



IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

An Assessment of Progress and Challenges



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This report was prepared by the staff of the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect: Professor Alex Bellamy, Dr Mark Love, Dr Noel Morada, Dr Sarah Teitt, and Ms Arna Chancellor based at the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland.

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Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

School of Political Science and International Studies

The University of Queensland

St Lucia Brisbane QLD 4072

Australia

Email: r2pinfo@uq.edu.au

<https://r2pasiapacific.org/>

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Stemming from the horrors of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the genocide in Srebrenica the following year, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an internationally agreed principle adopted unanimously by Heads of State and Government at the 2005 United Nations World Summit and subsequently reaffirmed by the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council. R2P recognises that states have a responsibility to protect their own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. It requires that the international community assist and encourage individual states to fulfill their responsibility and that when states are 'manifestly failing' to protect their populations from these four crimes, the international community should respond in a 'timely and decisive' fashion with diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means and, should that be deemed inadequate, with all the tools available to the United Nations (UN) Security Council. R2P calls specifically for the prevention of atrocity crimes and of their incitement.

This study evaluates the efforts of 20 states in the Asia Pacific region to implement their responsibility to protect. It employs an analytical framework of 36 indicators across seven distinct areas, based largely (though not exclusively) on the UN Secretary-General's recommendations for the implementation of R2P. It finds that the Asia Pacific region is performing moderately well, achieving an average index score within the median range. There are, however, significant differences in individual country experiences. The countries that have done most to implement R2P are South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Fiji, and Timor Leste. At the other end of the spectrum, North Korea has done almost nothing to fulfil its R2P. Other relatively weak performers are Myanmar, Laos, Brunei, China and Vietnam.

There are three clusters of measures that the Asia Pacific region as a whole performs well on, and three where performance is almost uniformly weak.

The strengths are:

- Protecting populations from atrocity crimes and reducing underlying risks.
- Engaging constructively with UN Human Rights mechanisms and enacting national legislation against discrimination.
- Supporting greater UN Security Council activism for atrocity prevention and human protection.

The region's key weaknesses are:

- Regional capacities for atrocity prevention.
- Putting protection into practice within the region.
- Dealing with past atrocity crimes.

This gives rise to three recommendations about future priorities:

- 1. More research is needed to better understand the factors that caused a decline in the risks and occurrences of atrocity crimes in the Asia Pacific region, and to monitor trends of incidents, risks and resilience over time.**
- 2. Steps should be taken to better harness the region's strong engagement with UN processes on human rights and national legislation, and to replicate the UN's models of dialogue and engagement.**
- 3. Urgent action is needed to improve the region's capacity and willingness to protect its own populations from atrocity crimes.**

This study will serve as a baseline for evaluating future trends and developments.

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Stemming from the horrors of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the genocide in Srebrenica a year later, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an internationally agreed principle adopted unanimously by Heads of State and Government at the 2005 United Nations World Summit and subsequently reaffirmed by the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council. R2P recognises that states have a responsibility to protect their own populations from four crimes that indisputably shock the conscience of humankind: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (hereafter, collectively labelled 'atrocity crimes')¹. It requires that the international community assist and encourage individual states to fulfill their responsibility and that when states are 'manifestly failing' to protect their populations from these four crimes, the international community should respond in a 'timely and decisive' fashion with diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means and, should that be deemed inadequate, with all the tools that are available to the United Nations (UN) Security Council. R2P calls specifically for the prevention of the four crimes and their incitement.

These are the three pillars of the Responsibility to Protect:

I: the primary responsibility of the state to protect its own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity;

II: the international community's duty to encourage and assist states to fulfil their primary responsibility to protect;

III: the international responsibility to take timely and decisive action to protect populations from these crimes when the state fails to do so.

The UN General Assembly reaffirmed R2P in 2009 and placed it on its formal agenda in 2017. The Assembly has hosted an annual dialogue on R2P since 2009, in which more than 130 States have participated. The UN Security Council has referred to the principle in more than sixty resolutions, including in relation to crises in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, Libya, Cote d'Ivoire, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen, Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic and, most recently, Syria.

The UN's Human Rights Council has adopted more than twenty resolutions that refer to R2P. Beyond the UN, more than 60 governments have appointed a senior official to serve as an R2P Focal Point. That includes six governments in the Asia Pacific region (Australia, Cambodia, Japan, New Zealand, Timor Leste, and the Republic of Korea).

The principle's three pillars encompass a broad range of policy mechanisms. In the domestic context, responsibility is exercised through security, human rights, and judicial institutions, through policies designed to eliminate discrimination and reduce inequality, as well as through vibrant civil societies and a free press. International elements of responsibility include using political mediation, economic incentives, sanctions, humanitarian aid, diplomatic measures, and legal instruments to encourage and assist states to fulfil their responsibility. Military intervention is reserved only for the most extreme situations, and can only be exercised in accordance with the UN Charter. Since 2009, the UN Secretary-General has issued an annual report on the implementation of R2P. This has helped clarify how States might implement their commitments² and the development of the R2P focal points network.³ But questions remain about what exactly R2P implementation looks like, what progress is being made, and where major gaps appear in the principle's implementation.

This study aims to provide answers to some of those questions by assessing the implementation of R2P in the Asia Pacific region.⁴ The Asia Pacific region includes the countries situated along the western shoreline of the Pacific Ocean, as well as countries situated in the western part of the Pacific Ocean (it does not, therefore, encompass all of the countries located in Asia, nor does it include all countries which border, or are located within, the Pacific Ocean [the Pacific Rim countries]). For the purposes of this study, the Asia Pacific region includes New Zealand and Australia, the countries typically considered to be part of South-East Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Brunei, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia and Timor-Leste), and select States situated in East Asia (China, Japan and South Korea). The Pacific or Oceanic region encompasses a large number of States. For the purpose of this study, we have limited the focus to the three largest by population, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands.

Figure 1: Case study countries



Atrocity crimes have left no part of the Asia Pacific region untouched. From the killing fields of Cambodia to the massacres that accompanied China's Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, the Asia Pacific's recent past abounds with examples of genocide and mass atrocities committed against unarmed civilians. A quarter of Cambodia's entire population died during three and a half years of Khmer Rouge rule (1975-1979), a similar proportion of East Timor's population perished under Indonesian occupation (1975-1999), North Korea lost a quarter of its population to the Korean War (1950-1953), and researchers now count the victims of Mao's rule in China not in the millions but in the tens of millions. For much of the twentieth century, East Asians were at greater risk of death by genocide or mass atrocities than any peoples anywhere else in the world. Civilians were intentionally killed in vast numbers in the region's many Cold War proxy conflicts. They were killed to consolidate new states by demonstrating its brute power and coercing opponents. They were killed by opponents to these states. They were killed to physically eradicate domestic political opposition. They were killed to impose new ideologies. And, they were killed to establish – and dismantle – em-

pires. The sheer scale of the bloodletting in the Asia Pacific has come to light only quite recently as more complete evidence of the mass violence used to enforce Mao's revolutionary programs, anti-communist killings in South Korea and Indonesia, and the systematic crimes against humanity perpetrated by the regime in North Korea has come to light to accompany what we already knew about atrocity crimes in Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, the Korean Peninsula and The Philippines.

The problem of atrocity crimes in the Asia Pacific stretches back well beyond the Cold War, of course. The Second World War in the Pacific gave rise to multiple genocides and numerous campaigns of mass killing. It exacted an immense toll on human life, as did Japanese imperialism in Korea and Manchuria. After wreaking havoc across the region, Japan itself was almost completely devastated by war. More than sixty cities, including half of Tokyo, were leveled by strategic bombing and some half a million civilians died.⁵ Overall, Japan lost more than three million soldiers and civilians between the invasion of Manchuria (1931) and the end of the war (1945). That figure, though, is dwarfed by the losses sustained in China. Over the same time period, between fifteen and twenty million Chinese died as a result of war. This includes between seven and eight million civilians killed by military actions and atrocities, and between five and ten million who died as a result of war-induced famine.⁶ These include some 300,000 civilians raped and murdered during the infamous Nanjing massacre of December 1937.⁷ Burma too experienced heavy fighting and losses as General Slim's British 14th Army battled Japanese invaders intent on reaching India.⁸ As the two powers, and their armies, tussled for supremacy, Burma descended into civil war. In addition to the 400,000 military casualties, between 500,000 and one million civilians were killed there, a large number at the hands of their neighbours.⁹ The Japanese orchestrated a campaign of terror against the ethnic Chinese in Malaya and Singapore, massacring between 70,000-100,000, and a further million people died in the battle for The Philippines, a significant number of them as a result of Japanese massacres committed once their defeat had become inevitable.¹⁰ All told, at least thirty million East Asians perished during the Second World War. But unlike in Europe, the killing did not stop in 1945.¹¹

Atrocity crimes were common features of the region's colonial wars well before the Second World War. They were widely committed during the US war in The Philippines (1899-1902) and the Dutch occupation of Indonesia (1816-1942). Atrocities on a ferocious scale were also common in internecine conflicts. China, in particular, experienced recurrent bouts of mass violence as the ailing Qing dynasty struggled to hold on to power in the face of endemic corruption, inefficiency and challenges to their rule. None, though, surpassed the scale of bloodshed achieved by the Taiping rebellion – a civil war ranked amongst the bloodiest conflicts humanity has ever seen. In 1850, millenarians of the 'Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Movement' responded to the state's efforts to suppress them by launching a massive rebellion in the country's south east. The ensuing war, fought with extreme brutality on both sides, lasted fourteen years and consumed between twenty and thirty million lives, the vast majority of them civilians.¹² In Australia, meanwhile, colonial settlement and the massacres that accompanied it resulted in the devastation of indigenous life there, the indigenous population falling by about 95% during the first century of colonisation.

Over the past few decades, however, the region's economic and political rise has been accompanied by a quiet transformation – a sharp and sustained reduction in the incidence of atrocity crimes. There were fewer cases of atrocity crimes in East Asia in 2015 than at any other point in the region's recorded history. The number of atrocity crimes has increased since then, owing to atrocities committed by the government of Myanmar against the Rohingya in Rakhine state and crimes committed by the authorities of The Philippines under the rubric of its war on drugs, but remain at unprecedentedly low levels across the region. Protracted international conflicts in Indochina and the Korean peninsula have either been resolved or have given way to uneasy peace or low-level conflict not characterised by the mass killing of civilians; authoritarian regimes that once turned their guns on their own people have either been replaced by democratic governments (as in Indonesia), or have adopted a 'market-state' model of authoritarianism that prizes stability and permits individuals a wider degree of freedom; internal conflicts in Indonesia, The Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia and (to a lesser extent) Laos have experienced peace processes which although of varying levels of outright suc-

cess contributed to dramatic declines in violence. Once wracked with recurrent and widespread atrocity crimes, the scale of which often exceeded that seen anywhere else in the world, the Asia Pacific today is experiencing three major ongoing cases: atrocities committed by the North Korean government against its own people, atrocities committed by the military of Myanmar against that country's Rohingya Muslim minority, and atrocities committed by security forces and their allies as part of the Philippines government's war on drugs.

One element of change is that Asia Pacific governments have publicly committed themselves at the United Nations to the Responsibility to Protect principle and to protecting their own populations from genocide and mass atrocities. They have made multiple pledges within their own region to promote the wellbeing of their citizens. For example, in Article 1 (7) of the ASEAN Charter, member states pledge to 'promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

In the UN General Assembly and Security Council, most Asia Pacific governments have explicitly endorsed R2P.¹³ At the 2015 UN General Assembly dialogue, China described R2P as a 'prudential norm' and suggested that 'states should establish relevant policies and mechanisms' for implementing it. China also noted that it was appropriate for the international community to adopt measures to fulfill R2P when needed, including the use of force 'as a last resort'.¹⁴ Indonesia told the UN that it 'fully subscribes to the finest objectives and purposes of the concept of R2P'. The Philippines noted simply that 'we subscribe to our shared responsibility' in relation to R2P. Malaysia observed its support for the 'noble purposes' of R2P and recognised 'notable successes in the implementation of R2P. Singapore, meanwhile, observed that 'the R2P principle states the obvious. The principle that each state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and that the international community should be prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner to help to protect populations against such crimes, should be unobjectionable'.

Asia Pacific governments have engaged in dialogue about implementing the principle, though this remains at a nascent stage led primarily by informal or non-state actors.¹⁵ For example, the Council for

Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific issued a report that explored how regional organisations might take the lead in implementing R2P in East Asia.¹⁶ In 2013-2014, former ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan convened a panel to advise the UN about the implementation of R2P in Southeast Asia. The panel set out a series of steps designed to advance R2P into practice, and since then Surin has toured the region advocating the recommendations to governments and civil society.¹⁷ Governments have started to actively consider the formal steps they need to take to implement R2P: in 2015, Japan and South Korea appointed senior officials as 'R2P focal points', proceeded the following year by Timor-Leste and Cambodia. Cambodia's Prime Minister, Hun Sen, gave a speech in which he reaffirmed his support for the principle and committed Cambodia to leading regional efforts to promote it.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen on the Responsibility to Protect:

*"I would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm Cambodia's commitment to "the Responsibility to protect Principle", which was adopted by member states of the United Nations in 2005. While the UN Charter basically affirms the sovereignty of Member States as a key principle in the promotion of international peace and security, it is also important to acknowledge that the exercise of sovereign rights of states carries with it certain obligations or responsibilities. In this regard, the adoption of "the Responsibility to Protect Principle" should be viewed as deepening the meaning of sovereignty in that it underscores the importance of states taking seriously their primary responsibility to protect their people against genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing."*¹⁸

On the whole, Asia Pacific states tend to be more inclined to support the preventive and non-coercive aspects of R2P than they are the those elements that contemplate non-consensual interference. Moreover, they have frequently expressed concerns about the potential for R2P to legitimise interference and non-consensual measures beyond that which is provided for by the UN Charter. Because of this, we should not assume that East Asian states will necessarily act like, sound like or replicate, experiences, norms or institutions devel-

oped in other parts of the world. The precise modalities of how the goals of R2P will be achieved will differ between regions and individual countries. Many Asia Pacific governments recognise that there is potential tension between traditional conceptions of sovereignty and their protection responsibilities.¹⁹ However, most have allowed their thinking to evolve in a way that reflects a degree of receptivity to principles associated with R2P and responsible sovereignty. Singapore, for example, has argued that 'narrow notions of sovereignty no longer hold today'.²⁰

Consultations with government officials and civil society groups identified six key barriers to achieving greater implementation of R2P in the Asia Pacific region:

1. Limited political will, engagement and resources to protect vulnerable communities;
2. Limited institutional capacity to prevent and respond effectively to atrocity crimes;
3. Lack of knowledge and understanding of R2P, atrocity risks, mitigation and response strategies;
4. Limited commitment to some of the social norms that support implementation of R2P, especially human rights and gender equality;
5. Limited civil society awareness, engagement and capacity to impact policy in the field of atrocity prevention and a lack of stable collaboration mechanism in different tracks (official, civil society, academia, United Nations);
6. Entrenched practices of authoritarian government, discrimination, deep-seated prejudice in some communities.²¹

The Asia Pacific will continue to confront critical challenges to sustain its progress in preventing atrocity crimes. Since 2016, the situation has become less encouraging due to the escalation of conflict in Myanmar and atrocities committed by the military and extra-judicial killings in The Philippines. These crises are a reminder that the gains made over the past few decades can be reversed and that the progress made in implementing R2P will help determine how well the region protects its peoples from atrocity crimes.

National implementation by governments is the cornerstone of R2P. The UN Secretary General identified the primary responsibility as that of the State to protect its own populations. The principle's other elements depend on the individual and collective action of States.

Paragraphs 138-140 of the World Summit Outcome included a number of specific undertakings by Member States and commitments to take action through the international community. The direct commitments made by States include:

1. A responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (para. 138).
2. A responsibility to prevent these crimes (para. 138).
3. A commitment to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from atrocity crimes and to assist those under stress before crises and conflicts break out (para. 139).
4. A commitment to support the work of the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (para. 140).

Specific commitments to take action overseas as members of the international community, include:

1. Encourage and help States to exercise their responsibility (para. 138).
2. Support the UN in establishing an early warning capability (para.138).
3. Use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect populations from atrocity crimes (para. 139).
4. Support timely and decisive action through the UN Security Council to protect populations from atrocity crimes should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations (para. 139).

These broad commitments and actions constitute a starting point for assessing the implementation of R2P. Further assistance is provided in the recommendations presented by the UN Secretary-General in the annual reports on R2P. These form the basis for developing the indicators used in this study.

This study uses the guidance offered by the UN Secretary-General to delineate what States might be realistically expected to do in order to implement their commitment to R2P. The UN Secretary-General offered the most comprehensive

guidance on how states should implement their commitment to R2P in the R2P reports of 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017 and 2018 , focusing respectively on his strategy for implementation, State responsibility and prevention (Pillar I of R2P), the provision of international assistance (Pillar II of R2P), and accountability.²² Combined, the Secretary-General's recommendations provide significant guidance on how States ought to build R2P considerations into their domestic, foreign aid and defence policies, and how these initiatives would contribute to the goal of preventing atrocity crimes and protecting vulnerable populations.

Indicators

This assessment utilises 36 separate indicators, grouped together into six thematic areas:

- Basic compliance with R2P (3 indicators);
- The adoption of relevant R2P Policy Mechanisms (3 indicators);
- Adoption and implementation of relevant International Human Rights obligations (11 indicators);
- The adopting of key Domestic Policy instruments (5 indicators);
- The use of Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy efforts to further the implementation of R2P (7 indicators);
- Support for the implementation of R2P through the United Nations, prevention, peacekeeping, and assistance (7 indicators).

These are not discrete categories and there is inevitably some overlap between some of the sectors, but taken together they provide a comprehensive picture of efforts to implement R2P.

PART II: FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT

Specific indicators/recommendations and key sector areas		
Thematic areas		Indicator
Basic Compliance	1	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	2	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	3	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
Policy mechanisms	4	Appoint national R2P focal point
	5	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	6	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
International Human Rights Obligations	7	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	8	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	9	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	10	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on the elimination of discrimination
	11	Participate in international peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council
	12	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	13	Ensure equal access to justice
	14	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity
	15	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	16	Enact and implement laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	17	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
Domestic implementation	18	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	19	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	20	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	21	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	22	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
Bilateral & Multilateral Relations	23	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	24	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	25	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	26	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention.
	27	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	28	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	29	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
United Nations, prevention, Peacekeeping, and assistance	30	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
	31	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
	32	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
	33	Contribute to United Nations peace operations (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
	34	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping
	35	Support the Kigali Principles
	36	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention

PART II: FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT

A five-point scale was used to evaluate a state's performance in each given indicator:

Five point scale	
Very strong	Contributions/compliance is fully comprehensive and consistent
Strong	Contributions/compliance is relatively comprehensive and consistent
Fair	Contributions/compliance generally meet basic expectations
Weak	Contributions/compliance fall below basic expectations
Very Weak	Contributions/compliance fall significantly below basic expectations

In some cases, the indicator was not relevant to a particular state's context or there was insufficient data to make an assessment. In these cases, no entry is recorded. From these assessments, an index score was developed to measure a country's overall performance. An index score of 100 would suggest that a country is doing everything that might be expected of it to implement R2P. At the other end of the spectrum, a score of 0 suggests it is doing nothing to implement its R2P. Between these polls, an overall score of 0-19 was judged 'very weak', 20-39 'weak', 40-59 'fair', 60-79 'strong' and 80-100 'very strong'. The same scale was used to evaluate the extent to which individual indicators are being implemented.

The evidence used to form assessments against each indicator are self-explanatory, as the following table relating to **basic compliance** indicates. A comprehensive list will be available in the **Technical Annex**.

Example: Indicators of Basic Compliance

Basic Compliance	Sample indicators
Protection of populations from atrocity crimes	Evidence of atrocity crimes
Reduction of atrocity crime risks	Atrocity crime risk assessments produced by Global Centre for R2P, Asia Pacific Centre for R2P, UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P, UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, US Holocaust Memorial Museum

Basic Compliance	Sample indicators
Dealing with past atrocity crimes	Evidence of efforts to address past atrocities through judicial and non-judicial measures, including reparations and addressing impunity. Remembrance events and survivor networks are important, as is commemoration of acts and memorials to past atrocities as part of preventing future crimes

To measure accession to and compliance with international human rights obligations, the following legal instruments were identified as especially relevant:

- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;
- Geneva Conventions on the Laws of Armed Conflict;
- Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (1977);
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Second Optional Protocol thereto (1989);
- International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights;
- Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women;
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
- Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto;
- Convention on the Rights of the Child;
- Arms Trade Treaty.

This list of instruments was identified as a basic floor. Other instruments (such as those canvassed under the terms of the Universal Periodic Review Process of the UN's Human Rights Council) were also considered relevant to the implementation of R2P and are taken into account where relevant to forming a judgment about a State's implementation of R2P.²³ The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the question of cooperation with the Court is treated as a separate indicator.

The UN Secretary-General recommended that Member States cooperate with UN treaty bodies

as well as with international and regional mechanisms. States have a responsibility to ensure accountability for human rights violations and past atrocity crimes. Indeed, treaty law requires states to take action in relation to a specific list of crimes. Training should be conducted for personnel in enforcement agencies and the judiciary on human rights, humanitarian law and refugee law. States should also adopt international humanitarian and human rights standards in national military statutes.

With respect to the requirement that States should cultivate and protect an ‘active, diverse and robust’ civil society that operates freely and openly, the assessment examined legal and social constraints on both civil society and the press, including restrictions on freedom of speech. Media should be independent and varied to include those representing racial, religious and ethnic minorities while also creating an environment that encourages ethical standards in journalism.

A Note on Data

The assessments drew on an extensive range of different sources, which will be published online in a separate **Technical Annex**. In general, assessments were based on a combination of direct primary evidence (such as ratified international statutes, voting behaviour at the United Nations Security Council and/or the General Assembly; constitutional edicts; domestic legal provisions (Criminal Codes etc)) and secondary evidence such as reports by different organisations (governmental and non-governmental) and academic sources. For example, to evaluate of R2P **policy mechanisms**, the assessment was based primarily on direct primary evidence, a State either has or has not appointed a Focal Point, has or has not ‘incorporated atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships’, and is or is not a member of the ‘Group of Friends of R2P’. To assess performance in relation to **international human rights obligations**, both types of evidence sources have been used. In regards to assessing indicators such as ‘Ensuring the promotion and protection of human rights...’, ‘...equal access to judicial institutions’, ‘Laws protecting vulnerable groups...’, a state’s constitution and domestic legislative provisions and wider policy framework were consulted

to assess the statutory record. Where applicable, to assess implementation in practice, the assessment drew on a variety of reports by national institutions, multilateral organisations, and non-government organisations. For evaluating **domestic implementation**, both direct and indirect evidence was used. **Bilateral and multilateral diplomacy** was assessed through a variety of measures such as participation in national, regional and international discussions on R2P (e.g. the annual General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogues on R2P), and on a state’s voting records at the General Assembly and/or Security Council on R2P-related resolutions, as well as its position on and involvement with wider atrocity crime prevention initiatives. The key **United Nations, prevention, peace-keeping and assistance** sector indicator concerns a state’s support – or not – for the international aspects of implementation, primarily through the UN. It too employed a mix of direct and indirect indicators.

National Performance

	Rating	Country
Strong	78.5	ROK (South Korea)
	77	Australia
	77	New Zealand
	76	Japan
	66	Fiji
	62	Timor Leste
Fair	58	Indonesia
	55	Malaysia
	51	Singapore
	46	The Philippines
	45	Cambodia
	41.5	Thailand
	41	Papua New Guinea
	40	Solomon Islands
Weak	31	Vietnam
	28	China
	23.5	Brunei
Very weak	18	Laos
	6.5	Myanmar
	0	DPRK (North Korea)

The Korean peninsula offers the best – and worst – examples of R2P in action. South Korea is one of the strongest states in implementing R2P, whilst just across the demilitarised zone, North Korea commits atrocity crimes and looks to block implementation of R2P.

Five of the six states that have done most to implement R2P – South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, Japan and Timor Leste – are also among the region's leading advocates of the principal. In addition to establishing solid domestic foundations for the protection of their populations, these five have appointed a senior official to serve as National R2P Focal Point, been active in regional and global networks, and have taken steps to support implementation in practical ways. The sixth state in this group – Fiji – has not yet adopted several of these measures (though it has become increasingly active in the past few years), but contributes to multilateral efforts in other ways (notably through a strong contribution to peacekeeping).

At the other end of the scale, two of the three states whose implementation of R2P was assessed to be very weak have ongoing episodes of atrocity crimes perpetrated by government forces. The DPRK's political prisons system has been judged by a UN Commission of Inquiry to constitute systematic crimes against humanity perpetrated against the North Korean people, whilst in 2017-2018 Myanmar's armed forces waged a campaign of ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and possibly genocide against the country's Muslim Rohingya population. At the same time, Myanmar's military has also committed atrocity crimes against other ethnic minorities, such as the Kachin. The third member of this group, Laos, has not recently experienced atrocity crimes but the Hmong people remain vulnerable and protections against atrocity crimes are very weak. Unsurprisingly, none of these states have been active in their support for R2P. Indeed, North Korea and more recently Myanmar have been active in trying to block the further development and global implementation of the principle.

The other state responsible for atrocity crimes in the past few years – The Philippines – achieved a score in the median range. This was largely due to its institutional architecture (human rights institution, decent human rights record, decent rule of law) and past support for R2P and atrocity prevention, but these institutions and practices have notably weakened since 2016. If trends continue, we would expect The Philippines to have a significantly lower score in the future.

The average index score for implementation was 45.5 – within the second quartile of the 'fair' category. This suggests that whilst governments in the Asia Pacific have taken steps to implement their responsibility to protect, there is still a significant amount of work to be done.

There were important sub-regional variations. Not surprisingly, Australasia performed most strongly, averaging an index score of 77. The wider Pacific region also performed well above the Asia Pacific region as a whole, averaging 60 - 'strong' overall in its performance. This was a result not only of strong implementation by Australia and New Zealand, but also of strong implementation by Fiji. Two of the Pacific's most challenging states – Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, both of whom have experienced armed conflict in the past

PART III: REGIONAL ASSESSMENT

two decades – have also taken steps to implement R2P and performed close to the wider regional average.

ASEAN performed below the regional average overall, and well below the Pacific average, scoring 37.5. Two of the three Asia Pacific states responsible for recent atrocity crimes – Myanmar and The Philippines – are ASEAN members. Two other members, Laos and Brunei, have also not taken steps to implement their R2P. Whilst Brunei is an outlier owing to its small size and unique characteristics, Laos exhibits some degree of atrocity risk and has limited national resilience to it. Four of the ASEAN ten confront significant domestic challenges when it comes to atrocity prevention and civilian protection. As a result, they have also been reluctant to support international endeavours to promote R2P (The Philippines is an exception as before 2016 it was quite supportive of such measures but this has declined markedly). A fifth ASEAN member, Vietnam, has also stopped short of enacting key domestic barriers against atrocity crimes such as human rights protections and institutions. ASEAN's overall performance is also affected by the pronounced underperformance of states such as Singapore and Thailand that have professed support for R2P but have only taken modest steps to implement it, either at home, within the region, or globally.

Overall, Northeast Asia performed marginally above the regional average and well above the ASEAN average, scoring 44, but we cannot read too much into this as the average was produced by wildly different individual performances. The Northeast Asian sub-region contained the Asia Pacific's strongest performers – South Korea and Japan – but also two of its weakest, North Korea and China.

Strengths

Very strong	80	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
Strong	75	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	72.5	Participate in international peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council
	67.5	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	60	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	60	Enact and implement laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	60	Contribute to United Nations peace operations (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate).
	60	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
Fair	55	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping.
	55	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas

The Asia Pacific region performs best where it matters most – the protection of populations from atrocity crimes and the reduction and management of the risk of atrocity crimes. Some 80% of the region's governments perform strongly or very strongly when it comes to their primary responsibility to protect and a similar number perform equally strongly in dealing with risks. This is consistent with what we know about atrocity crime trends in the Asia Pacific over the past few decades. This positive result has been achieved despite the fact that very few have adopted specific domestic policies aimed at preventing atrocities or protecting populations. Indeed, the region's performance in achieving the principal goals of R2P far outstrips its performance in implementing any of the specific measures thought necessary to strengthen the

prevention of atrocity crimes measures such as establishing National Human Rights Institutions, conducting risk assessments, holding governments accountable, maintaining legitimate security sectors controlled by civilians, criminalising incitement, or countering violent extremism.

The assessment highlights two further areas where Asia Pacific engagement has been particularly strong. Interestingly, both relate to processes marshalled by the UN. They suggest that governments in the Asia Pacific prefer addressing the international dimensions of R2P through the UN rather than through regional institutions.

1. Human Rights and Engagement. Four of the top six measures relate to human rights engagement. Asia Pacific governments participate actively in the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council, and although they do not always implement the recommendations that arise, they do take the process seriously. They also tend to cooperate with UN human rights mandate holders. The influence of this global engagement on human rights is evidenced by most of the region's governments enacting and implementing laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence. The ethos of engagement can also be seen in the fact that the region's participation in dialogue about R2P has also been 'strong'.
2. UN Security Council Activism. The region's strong support for UN peacekeeping operations will come as no surprise, but governments have also invested in training and capacity building for the protection of civilians through peacekeeping. There is also strong support for a more active Security Council, as the proposal to restrain the use of the veto in situations involving atrocity crimes is quite strongly supported by Asia Pacific governments.

'There needs to be more of the UN in the Asia Pacific, and more of the Asia Pacific in the UN', argued the UN Secretary-General's Special Adviser on R2P, Edward Luck, in 2008. This assessment supports that view, since the region has been most willing to embrace atrocity prevention and civilian protection related activities fostered through the UN system. Indeed, support for initiatives facilitated by the UN has proven stronger than support for

regional initiatives.

Weaknesses

Weak	32.5	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	32.5	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	32.5	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or on-going crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	30	Support the Kigali Principles
	30	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	25	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
Very Weak	10	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	8.5	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	0.5	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	0	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience

It is not surprising that the weakest areas include implementation of some of the UN Secretary-General's specific recommendations for atrocity prevention. The Asia Pacific region is not unique in that regard. Few, if any, states anywhere in the world have conducted a national assessment of risk and resilience or established domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable. Only a tiny handful of governments have begun to incorporate atrocity crime risks into development partnerships and Asia Pacific governments including Australia and Cambodia are among them. The utility of these recommendations should be re-evaluated in light of the very low compliance levels, as atrocity prevention might be better served by focusing resources on areas where positive traction is more

likely. Moreover, there is no obvious correlation between the adoption of these measures and improved performance in atrocity prevention.

That said, it is important to note that some specific R2P related recommendations have been more broadly implemented. For example, nearly one-third of the states assessed here have appointed a National R2P Focal Point and others are actively considering doing so. Most have criminalised incitement to commit atrocity crimes to some extent and most succeed in preventing their nationals committing atrocities overseas. One indicator – support for the Kigali Principles – is an outlier. Whilst only a small number of the region's governments have explicitly endorsed the Principles, a larger number have issued or supported statements referencing them positively, suggesting that the level of support for the protection of civilians in peacekeeping may be higher than the level of formal endorsements of the Kigali Principles suggest.

Beyond this, the assessment identified three areas where urgent work is needed to close the gap between the region's commitment to R2P and its practical experience:

1. **Strengthening Regional Capacities.** For all their talk about building a regional community and strengthening regional ties and institutions, governments remain reluctant to take active measures to strengthen regional capacities. Indeed, when it comes to R2P, Asia Pacific governments tend to be more comfortable working through the UN than they are strengthening and working through their own regional bodies. Although several states have voiced support for regional human rights and other preventive capacities, in principle, few if any have actively sought to build and extend those capacities, be they in ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, or the Pacific Islands Forum. For example, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights has declined several proposals for it to consider questions relating to the application of International Humanitarian Law and atrocity prevention to human rights. The Pacific Islands Forum briefly considered these issues under the rubric of conflict prevention, but this has not progressed over the course of the past decade. This is in stark contrast to developments in other re-

gions such as Europe and Africa. There have also only been very limited regional efforts to advance networks focused on atrocity prevention, in contrast to Latin America for example. The effects of this deficit can be seen in ASEAN's failure to play a constructive (much less, leading) role in preventing atrocity crimes and protecting vulnerable populations in Myanmar and The Philippines. In both cases, what limited international action there has been has been led by the UN, not the region.

2. **Putting Protection into Practice.** Asia Pacific governments are prepared to support atrocity prevention efforts and provide personnel and resources to help implement UN Security Council mandates. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, there is reasonably strong support for a more active Council when it comes to implementing R2P. But when it comes to taking their own measures to protect populations from atrocity crimes, the region's governments have performed poorly.

They are deeply reluctant, for example, to even utilise peaceful means to support protection, for example by encouraging and assisting states in crisis through the utilisation of preventive diplomacy and other mechanisms. As a result, for all its talk of prevention, the region is poor at the practice of prevention. In the past few years it has typically failed to prevent crises escalating into atrocities, and relied on external actors, notably the UN, to marshal a response.

Safe flight and asylum is one of the most effective and direct ways in which lives are saved when atrocity crimes are committed. Yet in the Asia Pacific there is a massive gap when it comes to the protection of people forced to flee atrocities. This subjects victims to a double abuse of their human rights: the atrocities themselves and the denial of their right to asylum and protection. Outside of the development of specific policy mechanisms recommended by the UN Secretary-General, the region performs weakest of all when it comes to protecting individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with international refugee law. Responsibility for this weak performance is shared across the region. Only a handful of states have signed and rati-

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fied the International Refugee Convention and Protocol. This leaves the great majority of the region's displaced people without the protections afforded to refugees and vulnerable to exploitation, abuse, human rights violations, and arbitrary measures. Some of those that have signed the Convention either breach key tenets of it – such as Australia, which imposes mandatory detention, generally considered a violation both of its legal obligations to refugees and of its human rights obligations – or offer very few resettlement places. New Zealand admits only a small number of refugees, Japan none at all, and South Korea provides places only to North Koreans. This has knock-on effects such as exacerbating problems of statelessness and creating large informal displaced populations.

for the future. In general, the region has not done well at dealing with past atrocities. Legal accountability for past atrocities remains very rare. The prosecution of serious crimes in Timor - Leste remains a relatively rare exception. In most cases, impunity is the norm. For example, only a handful of Khmer Rouge perpetrators ever faced justice for their actions. Meanwhile, historic atrocity crimes in China, Indonesia, Myanmar and elsewhere have gone entirely unpunished. The region has also tended to shy away from truth and reconciliation processes that address past atrocity crimes. This creates a culture of impunity that helps sustain atrocity crimes. As a result, the underlying grievances and injustices that can give rise to violent conflict and atrocity crimes remain unaddressed.

3. Dealing with the Past. Past atrocities haunt the Asia Pacific region, storing up potential trouble

PART III: COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS



AUSTRALIA

Scale	Indicator
Very Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Participate in international peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national, and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Enact and implement laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Participate in international, regional, and national discussions on the further advance of R2P
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention
	Support the Kigali Principles
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
Strong	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions to encourage states to fulfil their R2P
	Encourage and assist states to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or ongoing crisis
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Support prevention through development partnerships
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection
Fair	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
Weak	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold government accountable for upholding R2P
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
Very Weak	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with international refugee law
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience

AUSTRALIA

Australia is recognised globally as a leading international advocate of R2P. It was a founding member of the Group of Friends network at the UN in New York and Geneva, an early appointer of a national R2P focal point and active in the global network of focal points, and a vocal advocate of R2P in the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council and during its term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Australia is one of the principal supporters of civil society organisations working on R2P and is a donor to the UN's Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P. It tends to be a strong advocate for early preventive action, though its response to the 2017-18 crisis in Rakhine state, Myanmar, was slow and tepid. Australia is a vocal advocate for the protection of civilians and Kigali Principles, but makes only token troop contributions to UN peace operations.

Domestically, Australia is a stable and democratic state that has a very strong human rights record,

an open and free press and civil society, and no significant atrocity crime risks. It has strong and independent National Human Rights Institutions. However, Australia's policy of mandatory detention for asylum seekers arriving by boat is considered to be both contrary to its legal obligations under international refugee and human rights law, and harmful to people fleeing atrocity crimes and the risk of atrocity crimes. It is a policy inconsistent with Australia's responsibility to protect.

Australia has taken steps to implement R2P into national policy but it has not conducted a national assessment of risk and resiliences and has no plans to do so. Nor has it established mechanisms to hold the government accountable for its commitment to R2P. Steps have been taken to address historical atrocity crimes against Australia's indigenous population but these have thus far fallen short of constitutional recognition, the granting of a parliamentary voice, or reparations.

Australia Score, 77

Recognised worldwide as a leading advocate of R2P, Australia has taken strong steps to support its implementation. In some respects though, national policy remains inconsistent with international protection obligations.

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

Scale	Indicator
Very Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
Strong	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
Fair	Participate in peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Contribute to UN peace operations
Weak	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on elimination of discrimination
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Enact laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on the Prevention of Genocide and R2P
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping
Very Weak	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Support preventive action on atrocity crimes
	Support the Kigali Principles
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention

Brunei Darussalam is a small state with a population of less than 500,000. Brunei is a monarchy that has been governed under emergency powers since 1962, and there are various concerns about human rights protection and discrimination, especially concerning children, women, citizenship/statelessness and migrant workers. It has neither explicitly endorsed nor rejected R2P and abstained in the General Assembly's 2017 and 2018 votes on including R2P on the UN's formal agenda. Brunei has sent officials to participate informally in international and regional discussions on atrocity prevention but has not made a formal contribution. It has generally abstained from voting on General Assembly resolutions relating to country specific human rights violations, including in relation to atrocity crimes and prevention.

Brunei has not experienced atrocity crimes and there are no serious risks associated with atrocity crimes. Although there are no reports of major or violent violations of human rights, civil society and press freedom is compromised by emergency governing powers, and freedom of assembly and association is highly restricted. The new Syariah Penal Code criminalises exposing Muslim children, or the children of parents who have no religion, to the beliefs and practices of any religion other than Islam. Brunei has ratified only four and signed one of the twelve key human rights instruments most

relevant to R2P. It is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, although it established an Extradition Order (2006) that applies to numerous states and potentially allows for the extradition of those accused of genocide. It has participated in the Universal Periodic Review process of the Human Rights Council (where it has just one overdue report). Additionally, equal access to judicial institutions is weak, as are laws protecting vulnerable groups. Brunei has ratified the Geneva Conventions but there is very limited domestic legislation addressing atrocity crimes.

Given its size, it is not surprising that Brunei has not taken measures to implement R2P and it must be acknowledged that neither has Brunei looked to block R2P related measures or activities, either at the UN or within the region. It has made no formal statements on R2P, and has largely abstained from voting on General Assembly resolutions relating to country specific human rights violations. However, Brunei has on occasion supported collective action to protect populations from atrocity crimes. It supported General Assembly resolutions on Syria (e.g. A/RES/71/130 and A/RES/67/262) and, for its size, makes a decent contribution to UN peacekeeping, especially in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Brunei Score, 23.5

A small kingdom, Brunei has an ambiguous position having neither affirmed nor rejected R2P. This is reflected in practice. It confronts no serious atrocity crime risks, and has no major human rights problems, yet it has also adopted relatively few proactive measures. It has not promoted atrocity prevention internationally, but has not looked to block it either.

CAMBODIA

Scale	Indicator
Very Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
Strong	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
Fair	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Participate in peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness.
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Support prevention through development partnerships
	Contribute to United Nations peace operations (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
Weak	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on elimination of discrimination
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or on-going crisis
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN office on the Prevention of Genocide and R2P
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights System
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping
Very Weak	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
	Support the Kigali Principles
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention

Cambodia preforms most strongly in regards to some elements of R2P policy mechanisms (it is the first and only ASEAN member to nominate a national R2P Focal Point), and international legal instruments (the government have signed and/or ratified all twelve key covenants most relevant to R2P). It has progressed further than most in taking forward consideration of risk and resilience and developing an action plan for atrocity prevention. It has introduced numerous domestic laws designed to protect vulnerable groups, especially in relation to gender-based violence. Cambodia has been active in the field of fighting impunity and promoting atrocity prevention for nearly a decade. It was a founding member of the Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes (GAAMAC) network, which since 2009 has initiated a series of regional and international conferences on atrocities prevention. It is also a decent contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations, including those with a protection of civilians mandate. Cambodia established the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) to prosecute atrocity crimes perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge, and was also the first ASEAN member state to ratify the Rome Statue in 2002, and it has actively institutionalised genocide education through teacher training, distributing books, education, memorials, and hold-

ing inter-generational dialogues on past atrocities. But the ECCC has been plagued with problems and controversies and Cambodia has been reticent to support initiatives such as veto restraint and the Kigali Principles. There is also a gap between the government's rhetoric and its actions in regional organisations. Whilst the Prime Minister and National Focal Point have committed Cambodia to lead initiatives for atrocity prevention within ASEAN, this has not translated into practice. Indeed, Cambodia has not only failed to initiate action within the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, it has also failed to support initiatives proposed by others such as Indonesia and Malaysia.

Cambodia has struggled to translate its international commitment to R2P into domestic change. It has not yet established an independent human rights institution. Recent times have seen some backtracking on human rights, the intimidation of opposition parties, the winding back of the the rule of law, and restrictions placed on the media and civil society. New laws or amendments have raised questions about the ability of the media and civil society to freely participate in open dialogue on political matters and raised the prospect of more widespread political violence.

Cambodia Score, 45

Cambodia's past suffering under the genocidal Khmer Rouge (1975-1979) makes it a natural leader in the region to promote R2P. In addition to being the first ASEAN member state to ratify the International Criminal Court, it was also the first ASEAN member to appoint an R2P Focal Point in 2016. However, significant challenges remain, especially in relation to human rights, political accountability, the rule of law, and closing the gap between the government's rhetoric and reality.

CHINA

Scale	Indicator
Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Participate in peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Contribute to United Nations peace operations (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
Fair	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Support the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping
Weak	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on elimination of discrimination
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
Very Weak	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
	Support the Kigali Principles
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention

Over the past few decades, China has made significant progress in reducing the incidence and risk of atrocity crimes but it continues to perform weakly in relation to human rights, civil society and accountability. Like many other states in the region, China performs most poorly ('very weak') with respect to the adoption of R2P specific policy mechanisms due to the fact that it has not yet appointed an R2P focal point, nor does it appear to incorporate atrocity specific analysis into its foreign aid and defence policies. China also confronts significant challenges with respect to its national resilience to atrocity crimes. In particular, it performs poorly with respect to human rights and the protection of civil society freedoms. China has ratified eight (and signed two) of the twelve key international human rights instruments considered most relevant to R2P. Of particular concern is evidence of declining media and civil society freedom and the arbitrary detention of up to one million Muslim Uighers.

China's international record is quite mixed. On the positive side, it is an increasingly important contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping, including missions with robust protection of civilians mandates, but it has yet to support the Kigali Principles. China is amongst the world's top financial contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations, having significantly increased support for peacebuilding over the last decade through the adoption of 'developmental peacebuilding'. China provides troops, police and advisors to numerous

peacekeeping operations with a protection of civilian mandate, and is in the top contributors of female police peacekeepers. China supports regional organisations and finding regional solutions to regional problems, and has increased financial support to the African Union to establish an African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis. It is an active participant in international debates on R2P, both in the General Assembly and Security Council, though it opposed the inclusion of R2P on the General Assembly's main agenda. It has also participated actively in the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council. China has also demonstrated a willingness to support action to protect civilians and implement R2P, voting in support of UN Security Council action in Cote d'Ivoire, Yemen, Mali, the Central African Republic and other places.

However, China remains unwilling to support prevention and protection measures that do not enjoy the support of the host state. It blocked collective action to fulfil R2P in Syria and Myanmar, and delayed the imposition of an arms embargo on South Sudan by a number of years, contributing significantly to the international community's failures in those cases. It has looked to limit the scope of the Human Rights Council's work, especially on country situations and including those where atrocity crimes are committed. China has not yet adopted specific R2P/atrocity prevention measures.

China Score, 28

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has special international responsibilities in addition to the responsibilities held by other states. Despite initial misgivings, it has displayed an openness to R2P but has looked to limit and sometimes outright block its implementation. On the domestic front, significant challenges remain especially with respect to human rights, the promotion of civil society and accountability. Atrocity risks remain a concern.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Scale	Indicator
Weak	Participate in peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
Very Weak	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on the elimination of discrimination
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes.
	Contribute to United Nations peace operations (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention

A systematic perpetrator of crimes against humanity, the DPRK performs poorly in areas relating to the protection of its population from atrocity crimes. Millions of North Koreans have died as a result of either direct killing and torture by the government or government-induced famine.

The three indicators in which the DPRK rate 'weak' rather than 'very weak' concern participating in peer review processes (in recognition of at least participating in the Universal Periodic Review process of the Human Rights Council), the fact that the government has control over its military, and participates in some dialogue on R2P (it provided statements at the Informal Interactive Dialogues of the General Assembly on R2P in 2009, 2011, and 2014).

In terms of international law and human rights, the DPRK ratified seven of the twelve key international legal instruments most relevant to R2P; however, it has voiced reservations about many of them and utterly failed to uphold their core principles in practice. The domestic promotion and protection of human rights is practically non-existent. For example, it is one of the few countries worldwide that is not a member of the International Labour Organisation, and in 2015 the UN's Special Rapporteur on human rights in North Korea reported that labour conditions in the DPRK amount to human rights violations. Whilst it has participated in some peer review processes, the DPRK is classified

by the Human Rights Council as a non-reporting state for the non-submission of various reports and has not accepted individual complaints procedures or inquiry procedures. Despite constitutional claims that the courts are independent, in practice the Party and the Supreme Leader create law and determine the constitution; hence, there is no independent judiciary. While the DPRK has ratified the Genocide Convention (1948) and the Geneva Conventions (1949), there is no specific reference to acts such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity or war crimes within its domestic law, and there is clear evidence of the systematic commission of crimes against humanity. The law provides little to no protection for vulnerable groups, especially in the context of sexual and gender based violence.

Whilst authorities have maintained effective control over the security forces, widespread impunity runs deep, abuses are not investigated, and the security forces are used to smothering any opposition to the regime. There is no civil society to speak of and no independent press. The DPRK has voted against all General Assembly resolutions relating to R2P and has taken no steps to build dialogue in the region on human protection matters. In regards to peacekeeping, the DPRK has not contributed to UN peacekeeping operations and has voiced strong opposition to international action to prevent atrocity crimes.

DPRK Score, 0

According to a UN Commission of Inquiry, the DPRK commits systematic crimes against humanity against its own population. One of the most repressive states in the world, the DPRK is manifestly failing to protect its own population and actively works to block efforts to promote human protection. It is the region's worst performer by a considerable margin.

Scale	Indicator
Very Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Participate in international peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
	Support the Kigali Principles
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
Strong	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on the elimination of discrimination
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
Fair	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or on-going crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
Weak	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
Very Weak	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Ensure legitimate, effective, and civilian controlled security sector

Fiji is a relatively strong supporter of R2P and of multilateral measures to address peace and security issues more broadly. It has repeatedly voted and spoken in favour of R2P in UN settings, and supported and contributed to relevant regional initiatives such as RAMSI and the strengthening of the Pacific Islands Forum. Fiji is a significant contributor to UN peacekeeping and supports the Kigali Principles on civilian protection. It has also looked to strengthen training and capacity on civilian protection and committed to the voluntary compact for the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Fiji has acceded to and implemented most of the relevant instruments of international law and is a party to the Rome Statute of the ICC. However, it has not yet adopted R2P-specific policy initiatives such as appointing an R2P Focal Point.

Fiji's record on domestic implementation is similarly strong overall. It has a relatively strong National Human Rights Institution, and legislative protections for individual human rights and group rights. It has a fairly robust civil society, but more could be done to strengthen some of the core protections. Although tensions between different ethnic groups exist, Fiji does a relatively good job of managing them constructively. The most significant problem confronting the country is its long history of military coups, though these have never resulted in atrocity crimes and are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.

Fiji Score, 66

A small Pacific Islands state, Fiji has a long and proud history of contributing to UN peacekeeping operations. Considering its size, Fiji is a significant supporter of R2P and has contributed to the development of regional and global capacities. It has also used its vote in the UN to support atrocity prevention measures. Domestically, Fiji has a strong record of protecting its population from atrocity crimes, but has experienced periodic military coups.

INDONESIA

Scale	Indicator
Very Strong	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on elimination of discrimination
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Participate in international peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping.
Fair	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
Weak	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
Very Weak	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Support the Kigali Principles

Indonesia is close to becoming a strong implementer of R2P. It performs strongest in relation to its own track record in reducing atrocity crimes and their risks, the establishment of a relatively robust domestic human rights regime overseen by a National Human Rights Commission, and in its contribution to multilateral efforts to protect civilians through UN peacekeeping and support for greater activism by the UN Security Council. In terms of human rights, the Indonesian Constitution and sector-specific regulations prohibit discrimination and ensures citizens equal rights and equal access to judicial institutions. Indonesian civil society is one of the largest and most active in the region. Issues remain, however, especially with respect to the situation in West Papua.

Indonesia has participated in four of the nine UN General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogues on R2P, in addition to the 2016 Thematic Panel Discussion on “Ten Years of the Responsibility to Protect”. Whilst a member of the Human Rights Council, Indonesia supported four resolutions that directly referenced the responsibility to protect and whilst within the General Assembly, it has supported three key R2P related resolutions (abstaining on four votes). Indonesia is particularly strong in foreign assistance and peacekeeping: the State has formed partnerships with others for technical assistance and capacity-building purposes, has a well-resourced Peacekeeping Training Centre, and is one of the most significant contributors to peacekeeping in the region, contributing to nearly all of the peacekeeping missions that have had a protection of civilian mandate.

There are significant gaps in Indonesia’s commitment to international law. In particular, it has not yet ratified the Genocide Convention, Geneva Protocols, Refugee Convention, Arms Trade Treaty, or the Rome Statute. This constitutes a significant protection gap. Indonesia actively participates in the Universal Periodic Review of the HRC (although it currently has six overdue reports), and has some domestic laws that criminalise atrocity crimes but as yet no domestic laws that can penalise nationals for atrocity crimes or terrorism committed overseas. Whilst Indonesia has not overtly invested in tools to encourage states to fulfil their responsibility to protect, it has played a constructive human protection role in mediating a number of conflict situations, such as the Thai-Cambodian border conflict in 2011 and, more recently, cooperating with the EU to ease tensions between Iran and Saudi-Arabia. It played a key diplomatic role in resolving the 2008 crisis in Myanmar and attempted, unsuccessfully, to do the same in relation to the 2017 outbreak of atrocity crimes in Rakhine state.

Like many governments, Indonesia is weakest when it comes to the adoption of explicit policy mechanisms to support the implementation of R2P. It has not yet appointed a Focal Point (though it is actively considering doing so), does not incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into its conflict analysis, and neither has it conducted a national assessment of risk and resilience using the framework of analysis on the prevention of genocide. It is not yet a signatory to the Kigali Principles.

Indonesia Score, 58

The strongest ASEAN member when it comes to implementing R2P, Indonesia performs relatively well when it comes to domestic mechanisms for atrocity prevention and has consistently participated in efforts to support the implementation of R2P. It has also leveraged support for R2P within the Human Rights Council and General Assembly. However, its commitment to the principle has yet to translate into specific policy initiatives. Nevertheless, whilst much work remains to be done, Indonesia has already done much to support the implementation of R2P and strengthen atrocity prevention.

JAPAN

Scale	Indicator
Very Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on elimination of discrimination
	Participate in international peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national, and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Enact and implement laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
Strong	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping.
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
Fair	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
Weak	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
Very Weak	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Support the Kigali Principles

Japan is a leading regional advocate of R2P and plays a role in supporting its implementation. It performs well in regards to most aspects of R2P implementation, both domestic and international.

Japan appointed a national focal point for the Responsibility to Protect in 2015, has joined the Group of Friends of R2P, and has worked constructively – albeit through a focus on human security rather than R2P – to incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and development partnerships. However, Japan has stopped short of developing measures to ensure or promote implementation of R2P, such as a national assessment of risk and resilience and domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable.

Japan performs particularly well in terms of the implementation of existing international legal instruments and the domestic applicability of the covenant. Japan has ratified eleven of the twelve key international law instruments most relevant to R2P and actively participates in the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council. Additionally, Japan has relatively strong mechanisms ensuring the promotion and protection of human rights, equal access to judicial institutions, and the protection of vulnerable segments of society (particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence). Significantly, however, Japan has not yet established a National Human Rights Institution, though enabling legislation has been debated for two decades. Japan has a robust civil society sector, an inclusive education system, and civilian authorities maintain effective control over the security sector.

In terms of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, Japan performs very strongly. It has participated in and delivered official statements at all but two

of the General Assembly's meetings on R2P. Additionally, Japan has participated in various domestic and regional R2P-related panels and symposiums. During its tenure as a member of the Security Council (2005-2006, 2009-2010, and 2016-2017) it supported various resolutions relating to R2P and cosponsored two resolutions specifically referencing R2P. At the General Assembly it has been a cosponsor of at least 7 resolutions that have referenced R2P. Japan has been a 'strong' supporter of humanitarian and atrocity prevention activities in crisis contexts, though it has stopped short of developing a leadership role. Japan is also an active supporter of the United Nations, including its various organs and initiatives, and has invested considerable resources into strengthening the UN's ability to recruit, train and deploy human rights experts. It tends to support early preventive action, but was notably reluctant to act swiftly during the 2017 crisis in Rakhine state owing to its comprehensive bilateral relationship with Myanmar.

Japan focuses heavily on peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance, with a strong gender and development focus. Japan is one of the region's greatest financial contributors to peacekeeping and – since signing the Act on Cooperation with the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations in 1992 – has contributed to six UN peacekeeping operations, two of which (MINUSCA and UNMISS) have a protection of civilians mandate. Japan has also supported peacekeeping training centres in Africa and provided pre-deployment education and training on sexual violence and women's care needs. Until recently, Japan was constitutionally inhibited from deploying combat troops overseas and remains reluctant to do so. As such, it has not indicated support for the Kigali Principles.

Japan Score, 76

Incorporating atrocity prevention under the development policy of human security, Japan stresses the use of force as a last resort, the importance of consulting with regional organisations and obtaining consent for collective action, and generally prioritises the preventative aspects of R2P (such as good governance and functioning justice systems). Regardless, Japan is one of the regions strongest performers in terms of R2P implementation.

LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Scale	Indicator
Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Participate in peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council
Fair	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
Weak	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on elimination of discrimination
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
Very Weak	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or on-going crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping
	Support the Kigali Principles

Laos is among the weakest performers in the Asia Pacific region when it comes to the implementation of R2P. It performs strongest in relation to the protection of populations from atrocity crimes and the reduction of overall risks. It also does relatively well in relation to the adoption of international human rights laws considered most pertinent to R2P and participates constructively in the Universal Periodic Review process of the Human Rights Council.

Laos has ratified the Genocide Conventions and Geneva Conventions, as well as the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, but has not yet signed the Rome Statute or given any indication that it intends to. In principle, the Constitution and numerous laws ensure equal access to judicial institutions and the protection of vulnerable groups, but this does not yet translate into widespread practice. This is particularly marked in regards to minority ethnic groups, especially the Hmong, who are unable to freely express their cultural and religious identity for fear of persecution.

Laos performs relatively weakly on most domestic measures and this reflects the constricted civil and

political freedoms evident in the country. Civil society is heavily restricted and the education sector is not well attuned to addressing the underlying causes of atrocity crimes.

Internationally, Laos has done little to support implementation of R2P, though it has also not actively sought to block implementation. Reluctance to engage with R2P is particularly evident in its lack of participation with regional and international debates on the issue. Laos has never given a statement on R2P at the UN. Whilst initially supporting Venezuela's critical stance against R2P, in December 2011 Laos supported the funding of three additional posts for the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P (whereas Venezuela, Cuba, and 7 other states voted against the measure). Laos has not contributed to UN peacekeeping operations. However, military representatives attended the first ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network (APCN) meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in September 2012.

Thus far, Laos has displayed considerable reservations about R2P and faces critical challenges at home.

Lao People's Democratic Republic Score, 18

Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos) is amongst the region's more circumspect states with regards to R2P. Whilst not explicitly opposing the norm, domestically, regionally and internationally it has neither engaged with nor supported any of the discussions or initiatives designed to mitigate against atrocity crimes. Whilst Laos has made progress reducing domestic poverty, significant challenges remain with respect to human rights and civil and political freedoms.

MALAYSIA

Scale	Indicator
Very Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
Strong	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Participate in peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel
Fair	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on elimination of discrimination
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or on-going crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights System
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
Weak	Support Kigali Principles
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
Very Weak	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience

Malaysia's performance is well above the regional average and is close to being in the 'strong' category overall. Its new government, elected in 2018, is likely to strengthen Malaysia's position in the coming years.

In terms of domestic implementation, the security sector – although not without its problems – is generally accountable and under civilian control, whilst the education system is one of the more inclusive in the region. In regards to international law and human rights, there are a number of constitutional provisions ensuring governmental accountability, equal access to judicial institutions, and the protection of basic human rights; although these are generally weighted only 'fair' overall and there is room for improvement. Malaysia also scores 'fair' in regards to promoting and protecting a robust civil society and criminalising incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Malaysia's weakest indicators relate to its failure to sign, ratify and implement several relevant international treaties. As a result, protections remain arbitrary and subject to shifting political tides rather than enshrined into law.

Malaysia has been particularly active in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect, to date participating in five of the nine Interactive Dialogues on R2P. During its time as a non-permanent member of the Security Council (2015 – 2016), Malaysia supported all twenty-six resolutions relevant to

R2P. Malaysia is also a signatory to the "Code of Conduct regarding Security Council Action against Genocide, Crimes against Humanity or War Crimes" and is a supporter of the "French/Mexican initiative on Veto restraint in case of Mass atrocities." In terms of peacekeeping, Malaysia is amongst the regions strongest contributors – ranked eighth in Asia – and has participated in over 30 peacekeeping operations, four of which have had a protection of civilian mandate. Malaysia is also one of the few regional states to formally undertake atrocity prevention and human rights courses through the Malaysian Peacekeeping Centre (MPC).

Regionally, Malaysia has been among the more proactive states, though it has not specifically couched its activism in R2P terms. For example, at a 2017 ASEAN meeting of Foreign Ministers to discuss the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Rakhine state and the persecution of Rohingya Muslims, Malaysia has called for the creation of an independent ASEAN-led investigation into reports of abuses by the security forces against the Rohingya.

Like many other states, Malaysia has not adopted specific policies in relation to R2P and atrocity prevention. It has not yet appointed an R2P focal point, though it has expressed an interest in doing so, and is not a party to the Rome Statute. Nor is it a party to the Refugee Convention, creating a protection gap for refugees only partly filled by national and informal practice.

Malaysia Score, 55

Initially one of the region's more cautious governments with respect to R2P, Malaysia has become more vocal in its support, especially since its time as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (2015-2016) and its landmark 2018 election, as it has sought to promote atrocity prevention, especially in response to regional crises. In terms of its domestic resilience, Malaysia performs relatively well but there is considerable room for improvement in some specific areas, notably the signing, ratification and implementation of relevant international laws and the adoption of specific measures to support R2P.

MYANMAR

Scale	Indicator
Fair	Participate in peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
Weak	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Participate in peer review processes, including the universal periodic review of the Human Rights Council
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping
Very Weak	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on the elimination of discrimination
	Ensure equal access to judicial institutions
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention.
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
	Contribute to United Nations peace operations (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate).
	Support the Kigali Principles
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention

Myanmar continues to endure armed conflict and experience atrocity crimes. The country's armed forces committed crimes against humanity against the Rohingya population in 2017 and may be committing atrocity crimes in its ongoing campaigns with other ethnic separatist groups, including the Kachin. As such, it is not surprising that Myanmar is one of the region's worst performers, coming ahead only of DPRK.

The two indicators where Myanmar rate 'fair' are in recognition of its participation in discussions on R2P, having participated in the Informal Interactive Dialogues on R2P in 2009, 2014, 2015 and 2017, and in the prevention of atrocity crimes overseas by its nationals.

The country's principal problems are at home. Myanmar has manifestly failed to protect its populations from atrocity crimes. It has also failed to reduce risk or address past crimes. Underlying risks are significant and are exacerbated by government policies and practices.

In terms of human rights, Myanmar participates in the Universal Periodic Review process of the Human Rights Council but has ratified just four of the twelve key international covenants considered most relevant to R2P. Moreover, while it has ratified the Genocide Convention and the Geneva

Conventions, no specific reference to acts such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, or war crimes could be located within relevant legislation. Civil society and freedom of the press are highly constrained. Journalists are imprisoned for reporting on atrocity crimes perpetrated by government forces. Not only does the law fail to provide adequate legal protection for women, minorities and other vulnerable groups, it actually serves to entrench discrimination. The government organises an apartheid type system in Rakhine state.

Internationally, Myanmar performs very weakly across most measures. It briefly explored peacekeeping contributions, and between August 2015 and December 2016, Myanmar provided a limited number of contingent troops and experts to peacekeeping operations in Liberia (UNMIL) and South Sudan (UNMISS), whilst some military offices participated in United Nations peacekeeping training (in conjunction with the Australian Defence Force) in 2016, but this had ended by the time of this study.

Myanmar faces significant challenges with respect to its national resilience to atrocity crimes, and performs very weakly with respect to human rights and the legislative protection of vulnerable communities.

Myanmar Score, 6.5

In 2017, Myanmar's armed forces unleashed a campaign of crimes against humanity and possibly genocide against the country's Rohingya population. Unsurprisingly, Myanmar is amongst the weakest countries in the Asia Pacific in terms of R2P implementation. Whilst noting its support for the core objective of preventing mass atrocities, Myanmar has consistently emphasised non-intervention and the integrity of state sovereignty. The atrocities directed against the Rohingya Muslim minority – most recently in 2017 – are deeply troubling and clearly signal that national resilience to atrocity crimes is very low and in need of prompt attention.

NEW ZEALAND

Scale	Indicator
Very Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Participate in international peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse, and robust civil society
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national, and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Support the Kigali Principles
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
Strong	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions to encourage states to fulfil their R2P
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
Fair	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
Weak	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
Very Weak	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold government accountable for upholding R2P
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience

New Zealand, one of the principal global advocates of R2P, performs extremely well across almost all indicators.

New Zealand is especially strong on domestic implementation. New Zealand appointed a national R2P focal point in 2013 and is an active member of the Focal Point Network. It has ratified and implemented 11 of the 12 international treaties considered most relevant to atrocity prevention. Additionally, human rights are protected through numerous domestic laws - e.g. the Bill of Rights Act 1990, the Human Rights Act 1993 and the Domestic Violence Act 1995 - ensuring a robust civil society and open press, and the protection of vulnerable groups within society. New Zealand has an inclusive education system and its security sector is governed by numerous legislative safe-guards that ensure the legitimate and effective civilian control of its police and military.

New Zealand's contribution to international efforts to implement R2P is broadly positive but not especially proactive. This is exemplified by its policy on refugees. Whilst New Zealand is a signatory to International Refugee Law and complies with its

legal obligations, imposing none of the punitive measures imposed by its neighbor Australia, its annual intake is very small – per head of population less than half that of Australia, and more than five times less than countries like Sweden and Norway.

New Zealand actively participates in national, regional and international discussions on R2P and used various platforms to advance arguments in favour of atrocity prevention (e.g. the United Nations Security Council, General Assembly). New Zealand commended the Secretary-General's report for its emphasis on prevention rather than intervention and supports investment in this direction; however, whilst an active and substantial aid donor to the Pacific and other regional organisations, it has not yet championed R2P or atrocity prevention in these contexts. New Zealand provides only a modest number of civilians to UN missions with protection mandates but has not specifically focused on contributing military personnel to such operations. It has supported and contributed to various training exercises for peacekeeping, security, and law enforcement personnel in Africa and the Middle East.

New Zealand Score, 77

New Zealand has consistently shown itself to be a strong advocate of all three pillars of R2P, standing out as one of the strongest proponents of the norm in the Asia-Pacific region. New Zealand performs strongly on all the relevant domestic measures and most international measures, though it could do more to translate its rhetorical commitment to R2P into practical support.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Scale	Indicator
Very Strong	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
Fair	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on elimination of discrimination
	Participate in peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
Weak	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect.
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping
Very Weak	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Support the Kigali Principles

Papua New Guinea's track record is quite mixed, leaving it around the median range. It confronts a chronic crisis of endemic sexual and gender based violence, and PNG's women and girls are estimated to endure the highest rates of such violence anywhere in the world.

Domestically, PNG performs strongest in regards to criminalising incitement to commit genocide and in terms of its robust civil society and media sector which, whilst eroded somewhat in the last few years, has generally been one of the most vibrant, diverse and independent in the Pacific. In terms of international human rights law, PNG has ratified eight of the twelve key instruments considered most relevant to R2P, grants decent access to judicial institutions and participates in the Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process. Whilst it has progressed in terms of the domestic promotion and protection of human rights, it does not yet have a national human rights institute (although it has committed to establishing one), and substantive work remains to eliminate discrimination, especially on the basis of gender and sexual orientation. There is also room for improvement in security sector governance, with the police sometimes ignoring inter-communal violence and allowing warring factions to settle matters themselves.

On the international scene, PNG's implementation of R2P is equally mixed. It is a signatory to the French-Mexican proposal for a 'Political Declaration on suspension of veto powers in case of mass atrocity' and also supports the 'Code of the Conduct regarding Security Council action against

genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes'. Additionally, within the Security Council Open Debate on Maintaining International Peace and Security, PNG stated its support for introducing the Code of Conduct into the General Assembly in order to further its international acceptance by UN member states. Moreover, whilst it has never been a member of the Human Rights Council or the Security Council, Papua New Guinea is one of only seven countries in the region to have voted 'yes' to all General Assembly resolutions relevant to R2P. Whilst it could do more on a regional level, Papua New Guinea is a signatory to the Biketwa Declaration of 2000, which allows for the Pacific Island Forum to authorise regional action in response to security crises within member states. PNG's emphasis on regionalism was reiterated in its 2013 statement at the Informal Dialogue on R2P, which stressed that regional and sub-regional organisations remain central to atrocity prevention and conflict amelioration due to their capacity to collect and provide early warning information. PNG established the legislative framework to enable the state to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations in 2010, but to date it has only made very minor contributions.

Papua New Guinea's implementation efforts are at their weakest in terms of R2P policy mechanisms and laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence. Yet Papua New Guinea has consistently demonstrated its support for the R2P principle and has made progress in some areas.

Papua New Guinea Score, 41

Papua New Guinea has consistently voiced support for the R2P Principle and stressed the importance of building early warning and monitoring systems that recognise and respect the value of local knowledge in monitoring emerging conflicts. But it has struggled to put this commitment into practice and confronts challenges revolving around progressing the domestic promotion and protection of human rights, especially in regards to sexual and gender-based violence.

THE PHILIPPINES

Scale	Indicator
Very Strong	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
Strong	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Participate in peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
Fair	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes.
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping.
Weak	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on elimination of discrimination
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping
Very Weak	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Support the Kigali Principles

Implementation of R2P in The Philippines has weakened considerably since 2016 as a result of the government's program of extra-judicial killing. Having been among the leaders, The Philippines now sits among mid-range countries when it comes to implementing R2P. Its position is on a weakening trajectory.

The Philippines performs strongest in areas least affected by the government's violent campaign against drugs, which the International Criminal Court is currently investigating. In particular, it has relatively strong human rights institutions – though the government has tried to weaken them – and a history of supporting UN Security Council reform. In relation to human rights, it has ratified eleven of the twelve key international human rights instruments considered most relevant to R2P – though in 2018 it signaled its intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It has been an active participant in the Universal Periodic Review process of the Human Rights Council, in principle ensures equal access to judicial institutions, and has relatively strong legislative protections for vulnerable groups (particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence). The country's National Human Rights Institution has led investigations into state killings and, as a result, has been subjected to strong government interference. With the extrajudicial killing of tens of thou-

sands of people during Duterte's proclaimed "war on drugs," human rights protection has weakened significantly. The Philippines has a long tradition of active and vibrant civil society engagement but this has come under threat in recent times and thus its rating may need to be reconsidered.

Internationally, The Philippines has actively participated in international, regional and national dialogues on R2P. It was the first State to use the phrase 'R2P' in the UN Security Council. It has provided statements at five of the eight Informal Interactive Dialogues on R2P, has participated in several national and regional atrocity prevention workshops and, in 2016, it co-hosted the second meeting of the Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes in Manila. The Philippines is a supporter of both the 'Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes' and the French/Mexican initiative on Veto restraint in case of mass atrocities. However, its position on country specific issues has been more mixed. The Philippines was once amongst the region's most substantive contributors to United Nations peacekeeping missions – including those with a protection of civilians mandate (UNMISS, MONUSCO and UNOCI), but this has dropped dramatically over the last few years.

The Philippines Score, 47

Until 2016, The Philippines was one of the region's most overt supporters of the R2P, encouraging efforts to strengthen the promotion of human rights amongst ASEAN members and participating in domestic, regional and international dialogues on furthering the principle. However, since President Rodrigo Duterte took office in June 2016, the Philippines has backtracked on domestic human rights, announced its intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute, generally retreated on its hitherto solid regional and international commitments to atrocity crime prevention, and experienced atrocity crimes.

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Scale	Indicator
Very Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Participate in international peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse, and robust civil society
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
Strong	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments
	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on elimination of discrimination
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Encourage States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
Fair	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping
Very Weak	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Support the Kigali Principles

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The Republic of Korea (ROK) has performed strongly in implementing R2P.

The ROK performs strongest in terms of the implementation of existing international legal instruments, domestic implementation, and support for multilateral endeavours. It was the first East Asian state to appoint a national R2P focal point, has ratified ten, and signed one, of the twelve key international legal instruments considered most relevant to R2P, ensures equal access to judicial institutions, and has very strong domestic laws protecting human rights, eliminating discrimination and protecting vulnerable segments of society (particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence). Its robust and diverse civil society is amongst the most vibrant in the region, successive governments have ensured fair and equal access to judicial institutions, and civilian authorities maintain effective control over the security sector.

The ROK is amongst the strongest performers on the international dimensions of R2P as well, though many of its programs (for example refugee resettlement) are focused almost exclusively on problems associated with North Korea. Indeed, the ROK has highly restrictive asylum policies and in 2018 it refused to grant refugee status to 500 Yemenis seeking sanctuary from atrocity crimes in their own country. It has participated in and delivered official statements at all the UN General Assembly dialogues and debates on R2P, and is one of the few Asian states that are members of the

Group of Friends of R2P. It hosted the 2017 meeting of the R2P Focal Points Network. Additionally, the ROK has actively sought to further the R2P agenda at the United Nations. During its tenure as a member of the Security Council (2013-14) it chaired a High-Level Debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, cosponsored Resolution S/RES/2150 on 'Threats to International Peace and Security - Prevention of Genocide'. Lastly, the ROK has been a key actor in supporting human protection in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK – North Korea) – e.g. hosting the Seoul office of the OHCHR, which focuses on the human rights situation in the DPRK – and has also invested in promoting multilateral cooperation, trust and peace in Northeast Asia through the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI).

Despite the resource constraints placed on South Korea due to the ongoing military tensions with the DPRK, the ROK has made small but important contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping operations that have a protection of civilian mandate, and has been a generous financial contributor to UN peacekeeping. The Korea International Cooperation Agency conducts training programs for various human rights issues, including capacity building for diplomats with a special emphasis on R2P. However, whilst the state has good national provisions for peacekeeping training, there is limited explicit engagement with atrocity prevention and the ROK is not yet a signatory to the Kigali Principles.

The Republic of Korea Score, 78.5

The Republic of Korea was an early supporter of R2P and today stands as one of the Asia Pacific's principal supporters of the norm. It was the first East Asian state to appoint a focal point, has been an active participant in international and regional discussions on R2P, and has consistently demonstrated its support for all aspects of R2P and its implementation. Internationally, it tends to prioritise the situation in DPRK.

SINGAPORE

Scale	Indicator
Very Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
Strong	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Participate in peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness.
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
Fair	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on elimination of discrimination
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel
Weak	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
Very Weak	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Support the Kigali Principles

Singapore's performance in implementing R2P is close to the average. Thanks to strong economic indicators and the careful management of its different ethnic groups, Singapore has performed well when it comes to preventing violent conflict internally. Whilst Singapore has only ratified four and signed two of the twelve core international covenants most pertinent to R2P, it has relatively strong constitutional guarantees for human rights. The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore guarantees all person's equality before the law and further ensures that citizens may not be discriminated against based on religion, race, descent and place of birth. While women enjoy the same legal rights as men and enjoy some of the most robust gender-based protection laws in the region, no specific gender equality or anti-gender-discrimination legislation exists. Moreover, questions remain about the status and treatment of the many migrant workers resident in Singapore. The state has adequate laws that criminalise genocide, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes, but not crimes against humanity as such.

Domestically, Singapore is not strong on human rights but performs quite well in terms of operat-

ing a high-quality and inclusive education system, and a legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector. Moreover, while it is not yet a signatory to the Rome Statute, it has legislative provisions for prosecuting nationals for atrocity crimes committed overseas.

Internationally, Singapore has actively participated in national, regional and international discussions on R2P. It has participated in and delivered official statements at five of the nine Informal Interactive Dialogues on R2P and is one of the few Asian states that is a member of the Group of Friends of R2P. A recurrent theme of Singapore's statements has been to criticise the use of the veto on R2P related matters. Despite its broad support, at the General Assembly it has only directly supported one resolution (A/RES/71/130) referencing R2P and has generally abstained from voting. However, Singapore was one of only half a dozen Asia Pacific states that voted against the Venezuelan amendment to weaken the implementation of R2P thus supporting R2P. Nevertheless, it has taken few proactive steps to help strengthen regional networks for atrocity crime prevention or support the UN's early warning and capacity building efforts.

Singapore Score, 51

Singapore has been largely supportive of R2P and the issue of UN Security Council reform, whilst emphasising that, in regards to Pillar Three, the international community must act through the United Nations. Whilst it has actively participated in many of the informal activities around it has been less constructive in regards to supporting General Assembly resolutions that reference the principle and in providing material support. Domestically, Singapore performs quite well but there is significant room for improvement in some key areas, notably the signing, ratification and implementation of relevant international laws, permitting greater freedom within civil society and the adoption of specific measures to strengthen atrocity prevention.

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Scale	Indicator
Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness.
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
Fair	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Participate in peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on elimination of discrimination
	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel
Weak	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues on issues relating to atrocity prevention
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
Very Weak	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Support the Kigali Principles

A post-conflict society, rebuilding after violent conflict and near state-collapse, the Solomon Islands has made decent efforts to implement R2P. It has done especially well to prevent atrocity crimes and reduce risk and also has in place some legislative protections. The Solomon Islands tends to cooperate well with the UN and relevant regional organisations.

Given its small size, it is not surprising that the Solomon Islands has not been especially proactive in implementing R2P. Officials have attended meetings, but the government has yet to appoint a focal point largely owing to capacity shortfalls. A lack of diplomatic capacity largely explains why the Solo-

mon Islands has not expressed more support for atrocity prevention initiatives, though where it has offered statements these have been positive.

Domestically, the Solomon Islands performs decently well in areas such as human rights, access to justice, security sector governance, and education and is generally on a positive trajectory. There are, though, some notable issues in this regard. First, the Solomon Islands has no national human rights institution, and no stated objective of establishing one, creating a protection gap. Second, like most other states in the region, the Solomon Islands is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

Solomon Islands Score, 40

Rebuilding, with international support, after an internal armed conflict, the Solomon Islands is an average performer when it comes to implementing R2P. It has done well to protect its populations from atrocity crimes, reduce risk, and improve human rights but has not been proactive in advancing atrocity prevention. There are also some significant domestic protection gaps.

THAILAND

Scale	Indicator
Very Strong	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
Strong	Participate in peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
Fair	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on elimination of discrimination
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping
Weak	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
Very Weak	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
	Support the Kigali Principles

Thailand performs strongest in relation to diplomatic initiatives to support R2P. It has provided statements at every Informal Interactive Dialogue on R2P since 2013, and has participated in numerous national and regional atrocity prevention events (e.g. the first regional public seminar on the High Level Advisory Panel's report, Mainstreaming the Responsibility to Protect, was held in Bangkok in October, 2014). Additionally, it has voted in support of all General Assembly resolutions that reference R2P and is a supporter of both the 'Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes' and the 'French/Mexican initiative on Veto restraint in case of Mass atrocities'. Thailand has contributed to United Nations peacekeeping operations since 1991, making minor contributions to several missions with an explicit protection of civilians mandate. Despite its physically small peacekeeping contributions, Thailand is amongst the top five global contributors in terms of proportions of women for police peacekeepers and has undertaken training exercises that focus on the protection of vulnerable groups and adherence to international law.

On the domestic front, though, Thailand confronts many challenges. Many of Thailand's indicators have moved in the wrong direction since the 2014 coup but remain quite favourable by regional

standards. Thailand's civil society is vibrant though since the 2014 coup the degree of freedom of speech and expression has shrunk. It's education system is quite inclusive and has a relatively high level of gender parity. It performs weakest in terms of a lack of civilian oversight of the security sector, which has displayed a remarkable resistance to losing its structural and organisational power. In November, 2015 Thailand's Human Rights body – National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRCT) –was downgraded from 'A' accreditation to 'B' by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions, and whilst it has solid in principle and applied protection for supporting the elimination of discrimination against women, migrant workers and some ethnic minorities face various forms of discrimination. The state has ratified six and signed one of the twelve core covenants deemed most relevant to R2P. It has signed but not ratified the Arms Trade Treaty and Rome Statute, but is yet to endorse the Refugee Convention, the Geneva Protocol or Genocide Convention. In terms of international law and human rights sector, Thailand preforms weakest in regards to the criminalisation of atrocity crimes (it is not a member of the ICC nor signed or ratified Genocide Convention). Whilst it is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, it has some legislative mechanism for prosecuting nationals for committing atrocity crimes abroad.

Thailand Score, 41.5

Thailand is broadly supportive of R2P and has participated in every Informal Interactive Dialogue on R2P since 2013, supported all relevant General Assembly resolutions and has co-hosted and participated in numerous domestic and regional events on atrocity prevention. However, domestic protections against atrocity crimes are compromised in some respects, and a series of coups has caused protracted instability in addition to the challenges caused by the ongoing Pattani insurgency in the country's south.

TIMOR-LESTE

Scale	Indicator
Very Strong	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on elimination of discrimination
	Participate in peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
Fair	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or on-going crisis, such as good offices and preventive
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
Weak	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
Very Weak	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping.
	Support the Kigali Principles

Timor-Leste has faced many challenges but is a relatively strong performer in the implementation of R2P.

Emerging from decades of civil war and the atrocities perpetrated by Indonesian-backed militia in 1999, it has done well to protect its populations from atrocity crimes, reduce the risks of atrocities, and deal with the past. It performs well in regards to R2P policy mechanisms (it appointed a Focal Point in 2016), international law and human rights, and in the adoption of domestic measures. The region's newest state, Timor-Leste has ratified seven of the twelve key legal instruments considered most relevant to R2P, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It has relatively strong domestic laws ensuring the promotion

and protection of basic human rights and protection of vulnerable groups (although gender-based violence remains an ongoing concern), and is an active participant in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process of the Human Rights Council. Timor-Leste has a vibrant and relatively free civil society. It also has a strong and independent National Human Rights Institution.

Timor-Leste has had limited capacity and opportunity to progress R2P regionally or internationally, yet it still performs well in this domain. Timor Leste co-hosted the 2016 meeting of the global network. It delivered a statement at the first UN General Assembly debate on R2P in 2009.

Timor-Leste Score, 62

Timor Leste has formally acknowledged its support for all three pillars of R2P. Whilst a young state with limited capacity and opportunity, it has nevertheless proven itself to be a strong supporter of human rights promotion and protection. It has used its voice in the General Assembly to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility and co-hosted the Global Network of R2P Focal Point's sixth annual meeting in 2016, when it also announced the appointment of a national Focal Point.

VIETNAM

Scale	Indicator
Strong	Participate in peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council
	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Ensure legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
Fair	Reduction of atrocity crime risk
	Dealing with past atrocity crimes
	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and counter violent extremism
	Laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Ensure that the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets an example of inclusiveness
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
Weak	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on elimination of discrimination
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
Very Weak	Appoint national R2P focal point
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or on-going crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
	Support the Kigali Principles

Vietnam confronts several challenges when it comes to implementation of R2P overall. The strongest is in relation to human rights peer review and civilian control of the armed forces. In terms of international law, Vietnam has consistently been an active participant in the Universal Periodic Review process of the Human Rights Council and performs moderately well in relation to the other legal requirements. It has ratified eight of the twelve key legal instruments most relevant to R2P and the constitution ensures in principle equal access to justice. Vietnam is not a state signatory to the Rome Statute, though in 2012 Vietnam signed an agreement with the European Union that recognised the importance of the ICC and included a commitment to consider joining the Court. Additionally, the government has criminalised atrocity crimes in domestic law. Like most other states in the region, Vietnam is also not a part to the Refugee Convention. Whilst there is work to be done, the government has also enacted numerous domestic laws to ensure greater gender equality and the protection of vulnerable groups from discrimination. Other strengths include its civilian control over its security sector. Its education system has not always promoted diversity and inclusion but Vietnam has been making efforts to improve the sector through a strategic partnership with UNESCO.

Internationally, Vietnam has made a modest contribution to debates and practices about atrocity prevention and civilian protection. It has given two statements at the Annual Informal Interactive Dialogue on R2P and, in 2012, the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam co-hosted a national workshop on 'The Responsibility to Protect and the Role of the United Nations and Regional Organisations.' Vietnam served on the UN Human Rights Council between 2014 and 2016 and during that time it supported several resolutions that are cognate with R2P and human rights objectives.

Whilst Vietnam has abstained or not voted on the key R2P resolutions in the UN General Assembly whilst serving as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2008-2009, Vietnam voted in favour of Resolution 1894 (POC) S/RES/1894(2009) on the protection of civilians, which also reaffirmed the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In regards to peacekeeping, Vietnam has recently become a more active international contributor, opening a national Peacekeeping Centre in 2014 and contributing a small number of offices to missions in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Central African Republic (MINSCA), both of which have a protection of civilians mandate.

Vietnam Score, 31

Initially a sceptical 'fence-sitter', since 2008 Vietnam has demonstrated support in principle for R2P, especially Pillars I and II. However, the state confronts significant challenges in terms of protecting human rights, strengthening national resilience to atrocity crimes, and translating its principle atrocity prevention commitments into tangible policy positions.

The Asia Pacific region will continue to confront critical challenges to sustain its progress in reducing mass atrocities. Since 2016, the situation has become somewhat less encouraging due to the escalation of conflict in Myanmar and atrocities committed by the military, increasing tensions on the Korean peninsula and extra-judicial killings in The Philippines. Any one of these crises has the potential to further unravel the progress made in preventing atrocity crimes and reducing their incidence. Yet the forces that caused the decline of atrocity crimes, including state consolidation, rising incomes, and improvements in spheres such as human rights appear quite resilient. Indeed, with only a handful of exceptions, the region's states are capable of protecting populations in the face of violent extremists and other non-state armed groups and are greatly aided in that by regional norms prohibiting the granting of support to such groups by other states. The only scenarios where atrocity crimes seem more likely than not are in Myanmar – a country that has experienced one year of peace since before the Second World War – and North Korea.

Across the region, the implementation of R2P has ranged from strong and committed to practically non-existent. The countries that have done most to implement R2P are South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Fiji and Timor-Leste. Within ASEAN, Indonesia and Malaysia have led the way and are quite close to this group of leaders. At the other end of the spectrum, North Korea has done almost nothing to fulfil its R2P and perpetrates systematic crimes against humanity. It is the worst performer by a considerable margin, followed by Myanmar. Laos, Brunei, China and Vietnam are also not strong in their implementation of R2P, but are a considerable way ahead of the bottom two.

Most importantly, the region as a whole does well where it matters most: the protection of populations from atrocity crimes and reduction of risks. Most governments do a good job at this, most of the time. Somewhat surprisingly, the region also does well when it comes to engaging constructively with the UN on human rights and R2P-related issues and adopting national legislation to counter discrimination. It is also quite supportive of UN Security Council activism, suggesting that more could be done to deepen ties between the region and the UN.

Curiously, it would appear that – generally speaking – Asia Pacific governments are more comfortable pursuing R2P through the UN than through their own regional institutions. Whilst constructively engaging at the UN, they have done relatively little to develop or strengthen regional capacities for atrocity prevention or to take practical steps to protect populations from atrocity crimes. Thus, whilst the region have reduced atrocities overall, it has proven highly ineffective at preventing imminent atrocities or protecting populations from atrocities and relies on others to show leadership. It has also performed poorly in dealing with past atrocity crimes.

This gives rise to three recommendations about future priorities:

1. More research is needed to better understand the factors that cause a decline of atrocity crimes and the risk of atrocity crimes in the Asia Pacific and to monitor trends of risk, resilience and occurrences of atrocity crimes over time.
2. Steps should be taken to better harness the region's strong engagement with UN processes on human rights and national legislation, and to replicate the UN's models of dialogue and engagement.
3. Urgent action is needed to improve the region's capacity and willingness to protect its own populations from atrocity crimes. Failure to do this will leave the region incapable of preventing atrocities or protecting its own populations, and – when crises emerge – leave people in the Asia Pacific dependent on states and institutions outside the region for their protection.

The Asia Pacific experience with implementing R2P thus far illuminates three important lessons for the principle's future development more generally.

First, there are distinct regional pathways to protection and prevention. The region's performance on the key outcomes – prevention of atrocity crimes and protection from them – was almost uniformly better than its performance in any single one of the policies, institutions, or measures intended to produce those effects. This suggests that we have either not yet fully understood the forc-

es that make atrocities more or less likely, or we have not built those insights fully into prescriptions for preventive actions. The Asia Pacific experience suggests that the road to a less violent world might be paved in different ways. State consolidation was as significant in East Asia as it was in Europe, but its nature and the gradual adoption of responsible sovereignty was grounded in distinctively East Asian characteristics. It was this rootedness that tied states to their societies in a manner that made cultural sense and that was widely seen as legitimate. By contrast, while factors related to democratisation – often considered so crucial – played a role, it was a marginal one. Democratisation assisted transitions in South Korea and Indonesia but played a more ambivalent role in Fiji, The Philippines and Cambodia. Likewise, economics appears to matter more than has hitherto been recognised.

Second, political leadership matters. There are marked differences in the way that some similar types of states behaved. The Philippines, for example, is a democratic state but performed less well than some non-democracies owing to the choices of its populist president. Fiji and Thailand have both experienced coups, but they too have followed different paths. There is a massive difference between authoritarian government in North Korea and China. Practices are driven by the conscious will of East Asia's leaders. Leadership and the choices made by individuals were crucial. Their impact can be clearly seen when we view things in the prism of history. Not all leaders, of course, took decisions that benefitted peace. Mao led China through disastrous wars and catastrophic mass killing. Prioritising ideology and struggle over all else, his government sowed instability abroad and chaos and destruction at home. Pol Pot, Kim Il-Sung, and even Indonesia's Sukarno chose to place ideological preferences and revolutionary zeal ahead of practical judgment with often devastating effects. But almost everywhere leaders emerged who were prepared to prioritise state consolidation and economic development above all else, stepping back from revolutionary ideology and ethno-nationalism to instead focus on institu-

tion-building and economic reform at home and the sustenance of international conditions conducive to both. Some of these leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping and Roh Tae-Woo, had themselves previously served regimes responsible for atrocities. Yet in their own ways, they led important reforms that opened their countries to greater prosperity and reduced violence. Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, Malaysia's Mahathir Mohammed, and Indonesia's underrated and often overlooked President B. J. Habibie played similarly crucial leadership roles. Like Deng in China, Habibie brought an end to a period of autocratic rule by violence, especially in Timor, and ushered in not just greater peacefulness but also more rapid economic development. Unlike Deng, Habibie also helped entrench democracy in the world's largest Muslim majority country. It was the amalgam of all of these policy choices and the fact that leaders often worked together, quietly, learned from one another and, indeed, competed with each other for prestige that drove the decline of mass atrocities. Ultimately, the social structures driving decline were significant only inasmuch as they influenced the decisions of political leaders and their followers.

Third, if progress can be made in implementing R2P and reducing atrocities in the Asia Pacific, progress can be made everywhere. R2P is being implemented in some of the least propitious of conditions, amidst war, deeply divisive ideological conflict, state weakness and fragmentation, countless territorial disputes, and generalised poverty and destitution. Yet, despite these challenges, prosperity has grown, human rights have progressed, and atrocities have declined. If R2P is to deliver on its ambition to make atrocity prevention a lived reality everywhere, advocates must heed the lessons of the Asia Pacific and ensure that the principle is embedded or localised within existing cultural, normative and institutional frameworks and made consistent with them.

END NOTES

1. 'Ethnic cleansing' is an anomaly as it is not a separate category of crime recognised under international law. Depending on the context, its commission would form the basis of genocide, a relevant crime against humanity or a relevant war crime. Legislation to criminalise these three categories of crime therefore have the effect of criminalizing ethnic cleansing.
2. Since 2009 the Secretary-General has provided Annual Reports on R2P to the General Assembly and the UN Security Council: Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/677, 12 January 2009, Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect, A/64/864, 14 July, 2010, Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: The role of regional and subregional arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect, A/65/877-S/2011/39328, June, 2011, Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: Responsibility to protect: timely and decisive response, A/66/874-S/2012/578, 25 July, 2012, Ban Ki-moon, Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention. Report of the Secretary-General, A/67/929-S/2013/399, 9 July 2013, Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: Fulfilling our collective responsibility: International assistance and the responsibility to protect, A/68/947-S/2014/449, 11 July 2014, Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: A vital and enduring commitment: implementing the responsibility to protect, A/69/981-S/2015/500, 13 July 2015, Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: Mobilizing collective action: the next decade of the responsibility to protect, A/70/999-S/2016/620, 22 July 2016, Antonio Guterres, Report of the Secretary-General: Implementing the responsibility to protect: accountability for prevention, 10 August, 2017, A/71/1016-S/2017/556, and Antonio Guterres, Report of the Secretary-General: Implementing the responsibility to protect: from early warning to early action, 1 June 2018, A/72/884-S/2018/525.
3. See: http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/regional-breakdown_global-network-of-r2p-focal-points.pdf
4. The data is current to early-mid 2018. There is no single, comprehensive longitudinal data-set or analyses of Asia-Pacific countries engagement with R2P up to the present; however, some older analysis is available. Cf. Alex J. Bellamy and Sara E. Davies, 'The Responsibility To Protect in the Asia-Pacific Region', Security Dialogue, vol. 40, no. 6, 2009, pp. 547- 574 and Mariam Bensaoud 'Between R2P and the ASEAN Way: The case of Myanmar's Cyclone Nargis'. Working Paper No.13. Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Gadong, 2013.
5. Richard B. Frank, *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire* (New York: Random House, 1999), p. 77.
6. See, Ho Ping-ti, *Studies on the Population of China: 1368-1953* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 252 and R. J. Rummel, *China's Bloody Century* (New York: Transaction, 1991).
7. Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
8. 'Burma' is used to describe the country when it was under British rule. 'Myanmar' is used to describe it post-independence.
9. The high end estimate comes from Frank McLynn, *The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942-1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 1 and the lower end from Michael Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and other Figures 1500-2000* 2nd edition, (New York: Macfarland and Co., 2001), p.556.
10. Rajiv Biswas, *Future Asia: The New Gold Rush in the East* (London: Palgrave, 2011), p. 7.
11. Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, *Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain's Asian Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010).
12. Stephen R. Platt, *Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, the West and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War* (New York: Knopf, 2012) and Michael Burleigh, *Small Wars, Far Away Places: The Genesis of the Modern World: 1945-1965* (London: Pan Macmillan, 2014), p. 18.
13. Bellamy and Davies, 'The Responsibility to Protect in the Asia-Pacific'.
14. A complete set of statements is provided by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. See www.globalr2p.org
15. See Mely Cabellero-Anthony, 'The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia: Opening up Spaces for Advancing Human Security', *Pacific Review*, 25 (1) 2012, pp. 113-134.
16. Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, Memorandum No. 18, September 2011.
17. High-Level Advisory Panel on the Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia, *Mainstreaming the Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia: Pathway Towards a Caring ASEAN Community*, presented in New York, 2015.
18. Full text available at: <http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/docs/R2P%20at%2010%20Conference/Samdech%20Hun%20Sen%20Key%20Note%20Address%20R2P.pdf>
19. Noel M. Morada, 'R2P Roadmap in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Prospects', UNISCI Discussion Papers 11, 2006, p. 61 and Alex J. Bellamy and Catherine Drummond, 'The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia: Between Non-Interference and Sovereignty as Responsibility', *The Pacific Review*, 24 (2) 2011, pp. 179-200.
20. S. Jayakumar, Statement by H.E. Professor S. Jayakumar, Deputy Prime Minister, Co-ordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Law of the Republic of Singapore at the High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/60/PV.8), New York: United Nations, 16 September 2005
21. Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 'A Theory of Change for strengthening the prevention of atrocity crimes and the protection of vulnerable communities in the Asia-Pacific region', Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (APR2P). The University of Queensland, St Lucia, Australia.
22. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/677, 12 January 2009.; Ban Ki-moon, Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention, Report of the Secretary-General, A/67/929, 9 July 2013.; Fulfilling our Collective Responsibility: International Assistance and the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, A/68/947, 11 July 2014; Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Accountability for Prevention, Report of the Secretary-General, A/71/1016-S/2017/556, 10 August 2017.
23. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) identify Nine Core International Human Rights Instruments: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Convention on the Rights of the Child, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. There are also a number of Optional Protocols associated with many of these Treatise.

