civicus.org/index.php/fr/medias-ressources/122-news/interviews/3417-west-papua-indonesia-failure-to-implement-human-rights-protections-in-law-contributes-to-violations>; Minority Rights Group International, 2021. *Civil Society Condemns Human Rights Violations against Indigenous Peoples in West Papua*, <https://minorityrights.org/2021/06/18/west-papua/>.

¹² For more context on the conflict between Indonesia and Papua/West Papua, and the ongoing insurgency, see: Sara, Sally, Anne Worthington and Victor Mambor, 2020. 'The battle for West Papuan independence from Indonesia has intensified with deadly results'. *ABC News*, 12 May. Available at: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-12/west-papua-secret-war-with-indonesia-for-independence/12227966>; Tasevski, Olivia, 2021. 'Indonesia Can't Quell West Papua's Growing Independence Movement'. *Foreign Policy*, 18 October. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/west-papua-indonesia-jokowi-independence-movement-human-rights/>.

¹³ Human Rights Monitor, 2023. *Human Rights Council Calls for Access to West Papua during UPR*, <https://humanrightsmonitor.org/news/human-rights-council-calls-for-access-to-west-papua-during-upr-2/>.

¹⁴ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNOHCHR), n.d. *Late and non-reporting States*, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/LateReporting.aspx.

¹⁵ UNOHCHR, n.d. *View Country visits by Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council since 1998*, <https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewCountryVisits.aspx?visitType=all&country=IDN&Lang=en>.

¹⁶ U.S Department of State, 2021. *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Indonesia*, 'Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:'.
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genocide and crimes against humanity as “massive human rights violations”,¹⁷ with no mention of war crimes or ethnic cleansing.

Regarding war crimes, while some provisions of the *Geneva Conventions* have been incorporated into the *Military Law Code* to cover them, there appears to be no legislation to cover war crimes in non-international armed conflicts.¹⁸

As mentioned in a previous Indicator, Indonesia has not signed or ratified the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*.

Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism.

Strong
Unchanged

Indonesia plays host to many extremist groups and has a long history of terrorist attacks being committed on its territory. Therefore, the country has a robust counter-extremism and counter-terrorism apparatus. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the Bali Bombings, Indonesia’s responses focused on the security and judicial sectors, increasing training of police and military personnel and enlarging cooperation with Australia and the US, among others, to gather data and intelligence on terror threats.¹⁹

In the following decade, it has developed community outreach and deradicalization programs to counter homegrown terror threats stemming from the influence of ISIS. In early 2021 the country unveiled the National Plan of Action on Countering Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism (NAP CVE), a strategic plan to oversee all aspects of Indonesia’s counterterrorism response. The NAP CVE is comprehensive in its response and appears to largely be an improvement on previous action by the Indonesian government.²⁰

Enact and implement laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence.

Weak
Decrease

While national laws criminalise different types of sexual violence and local NGOs offer assistance and monitoring services, sexual violence remains a problem in Indonesia. *The Sexual Violence Prevention Bill*, first proposed in 2016, was taken off parliament’s priority list in July 2021. This occurred after women’s rights groups in the country reported instances of domestic violence increasing during pandemic lockdowns.²¹

Aspects of sexual and gender-based violence, such as sexual harassment, female genital mutilation, and discrimination and violence against LGBTIQ+

¹⁷ Ministry of Law and Human Rights, n.d. *Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 26 of 2000 on Human Rights Court*, Article 7-9’, <https://peraturan.go.id/common/dokumen/terjemah/2019/UU%2026%202000%20English.pdf>.

¹⁸ Parliamentarians for Global Action, 2022. *Indonesia and the Rome Statute*.

¹⁹ Counter Extremism Project, 2022. *Indonesia: Extremism and Terrorism*, ‘Overview’, <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/indonesia>.

²⁰ Counter Extremism Project, 2022. *Indonesia: Extremism and Terrorism*, ‘Domestic Counter-Extremism’; Hiraswari Gayatri, Irine, 2021. *Indonesia’s NAP CVE as an Instrument of a Gendered Non-Traditional Security Approach in Indo Pacific*,

<https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/indonesias-nap-cve-as-an-instrument-of-a-gendered-non-traditional-security-approach-in-indo-pacific/>; Laksmi, Sylvia, 2021. *Revisiting Indonesian counterterrorism strategies: success and challenges*, <https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/insights/revisiting-indonesian-counterterrorism-strategies-success-and-challenges>;

Sumpter, Cameron and Joseph Franco, 2021. *Islamist Militancy in Indonesia and the Philippines: Domestic Lineage and Sporadic Foreign Influence*, <https://icct.nl/publication/islamist-militancy-in-indonesia-and-the-philippines-domestic-lineage-and-sporadic-foreign-influence/>.

²¹ HRW, 2021. *Indonesia: Events of 2020*, ‘Women’s Rights’; Amnesty International, 2021. *Indonesia 2020*, ‘Women’s rights’.

	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law.	Fair Unchanged	<p>persons, remain widespread.²² Further, the government does not always enforce laws prohibiting rape and domestic abuse effectively – sentences are often light, and “many rapists received the minimum sentence”.²³</p> <p>Indonesia has still yet to sign the <i>1951 Refugee Convention</i> and its <i>1967 Protocol</i>. In 2016, <i>Presidential Regulation 125</i> was passed that sought to close the regulatory gap in Indonesia’s refugee law. Article 9 of the Regulation stipulates that if refugees are in danger, then they must be taken to the nearest port or shore and given medical attention if needed.²⁴</p> <p>This Regulation was called into question following the arrival of a boat full of Rohingya refugees off the shores of Aceh province in December 2021. The authorities cited concerns over COVID-19 infections, and after initially planning to hand over supplies and send their boat back into international waters, the refugees were eventually settled due to outcry from the local population and NGOs.</p> <p>While the actions of Indonesian authorities were welcomed by local advocates and the UNHCR, Indonesia’s capacity and legislative framework for accepting and processing refugees requires further work to be truly comprehensive.²⁵</p>
Domestic Implementation	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience.	Very Weak Unchanged	No evidence of a national assessment carried out in Indonesia could be found.
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society.	Weak Decrease	<p>Indonesia’s civil society sector has been traditionally vibrant and was effective against the Suharto regime and supported Indonesia’s eventual turn to democracy in the 1990s. Yet the effectiveness of civil society within Indonesia has declined due to increased polarisation of civil society organisations and continued illiberal tendencies of the Indonesian government.²⁶ The establishment of laws neutralising the country’s anti-corruption body (the KPK) is one recent example of the decline in Indonesia’s once effective civil society sector.²⁷</p> <p>Freedom of expression and communication is generally respected in Indonesia and like the civil society sector, the media in Indonesia is traditionally active and holds a variety of views.</p>

²² U.S Department of State, 2023. *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Indonesia*, ‘Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses’, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/415610_INDONESIA-2022-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ refworld, 2016. *Indonesia: Regulation of the President of the Republic of Indonesia No. 125 Year 2016 Concerning the Handling of Foreign Refugees*, ‘Article 9’, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/58aeec374.html>.

²⁵ Strangio, Sebastian, 2021. ‘Following Outcry, Indonesia Allows Rohingya Refugee Boat to Land’. *The Diplomat*, 30 December. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/following-outcry-indonesia-allows-rohingya-refugee-boat-to-land/>; Llewellyn, Aisyah, 2021. ‘Rohingya refugees brought ashore after dramatic Indonesia rescue’. *Aljazeera*, 31 December. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/31/rohingya-refugees-brought-ashore-in-indonesia-after-navy-rescue>.

²⁶ See: Mietzner, Marcus, 2020. ‘Sources of resistance to democratic decline: Indonesian civil society and its trials’. *Democratization*, vol. 28, no. 1, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2020.1796649>.

²⁷ Ibid., Transparency International, 2021. *Dismissals Following Controversial Civics Test Further Weaken Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Agency KPK*, <https://www.transparency.org/en/press/dismissals-controversial-civics-test-further-weaken-indonesia-anti-corruption-agency-kpk>; see also: Mulholland, Jeremy, and Zainal Arifin Mochtar, 2021. *Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission in dire straits*, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/03/16/indonesias-corruption-eradication-commission-in-dire-straits/>.

			Human rights defenders, particularly those that speak out against corruption and West Papua, are subject to harassment by the security forces and through the use of defamation laws and other intimidation tactics. ²⁸
	Ensure a legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector.	Fair Unchanged	There is no update in security sector reform in Indonesia, and while both the police and armed forces are under civilian control, there were numerous accounts of abuses. These include instances in West Papua, but also in arrest procedures and judicial misconduct regarding detainees. ²⁹
	Ensure the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets examples of inclusiveness.	Fair Unchanged	Indonesia's education system, while having steadily improved over the last few decades, is still of relatively poor quality, despite wide access to schools for much of the population. ³⁰
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas.	Weak Unchanged	Like within many other countries, students and teachers within Indonesia struggled with online learning during the pandemic due to a lack of capacity in internet access and resources. ³¹
			Indonesia's reticence in signing the <i>Rome Statute</i> means the country has little legislation in place to prevent and convict citizens that commit atrocities overseas. The Trilateral Cooperative Agreement Indonesia has with the Philippines and Malaysia is still in place and is used to help curb the movement of Islamist fighters and terrorists. Yet, there is criticism that the Agreement could do much more to prevent such movement in within the region. ³²
Bilateral and Multilateral Relations	Participate in international, regional, and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P.	Strong Unchanged	Civil society groups within Indonesia participated in workshops and discussions related to R2P and the commission of atrocity crimes. These included exploring the role of parliamentarians in protecting religious freedoms ³³ and developing an atrocity prevention mechanism at the national level. ³⁴
			Indonesia also hosted the third annual meeting of the civil society consortium the Asia Pacific Partnership for Atrocity Prevention (APPAP), ³⁵ of which multiple Indonesian civil society organisations are members.

²⁸ Amnesty International, 2021. *Indonesia 2020*, 'Human rights defenders'; UNOHCHR, 2021. *Indonesia: Stop judicial harassment of human rights defenders – UN expert*,

<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27867&LangID=E>.

²⁹ U.S Department of State, 2021. *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Indonesia*, 'Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:'. See also: Lowry, Bob, 2016. *The puzzle of security sector reform in Indonesia*,

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/puzzle-security-sector-reform-indonesia/>.

³⁰ Reasons for this are given here: Rosser, Andrew, 2018. *Beyond Access: Making Indonesia's Education System Work*, 'Proximate Causes of Poor Educational Quality and Learning Outcomes in Indonesia',

<https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/beyond-access-making-indonesia-s-education-system-work#sec34441>.

³¹ Pradana, Mahir, and Syarifuddin Syarifuddin, 2021. *The Struggle Is Real: Constraints of Online Education in Indonesia During the COVID-19 Pandemic*, <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/feduc.2021.753776/full>.

³² Constraints on the Agreement include border disputes and the continued priority of the affected countries to dealing with Chinese actions in the South China Sea. See: Yeo Yaoren, Kenneth, Rueben Ananthan Santhana Dass and Jasminder Singh, 2021. *Maritime Malice in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines: The Asymmetric Maritime Threat at the Tri-Border Area*, <https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/04/maritime-terrorism-southeast-asia-policy-brief.pdf>.

³³ Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (APR2P), 2019. *The Role of Parliamentarians in Protecting Religious Freedom and Beliefs in Anticipating the Risk Factors to Mass Atrocities in Indonesia*, https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/4294/spotlight_dec2019_issue62_indonesia_MPs_dialogue.pdf.

³⁴ APR2P, 2021. *Towards a National Network for the Prevention of Social Conflict and Atrocity Crimes in Indonesia*, https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/6437/spotlight_apr2021_NationalNetwork_dialogue.pdf.

³⁵ APR2P, 2020. *APPAP Third Annual Meeting Jakarta 2019*, https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/5048/spotlight_jan2020_issue64_3rd_APPAP_meeting_jakarta.pdf.

Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect.

Fair
Unchanged

As mentioned in a previous Indicator, Indonesia's response to Myanmar's coup and the ensuing violence has been in line with the ASEAN philosophy of non-interference and mutual consensus. However, the country was crucial, along with Malaysia, in setting up a special meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers to discuss the crisis³⁶ and in the development of that body's five-point consensus that attempted to alleviate it.³⁷

UN General Assembly Resolutions:³⁸

Indonesia has voted upon the following resolutions in the General Assembly that referenced R2P. It has abstained from voting for all of them, except for A/RES/75/277 to which it voted no. This resolution called for R2P to be included on the annual agenda of the UN General Assembly.³⁹

- 2021: Terrorism and human rights A/RES/76/169: **adopted without vote.**
- 2021: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea A/RES/76/177: **adopted without vote.**
- 2021: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/RES/76/228: **abstain.**
- 2022: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions A/RES/77/218: **abstain.**
- 2022: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea A/RES/77/226: **adopted without vote.**
- 2022: Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar A/RES/77/227: **adopted without vote.**
- 2022: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/RES/77/230: **abstain.**

Indonesia has been elected to the Human Rights Council for 2024; this is its sixth term. It received the highest number of votes among all regions' candidates.⁴⁰ Human rights activists have expressed disappointment over the election of Indonesia,

³⁶ See: Strangio, Sebastian, 2021. 'Indonesia Leading ASEAN Push on Myanmar Coup'. *The Diplomat*, 18 February. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/indonesia-leading-asean-push-on-myanmar-coup/>; Takahashi, Toru, 2021. 'Indonesia ramps up diplomacy to solve Myanmar crisis'. *Nikkei Asia*, 11 March. Available at: <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/Indonesia-ramps-up-diplomacy-to-solve-Myanmar-crisis>; Arshad, Arlina, 2021. 'Indonesia president Jokowi calls for high-level Asean meeting to discuss Myanmar crisis'. *The Straits Times*, 20 March. Available at: <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-president-jokowi-calls-for-asean-high-level-meeting-on-myanmar-crisis>.

³⁷ Drajat, Gibran Mahesa, 2021. *The Indonesia factor in ASEAN's response to Myanmar*, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/05/21/the-indonesia-factor-in-aseans-response-to-myanmar/>.

³⁸ GCR2P, 2021. *UN General Assembly Resolutions Referencing R2P*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/un-general-assembly-resolutions-referencing-r2p-2/>. (Voting records for each resolution were accessed using the UN's Digital Library: General Assembly of the United Nations, n.d. *Voting Records*, <https://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/voting.asp>.)

³⁹ Indonesia insists their vote is procedural rather than conceptual, and the government maintains support for the principle. See: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, New York, 2021. *The Responsibility to Protect and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity*, <https://kemlu.go.id/newyork-un/en/news/13187/the-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-prevention-of-genocide-war-crimes-ethnic-cleansing-and-crimes-against-humanity>; cf. Wicaksana, I Gede Wahyu, 2021. *What's behind Indonesia's opposition to R2P?*, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/07/15/whats-behind-indonesias-opposition-to-r2p/>.

⁴⁰ Ayudiana, Shofi, 2023. 'Indonesia regains seat in UN Human Rights Council'. *Antara*, 11 October. Available at: <https://en.antaranews.com/news/295839/indonesia-regains-seat-in-un-human-rights-council>.

arguing that their rights record concerning Papua, as well as failure to protect the rights of minority groups and civil liberties more generally, should make them ineligible for membership.⁴¹

Indonesia previously began its fifth term on the Human Rights Council in 2020 (until 2022).⁴² It abstained from voting on all resolutions referencing R2P.

	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging and ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy.	Fair Unchanged	Efforts by Indonesia to curb the violence in Myanmar have been primarily through talks with ASEAN, rather than bilateral. The government, along with much of ASEAN, has placed a priority on dialogue and working with the military junta to stop the violence and ensure a return to peace. ⁴³
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention.	Fair Improve	Actions by the Indonesian government at the UN and more regionally suggest they remain cautious about the implementation of R2P and the furthering discussions of the norm.
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations.	Weak Improve	No updated information could be found on Indonesia strengthening regional organisations.
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities.	Fair Unchanged	Indonesia maintains its preference for pursuing its foreign policy through ASEAN, and Indonesian civil society groups are active dialogue partners with APPAP and APR2P.
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships.	Fair Unchanged	Indonesia has development partnerships with a variety of entities, including Australia – with a budget estimate of \$265.7 million for 2022-2023 ⁴⁴ – and the World Bank. The World Bank has developed a new Country Partnership Framework with Indonesia for 2021-2025, to help it recover from the pandemic. ⁴⁵
			No measures directly mentioned atrocity prevention.
United Nations, prevention, Peacekeeping, and assistance	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P.	Fair Unchanged	No updated evidence could be found of Indonesia either being for or against the workings of the Office.
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system.	Fair Unchanged	While it has actively voted for resolutions that reference R2P in the Security Council, Indonesia was the only ASEAN country to vote 'no' for Resolution A/RES/75/277, which sought to place

⁴¹ Idrus, Pizaro Gozali, 2023. 'Activists object as Indonesia is again elected to UN Human Rights Council'. *Benar News*, 11 October. Available at: <https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/activists-unhappy-human-rights-council-membership-10112023134233.html>.

⁴² For context on Indonesia's appointment, see: Rakhmat, Muhammad Zulfikar, Ramadha Valentine and Dimas Permadi, 2019. 'With a UN Human Rights Council seat, Indonesia has a choice'. *The Interpreter*, 29 October. Available at: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/with-un-human-rights-council-seat-indonesia-has-choice>; Karim, Moch Faisal, 2020. 'Why Indonesia's human rights advocacy at the United Nations is often inconsistent and half-hearted'. *The Conversation*, 24 July. Available at: <https://theconversation.com/why-indonesias-human-rights-advocacy-at-the-united-nations-is-often-inconsistent-and-half-hearted-143005>.

⁴³ See: Aljazeera, 2021. 'ASEAN demands "immediate cessation of violence" in Myanmar'. *Aljazeera*, 24 April. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/24/myanmar-coup-leader-in-jakarta-for-southeast-asian-summit>; Lee, Hui Ling, 2021. 'Myanmar coup: ASEAN's quite diplomacy is more constructive'. *The Interpreter*, 22 March. Available at: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-coup-asean-s-quiet-diplomacy-more-constructive>.

⁴⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2023. Australia's development partnership in Indonesia, <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/development-assistance/development-assistance-in-indonesia>.

⁴⁵ The World Bank, 2021. *Indonesia: New Country Partnership Framework to Focus on Economic Recovery and Long-Term Growth*, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/05/11/indonesia-new-country-partnership-framework-to-focus-on-economic-recovery-and-long-term-growth>.

		discussions of furthering R2P on the General Assembly's annual agenda.
Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes.	Strong Unchanged	Indonesia maintains broad support for the prevention of atrocities. As mentioned in a previous Indicator, civil society and other agents within Indonesia agreed to establish a network to prevent social conflict and atrocity crimes at a national level. ⁴⁶
Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping operations (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate).	Very Strong Unchanged	Indonesia remains committed to peacekeeping, with over 2629 personnel deployed for current peacekeeping missions. ⁴⁷ Indonesia's role in peacekeeping has been well regarded by officials in the UN and those of host countries in which Indonesian peacekeepers are deployed. ⁴⁸ The country's recent stint on the UN Security Council has highlighted its continued commitment to improving peace and security through its peacekeeping missions. ⁴⁹
Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping.	Very Strong Unchanged	Indonesia has used the past few years of its time at the UN to further the Women, Peace and Security agenda and increase the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions. During Indonesia's time on the UN Security Council and its tenure as President, it sponsored several resolutions regarding UN peacekeeping operations and specifically oversaw the adoption of a resolution to include more women in peacekeeping roles. ⁵⁰ Indonesia has made it a priority to recognise the role women have as peacebuilders in conflict situations, and to increase the number of female personnel in its deployments. ⁵¹
Support the Kigali Principles.	Very Weak Unchanged	Despite its stellar record of peacekeeping operations, Indonesia still does not support the Kigali Principles.
Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention.	Very Strong Unchanged	Indonesia remains a supporter of both ACT Code of Conduct regarding UNSC action against atrocity crimes, and the French/Mexican initiative on the suspension of veto powers in the case of mass atrocities. ⁵²

⁴⁶ APR2P, 2021. *Towards a National Network for the Prevention of Social Conflict and Atrocity Crimes in Indonesia*.

⁴⁷ UN Peacekeeping, 2021. *Troop and Police Contributors*, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>. (Indonesia can be selected from the drop-down box).

⁴⁸ United Nations Peacekeeping, 2023. *Troop and Police Contributors*, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.

⁴⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2019. *Indonesia's Non-Permanent Membership to the United Nations Security Council Period 2019-2020*, https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/147/halaman_list_lainnya/indonesian-membership-on-the-un-security-council.

⁵⁰ Wahyuni, Natasia Christy, Heru Andriyanto, 2020. 'Indonesia among Top Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Mission'. *Jakarta Globe*, 16 October. Available at: <https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-among-top-contributors-to-un-peacekeeping-mission/>; Security Council Report, 2020. *Women in Peacekeeping Operations: Adoption of a Resolution*, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2020/08/women-in-peacekeeping-operations-adoption-of-a-resolution.php>; United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 2538 (2020), 28 August 2020, S/RES/2538 (2020), p. 2.

⁵¹ See: Gayatri, Irine Hiraswari, Nuri Widiastuti Veronika and Jacqui True, 2020. 'Indonesia's UN Security Council drive for inclusive peace and security'. *The Interpreter*, 2 September. Available at: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-s-un-security-council-drive-inclusive-peace-and-security>; Veronika, Nuri, Irine Gayatri and Jacqui True, 2020. *What Indonesia's stint on the UN Security Council means for peace-building in the Indo-Pacific*, <https://lens.monash.edu/@politics-society/2020/09/03/1381203/what-indonesias-stint-on-the-un-security-council-means-for-peacebuilding-in-the-indo-pacific-region>.

⁵² GCR2P, 2019. *List of Signatories to the ACT Code of Conduct*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/list-of-signatories-to-the-act-code-of-conduct/>; GCR2P, 2020. *Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocities*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/political-declaration-on-suspension-of-veto-powers-in-cases-of-mass-atrocities/>.

