



MYANMAR

UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF R2P
IMPLEMENTATION 2023



Asia-Pacific Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect



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MYANMAR

Myanmar continues to endure armed conflict and atrocity crimes in the wake of the February 2021 coup. This has put the country in a state of conflict, which heavily impacts the opportunities it has to act on all of the R2P indicators in this study. Myanmar is one of the worst performers in the region for R2P implementation because of this, and because of the violence and atrocities committed by the armed forces against the population.

In acknowledgement of their participation in the 2011 UPR, Myanmar has been awarded 'fair' in this indicator. It is their highest scoring indicator and only one above 'weak' or 'very weak'.

Myanmar has failed to protect its population from atrocity crimes in the present, failed to reduce risk of atrocity crimes, and failed to address past atrocity crimes. This is not only tragic for the current population of Myanmar, but also for the forthcoming generations as the work to build a robust society will only be more challenging and filled with more atrocities to reconcile over.

Women, minorities and members of LGBT+ community are not only discriminated against, but lack protection from discrimination as well as legal recognition that discrimination is wrong.

Myanmar is often the subject of UN resolutions calling for action.

Its index score has dropped with two points compared to 2022.

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Burma)
 Myanmar: Updated Assessment of R2P Implementation 2023

Thematic Area	Indicator	Assessment	Notes
Basic Compliance	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes.	Very Weak Unchanged	The situation in Myanmar has deteriorated following the Tatmadaw's coup on 1 February 2021. The military junta has since been fighting its own people to maintain power, committing human rights violations and atrocity crimes in the process. ¹
	Reduction of atrocity crime risks.	Very Weak Unchanged	Since the coup, the risk of atrocity crimes occurring in Myanmar has increased from an already high level. The Tatmadaw are fighting anyone who opposes their rule. Myanmar has thus slid into civil war, where violence and atrocity crimes are widespread. ²
	Dealing with past atrocities.	Very Weak Unchanged	Myanmar has continued to not address past violations and atrocity crimes committed in the country. The ruling junta is focussed on maintaining power through violence, rather than reconciliation. ³
Policy Mechanisms	Appoint national R2P Focal Point.	Very Weak Unchanged	Myanmar does not have a national R2P focal point. ⁴
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships.	Very Weak Unchanged	No evidence could be found of Myanmar taking these steps.
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect.	Very Weak Unchanged	Under the current regime, there appears no mechanisms in place to hold the government accountable for their responsibility to protect.
International Human Rights Obligations	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law.	Weak Unchanged	Myanmar's ratification remains at five out of the twelve key international human rights laws that are relevant to R2P, including convention on the Rights of the Child, Convention on Elimination of Discrimination against Women and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights. ⁵ They have still neither signed nor ratified: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Geneva Protocol I</i>.⁶ • <i>The 1951 Refugee Convention</i> and its <i>1967 Protocol</i>.⁷

¹ Amnesty International, 2023 'Myanmar: Two years after the coup, global action needed to halt military's nationwide assault on human rights' *Amnesty International*, 30th January. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org.au/myanmar-two-years-after-coup-global-action-needed-to-halt-militarys-nationwide-assault-on-human-rights/>

² Maizland, Lindsay, 2022. *Myanmar's Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict*, <https://www.cfr.org/background/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya#chapter-title-0-9>; Tonnesson, Stein, 2021. *The New Pattern of Conflict in Myanmar*, <https://blogs.prio.org/2021/12/the-new-pattern-of-conflict-in-myanmar/>; Manny Maung, 4th July 2022 *Myanmar Military Atrocities Laid Bare in Gruesome Footage*, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/04/myanmar-military-atrocities-laid-bare-gruesome-footage>

³ Alar Corritti, Mie Mie, Matthias, Ko Banya, 2023, 'Atrocities in Myanmar: Documenting the Junta's Attacks on Civilians' *United States Institute of Peace*, 1st March. Available at: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/atrocities-myanmar-documenting-juntas-attacks-civilians>

⁴ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), 2022. *Members of the Global Network of R2P Focal Points*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/members-of-the-global-network-of-r2p-focal-points/>.

⁵ United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies: UN Treaty Body Database 2024. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=115&Lang=EN (Select Myanmar in the box)

⁶ International Committee of the Red Cross, n.d. *Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)*, 8 June 1977, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=470.

⁷ United Nations Treaty Collection (UNTC), 2024. 2. *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=en.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The <i>Arms Trade Treaty</i> [ATT].⁸ • The <i>Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court</i>.⁹ • The <i>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</i> [ICCPR]. • The <i>Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</i> [CAT]. • The <i>International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination</i> [CERD].¹⁰
Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court.	Very Weak Unchanged	Myanmar is yet to sign the <i>Rome Statute</i> .
Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles.	Very Weak Unchanged	Myanmar has the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission (MNHRC). The Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions now recommends it losing its accreditation. ¹¹ The MNHRC has been widely criticised by the UN and human rights observers for failing to uphold their mandate in response to the coup. ¹² Myanmar has also received intense critique over the human rights violations since the coup. ¹³
Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on the elimination of discrimination.	Very Weak Unchanged	The Tatmadaw is actively working against the promotion and protection of human rights in the country to maintain power and has committed atrocity crimes to do so. The atrocity crimes include deliberate targeting of civilians, including schools and hospitals, usage of landmines, and detainment as well as blockage of foodstuffs and medicine to the Rohingya population. ¹⁴ There is no work done to eliminate discrimination. The Rohingya population, women and girls and minorities are routinely subject to discriminatory treatment leading to unequal pay, unjust access to health and food, and violence suffered by large parts of the population. ¹⁵
Participate in international peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the UN Human Rights Council.	Fair Unchanged	Myanmar participated in its third UPR in 2021. The UN working group drew attention to discrimination and human rights issues within the country in their report. ¹⁶ Myanmar has not responded to the findings, presumably due to the coup.

⁸ UNTC, 2024. 8. *Arms Trade Treaty*, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-8&chapter=26.

⁹ International Criminal Court (ICC), n.d. *The States Parties to the Rome Statute*, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx#M.

¹⁰ United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies: UN Treaty Body Database 2024.

https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=119&Lang=EN. Select Myanmar in the box)

¹¹ Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), 2024. *Members*, <https://ganhri.org/membership/>

¹² United Nations, Human Rights Council (HRC), Summary of Stakeholders' submissions on Myanmar, 12 November 2020, A/HRC/WG.6/37/MMR/3, para. 6.

¹³ UNHCR, 30th June 2023, Myanmar: *Humanitarian and human rights situation compounded by the military's restrictions on aid*, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2023/06/myanmar-dire-humanitarian-and-human-rights-situation-compounded>

¹⁴ Human Rights Watch n.d., *World Report 2023: Myanmar*, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/myanmar#a48a3b>

¹⁵ U.S Department of State, 2023. *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burma*, 'Section 6. Discrimination' <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/burma/>

¹⁶ UNHRC, 2021, A/HRC/47/13, 'Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Myanmar', *UNHCR*, 12th April. Available at: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G21/085/42/PDF/G2108542.pdf?OpenElement>

	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations.	Very Weak Unchanged	Myanmar has a good number visits by UN Special Rapporteurs and up until 205 these have generally been reported on and completed. Visits by mandate holders after this date are either inactive or have been declined by Myanmar, with the most recent requested one week after the coup. ¹⁷
	Ensure equal access to justice.	Very Weak Unchanged	Myanmar refrained from inviting or providing a standing invitation to UN special rapporteurs. There is limited access to justice, with a military-heavy supreme court, regular disappearances of people, motivated killings of civilians, arbitrary arrests and wide-spread corruption. ¹⁸ Human rights defenders, journalists and opposition politicians are particularly affected by the increasingly politicized justice system. ¹⁹
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.	Very Weak Unchanged	Myanmar continues to use atrocity crimes as a tool of State repression, and because of the politicization of courts, justice for these crimes does not seem to be forthcoming. ²⁰ The NUG, the former government, accepted ICC jurisdiction over Myanmar in September 2021, offering a potential pathway for prosecution of the current regimes atrocities. ²¹ This has not happened yet, which has received critique ²² , although there is an open investigation. ²³ The Tatmadaw have criminalized genocide in 2021. This was largely motivated by wanting to lessen international pressure after The Gambia brought at charge of genocide against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice in 2019. ²⁴ No evidence could be found of other atrocity crimes being criminalized although there is plenty of critique of Myanmar itself committing atrocity crimes. ²⁵
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism.	Very Weak Unchanged	Since the coup in 2021, the Tatmadaw has changed the country's counter-terrorism law to be more restrictive of those critical of the military government. ²⁶ These laws have been critiqued

¹⁷ UNHCHR, n.d. *View Country visits of Special Procedures of the Human Rights council since 1998*, <https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewCountryVisits.aspx?visitType=all&country=MMR&Lang=en>.

¹⁸ U.S Department of State, 2023. *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burma*, 'Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees; Trial Procedures', <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/burma/>

¹⁹ Amnesty International, n.d. *Myanmar 2022*, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/myanmar/report-myanmar/>

²⁰ U.S Department of State, 2021. *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burma*, 'Executive Summary'.

²¹ Simpson, Adam, 2021. 'Myanmar's exile government signs up to ICC prosecutions'. *East Asia Forum*, 17 September. Available at: <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/09/17/myanmars-exile-government-signs-up-to-icc-prosecutions/>.

²² Askash Chandraan, 5th April 2023, *The Lowly Institute What of the Rohingya? The ICC, Ukraine, and limits of "international" justice*, <https://www.lowlyinstitute.org/the-interpretor/what-rohingya-icc-ukraine-limits-international-justice>

²³ ICC, n.d. *Information for Victims: Bangladesh/Myanmar*, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/victims/bangladesh-myanmar>

²⁴ The Irrawaddy, 2021. 'Myanmar Junta Enacts Genocide Law'. *The Irrawaddy*, 26 August. Available at: <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-enacts-genocide-law.html>; UCA News Reporter, 2021. 'Myanmar junta enacts law to prevent genocide'. *ucanews*, 27 August. Available at: <https://www.ucanews.com/news/myanmar-junta-enacts-law-to-prevent-genocide/93896>.

²⁵ Nicholas Koumjian, 1st Febuary 2023, United Nations Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, *Two more years of atrocities in Myanmar*, <https://iimm.un.org/two-more-years-of-atrocities-in-myanmar/>

²⁶ The Irrawaddy, 2021. 'Myanmar Coup Chief Amends Counterterrorism Law'. *The Irrawaddy*, 3 August. Available at: <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-coup-chief-amends-counterterrorism-law.html>; Al Jazeera, 2021. 'Myanmar charges US journalist with "terrorism" and sedition'. *Al Jazeera*, 10 November. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/10/danny-fenster-myanmar-files-new-charges-against-us-journalist#:~:text=The%20counterterrorism%20law%20criminalises%20contacts,to%2020%20years%20of%20imprisonment..>

			because of their lack of checks and balances, unclarity about scope, and expansive definition of ‘terrorism’. ²⁷ This affects the legal protection citizens can expect to get, as even in cases where lawyers are used these fear repercussions of taking cases. ²⁸
			Tightening laws and continuing violence against their own citizens instead of addressing this issue only worsens the ongoing conflicts in Myanmar.
	Enact and implement laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence.	Very Weak Unchanged	Sexual violence is a part of the military’s playbook in Myanmar, a devastating condition of life in a country where one in five women prior to the coup already experienced sexual violence from their spouse. External aid organisations attempt to draw attention to the situation and lessen the damage by educating women. ²⁹ However, the laws in place are inefficient at protecting the rights of women, and are lacking entirely when it comes to discrimination of minorities. ³⁰
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law.	Very Weak Unchanged	Myanmar’s current government has created a situation of nearly 2 million internally displaced people and over 1 million refugees. The UNHCR, particularly concerned at the protracted nature of the conflict, attempts to partner with neighbouring countries to provide basic necessities such as food, medicine and a sanitary living environment. ³¹ Myanmar, as mentioned in a previous indicator, has still not signed the <i>1951 Refugee Convention</i> and its <i>1967 Protocol</i> .
Domestic Implementation	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience.	Very Weak Unchanged	Similarly to last year, no evidence could be found of a national assessment having taken place.
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society.	Very Weak Unchanged	The civil society sector in Myanmar has been effectively destroyed in the military coup of February 2021.
			There is no freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, freedom of political association, election, widespread corruption in government and human rights NGO’s are not permitted. ³²
	Ensure a legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector.	Very Weak Unchanged	Due to the military coup, there is no civilian oversight of the security forces. ³³
	Ensure the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets examples of inclusiveness.	Very Weak Unchanged	Education is in poor shape in Myanmar, as firstly covid and secondly the coup caused public schools to close for 532 days. Following the re-opening of schools, a third of the teachers were dismissed for

²⁷ Access Now, 2023 ‘Myanmars “counter-terrorism” by-laws must be denounced for what they are – illegal.’ *Access Now*, 19th April . Available at: <https://www.accessnow.org/myanmar-counter-terrorism-law/>

²⁸ Human Rights Watch, 2023 “Our numbers are dwindling” Myanmars post-coup crackdown on Lawyers’, *Human Rights Watch*, June 8th. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/06/08/our-numbers-are-dwindling/myanmars-post-coup-crackdown-lawyers>

²⁹ United Nations Myanmar, 2023 ‘Together for Transformation: Myanmars stand against gender-based violence’, *United Nations Myanmar*, 7th December. Available at: <https://myanmar.un.org/en/255188-together-transformation-myanmars-stand-against-gender-based-violence> ; Norwegian People’s Aid, n.d., *Fighting gender-based violence amidst conflict*, <https://www.npaid.org/news/fighting-gender-based-violence-amidst-conflict>

³⁰ U.S Department of State, 2023. *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burma*, ‘Section 6. Discrimination’ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/burma/>

³¹ UNHCR, November 2023 *Myanmar emergency update*, <https://reporting.unhcr.org/myanmar-emergency-regional-update-6584> and UNHCR, n.d., *Myanmar situation*, <https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/situations/myanmar-situation>

³² U.S Department of State, 2023. *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burma*, ‘Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process, Section 4: Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government’ <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/burma/>

³³ Human Rights Watch n.d., *World Report 2023: Myanmar*, ‘Shrinking Civic Space and Legal Challenges’, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/myanmar#a48a3b>

			<p>political reasons, and those who had already missed years of school did not re-enrol in large numbers.³⁴</p> <p>In principle, education is free and compulsory for children up to 10 years of age, yet access for children with disabilities, those of ethnic minorities or those in rural areas is limited. Furthermore, because compulsory education is finished when the children are still quite young, many are vulnerable to child labour and trafficking.³⁵</p>
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas.	Weak Unchanged	No evidence could be found of Myanmar criminalising atrocity crimes committed overseas by its nationals.
Bilateral and Multilateral Relations	Participate in international, regional, and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P.	Very weak Decrease	No evidence could be found of the military regime discussing R2P, instead focusing its attention on its sovereign right to rule. It's actions do not demonstrate respect for the norm.
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect.	Very Weak Unchanged	<p>The UN continues to recognize the NUG and not the junta as the government of Myanmar.³⁶ Votes below therefore reflect the view of the NUG.</p> <p>UN General Assembly Resolutions:³⁷</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2018: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions A/RES/73/172: did not vote. • 2018: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea A/RES/73/180: adopted without vote. • 2018: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/RES/73/182: did not vote. • 2019: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea A/RES/74/166: adopted without vote. • 2019: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/RES/74/169: did not vote. • 2020: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea A/RES/75/190: adopted without vote. • 2020: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions A/RES/75/189: did not vote. • 2020: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/RES/75/193: did not vote. • 2021: Promoting a culture of peace and tolerance to safeguard religious sites A/RES/75/258: adopted without vote. • 2021: The responsibility to protect and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity A/RES/75/277: did not vote.

³⁴ Sutirtha Sinha Roy, Roy Van Der Weide, Saurav Dev Bhatta & Mar Mar Thawin, 2023, 'A generation of children are at risk of learning losses in Myanmar', *World Bank Blogs*, October 24th. Available at:

<https://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/generation-children-are-risk-learning-losses-myanmar#:~:text=Myanmar%20stands%20in%20sharp%20contrast,among%20high%20school%20aged%20students>.

³⁵ U.S Department of State, 2021. *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burma*, 'Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons, Children'.

³⁶ Sebastian Strangio, 2022, 'UN General Assembly Denies Junta Bid for Myanmar Seat', *The Diplomat*, 19th December. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/un-general-assembly-denies-junta-bid-for-myanmar-seat/>

³⁷ GCR2P, 2023. *UN General Assembly Resolutions Referencing R2P*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/un-general-assembly-resolutions-referencing-r2p-2/>. (Voting records for each resolution were accessed using the UN's Digital Library: General Assembly of the United Nations, n.d. *Voting Records*, <https://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/voting.asp>.)

- 2021: Terrorism and human rights A/RES/76/169: **adopted without vote.**
- 2021: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea A/RES/76/177: **adopted without vote.**
- 2021: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/RES/76/228: **yes.**
- 2022: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, A/RES/77/218: **yes**
- 2022: Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, A/RES/77/226: **adopted without a vote**
- 2022: Myanmar/Burma, A/RES/77/227: **adopted without a vote**
- 2022: Syria A/RES/77/230: **yes**

Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging and ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy.	Very Weak Unchanged	The Tatmadaw has not fulfilled its responsibility to protect regarding ethnic minorities or its own citizens during the post-coup violence, instead it has acted to make the situation in Myanmar an object of concern both int the region and internationally. Very little has been done by the international community to intervene, although there is a case at the ICJ. ³⁸
Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention.	Very Weak Unchanged	No evidence could be found of Myanmar supporting atrocity prevention networks.
Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations.	Very Weak Unchanged	While Myanmar is a member of regional organisations, most notably ASEAN, the situation in Myanmar is one of AESEAN’s biggest challenges. ³⁹
Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities.	Very Weak Unchanged	The current Myanmar government actively violates human rights to remain in power. NGO’s are calling upon other states to intervene due to the severity of the situation in Myanmar. ⁴⁰
Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships.	Very Weak Unchanged	No evidence could be found of the Tatmadaw supporting atrocity prevention measures through development partnerships. Following the coup, it has been difficult to provide aid to Myanmar without it falling into the governments hands due both to the nature of the aid system and the laws made. ⁴¹

United Nations, prevention, Peacekeeping, and assistance	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P.	Very Weak Unchanged	No evidence could be found of Myanmar supporting any such initiative.
	Support the strengthening of the UN’s capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system.	Weak Unchanged	As mentioned in a previous Indicator, Myanmar’s delegation to the UN, on behalf of the NUG, has supported stronger measures from the UN to protect the people of Myanmar from atrocity crimes. This contrasts with the junta, who as also mentioned in previous Indicators, violate human rights at the level of atrocities.

³⁸ GCR2P, 2023. *Myanmar (Burma)*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/myanmar-burma/>.

³⁹ Council for Foreign Relations, 18th September 2023, *What is ASEAN?* <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-asean#:~:text=Introduction,Singapore%2C%20Thailand%2C%20and%20Vietnam.>

⁴⁰ Amnesty International, 2023 ‘Myanmar: Two years after the coup, global action needs to halt militarys ‘nationwide assault on human rights’, *Amnesty International*, 30th January. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org.au/myanmar-two-years-after-coup-global-action-needed-to-halt-militarys-nationwide-assault-on-human-rights/>

⁴¹ Root, L. Rebecca 2023 ‘Aid needs grow in Myanmar as resistance advances put more civilians at risk’, *The New Humanitarian*, 6th December. Available at: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2023/12/06/aid-needs-grow-myanmar-resistance-advances-put-more-civilians-risk>

Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes.	Weak Unchanged	The junta in Myanmar show no interest in preventing atrocity crimes and instead commit them. However, the NUG and the people protesting against the coup clearly support the prevention of atrocity crimes and call for the application of R2P.
Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping operations (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate).	Very Weak Unchanged	Myanmar's Tatmadaw does not currently have any personnel deployed to peacekeeping missions.
Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping.	Very Weak Unchanged	There is no evidence Myanmar has developed any capacities for peacekeeping or civilian protection. In contrast, the Tatmadaw, as described in other Indicators, have been actively committing atrocities for years and are engaged in combat operations with ethnic armed groups, the People's Defence Force of the NUG, and unarmed civilians.
Support the Kigali Principles.	Very Weak Unchanged	No evidence could be found that Myanmar has changed its position, and Myanmar does not support the Kigali Principles.
Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention.	Very Weak Unchanged	Myanmar is still no longer a signatory to the ACT Code of Conduct, ⁴² nor the French/Mexican initiative on the suspension of veto in the case of mass atrocities. ⁴³

⁴² GCR2P, 2019. *List of Signatories to the ACT Code of Conduct*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/list-of-signatories-to-the-act-code-of-conduct/>.

⁴³ GCR2P, 2022. *List of Supporters of the Political Declaration on the Suspension of Veto*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/list-of-supporters-of-the-political-declaration-on-suspension-of-veto/>