France and the Responsibility to Protect

Eglantine Staunton
PhD Candidate, School of Political Science and International Studies,
PhD Researcher, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
University of Queensland

Introduction

As a key European power and one of the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, France’s position towards the responsibility to protect (R2P) can be seen as important for the future development of the norm. In light of the idea that France considers itself as the birthplace of human rights, and the fact that France has intervened militarily regularly over time to protect endangered populations on top of promoting human protection norms, France’s support to R2P can be seen as somewhat unsurprising. Nevertheless, France’s lack of direct normative contribution during the early stages of the emergence of the norm needs to be addressed. Additionally, in order to better understand how this European power concretely impacts the global norm, it is important to define the nature of this support, in particular France’s commitment to restrain the use of the veto in mass atrocities situations, and to identify some of the key specificities of the French definition of R2P.

France and R2P during Hollande’s presidency

Since the beginning of his presidency in May 2012, Hollande and his executive have been strong promoters of the norm of R2P. First, from a domestic point of view, the 2013 White Book on Defence and National Security\(^1\) showcased the importance of the norm for the French executive. The 2008 White Book, written during Sarkozy’s mandate, already acknowledged R2P and France’s will to fulfil its responsibilities, but the 2013 report went a step further by explaining that the promotion of the norm was a priority: “The consensus on the Responsibility to Protect, as expressed at the UN World Summit in 2005, remains fragile, but France intends to make the consolidation of this principle a priority of its external action.”\(^2\)

In light of this objective, France co-drafted the majority of the UN Security Council Resolutions referring to R2P: Resolutions 2085, 2100 and 2227 on Mali; 2093 on Somalia;
R2P IDEAS in brief

2095 on Libya; 2117 and 2220 on small arms and light weapons; 2121, 2127, 2134, 2149, 2196 and 2217 on the Central African Republic; 2139 and 2165 on Syria; 2150, 2170, 2171 and 2185 on the threats to international peace and security; 2155, 2187, 2206 and 2223 on South Sudan; and 2211 on the Democratic Republic of Congo.³

Additionally, the French administration has been advocating for the P5 to restrain the use of their veto power in mass atrocity situations. In September 2013, in front of the UN General Assembly, Hollande explained that, “the UN has a responsibility to take action. And whenever our organization proves to be powerless, it is peace that pays the price. That is why I am proposing that a code of good conduct be defined by the permanent members of the Security Council, and that in the event of a mass crime they can decide to collectively renounce their veto powers.”⁴ The French executive is proposing the use of this regulation in cases of “genocide, crimes against humanity and large-scale war crimes.”⁵

This call has been pushed forward by French representatives since Hollande’s announcement⁶ and is progressively gaining international traction. In particular, on 25 September 2014, a ministerial meeting was organized by France and the UN General Assembly, and was co-chaired by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius and his Mexican counterpart José Antonio Meade Kuribreña. This meeting gathered UN Member States, UN officials, and representatives of international civil society in order to discuss the French proposal and the conditions of its implementation.⁷

In addition to this active diplomatic support, Hollande and his executive have played a key part in the deployment of military force to uphold R2P. For instance, after co-drafting Resolution 2085 in December 2012, which “authorize[d] the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali […] to support the Malian authorities in their primary responsibility to protect the population,”⁸ Hollande announced in January 2013 a French intervention in Mali. He justified the intervention to the public opinion by explaining that “Mali is facing an assault from terrorist elements coming from the north […]. Consequently, it is the core existence of this friendly state, Mali, the safety of its population, and the one of our citizens there, that are at stakes. […] I have thus, in the name of France, answered the call for help of the President of Mali which was supported by Western African states.”⁹ A few hours earlier, the French deployment had already begun through Opération Serval, which mobilized up to 4,500 troops. It was followed by Opération Barkhane in August 2014, which is constituted of 3,000 troops.¹⁰ The operations aim to fight the terrorist groups that had taken control of the north and provide humanitarian relief. This rapid deployment led Hollande to receive the 2013 Félix Houphouët-Boigny Peace Prize.
In August 2013, Hollande’s administration also actively prepared for an intervention in Syria. After recognising the national coalition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian nation in September 2012 and providing humanitarian and material support to the opposition, the President declared that he was thinking about a military intervention to respond to the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime. At the conference of the French ambassadors, he declared that “the chemical massacre of Damascus cannot go unanswered. [...] France is ready to punish those who have taken the unspeakable decision to gas innocent people.” Nevertheless, the French proposal to intervene militarily was rapidly taken off the table by the Kerry-Lavrov disarmament accord.

A few months later, in December, France intervened in the Central African Republic (CAR). In support of UN Security Council Resolution 2127, which established a mandate for the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) to protect civilians, restore the authority of the government, and stabilise a country that has been in turmoil for over nine months, France undertook Opération Sangaris to support the UN force deployed. Hollande explained that it was “France’s duty. [...] France is expected there in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. It will be there.” This rapid response was welcomed by Kofi Annan who declared that, “it was necessary to react and only France could react quickly. I’m glad Francois Hollande and France have accepted the responsibility entrusted to them by the UN resolution. [...] We must acknowledge the work of France in Mali and Central African Republic. If everyone had the same moral impulse, the world would be very different.”

Last but not least, France’s participation to the coalition of states fighting ISIL in Iraq needs to be briefly mentioned. In light of Resolution 2170 passed in August 2014, the French executive is participating to the strikes against the Islamic State and deployed earlier in the year aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the Gulf. As Hollande explained, “the casting off of our aircraft carrier is [...] a commitment. The Charles de Gaulle is an instrument of power and strength, it is the symbol of our independence. It manifests the political, military, and diplomatic capacity of France. Today the situation in the Middle East justifies the presence of our aircraft carrier.” Consequently, this deployment can be seen as a key symbol of France’s willingness to play a key role.

R2P support coherent with France’s tradition

This strong French commitment to protect endangered populations rapidly led some influential international commentators to talk about the emergence of an ‘Hollande doctrine’: for instance, Guardian journalist Simon Tisdall argued that the doctrine can
broadly be defined as “a self consciously benign form of armed interventionism based on international authority and local consent.”\textsuperscript{16}

Nevertheless, by associating the French commitment with the current President, this kind of commentary considerably overlooks the historical importance of the idea of a \textit{devoir d'ingérence},\textsuperscript{17} and the commitment to human protection more generally, that has informed French foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{18}

First, it is important to emphasise that Sarkozy, Hollande’s predecessor, was already a strong advocate of R2P. In addition to supporting the norm diplomatically,\textsuperscript{19} his executive also co-drafted every resolution on R2P voted by the UN Security Council from August 2006, and was involved in what was seen as the first military R2P intervention in Libya. In front of the UN Security Council, before Resolution 1973 was passed, Foreign Minister Juppé justified France’s mobilisation:

> Despite these calls for peace, the situation in Libya today is more alarming than ever. As I speak, Colonel Al-Qadhai’s troops pursue their violent conquest of liberated cities and territories. We must not give free rein to warmongers; we must not abandon civilian populations, the victims of brutal repression, to their fate; we must not allow the rule of law and international morality to be trampled underfoot. For this reason, France sought to contribute its utmost to the international momentum by working alongside the United Kingdom, the United States and others to prepare the draft resolution before the Council. [...] If it is adopted, we are prepared to act with Member States — in particular Arab States — that wish to do so. We do not have much time left. It is a matter of days, perhaps even hours. Every hour and day that goes by means a further clampdown and repression for the freedom-loving civilian population, in particular the people of Benghazi. Every hour and day that goes by increases the burden of responsibility on our shoulders.\textsuperscript{20}

After lobbying with the UK for a military intervention, France heavily participated in NATO’s Operation Unified Protector by mobilising up to 4,200 soldiers. It undertook 5,600 operations (4,000 of which were undertaken by the French air force), which corresponded to “25% of the operations, 35% of the offensive missions and 20% of the strikes of the coalition.”\textsuperscript{21}

Before then, the French executives, regardless of their political affiliations, had been promoting human protection norms since the 1980s and had consistently intervened for humanitarian purposes since the beginning of the 1990s. This impulse began in 1987 when
Bernard Kouchner and Professor Mario Bettati organised a Conference on Moral and Humanitarian Right in order to define and promote the importance to have a recognise devoir d’ingérence. This initiative received strong public support, including from President Mitterrand and his government, and constituted the beginning of the French executive’s commitment to the creation of an internationally recognised duty of humanitarian assistance. Throughout the years, these efforts continued and led the executive to promote and support human protection norms, in particular the development of the norm of humanitarian intervention, in addition to heavily intervening abroad for humanitarian purpose in places such as Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Lebanon, Côte d’Ivoire and Libya.

France’s commitment to human protection norms over time can be explained by the idea that promoting human rights is seen as an integral part of France’s identity. In particular, the idea that France is “the motherland of human rights”, and as such has a duty to promote them, is widely spread and accepted in France. It has been largely argued within the French educational curriculum using the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen as a reference, and remains conveyed in the speeches of representatives and officials of France. As Hollande explained in front of the UN General Assembly, France has always proclaimed universal rights, “rights that are those of any human being, wherever they live. [...] France wants to be exemplary, not to give lessons but because it is its history, it is its message. Exemplary to carry the fundamental freedoms, it is its fight, it is also its honour.” Similarly, in 2007, Sarkozy had explained that “France still carries a message and values that resonate throughout the world, those of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, of humanism and also, more recently, of humanitarianism and the duty to protect.”

In addition to this commitment to human rights, it is important to acknowledge that being a strong advocate of human rights and human protection norms has had the benefit to bolster another key aspect of France’s identity: its rank. This notion of rank, of grandeur (or greatness) has also influenced French leaders for centuries independently of their political affiliations. For instance, even at a time when France was going through its decolonization process, De Gaulle explained that “France is only really herself when she is at the first rank. [...] In short, France cannot be France without grandeur.” Similarly, in 2013, Hollande explained that “through its economy, its ideas, its language, its diplomatic and military capabilities and its seat at the United Nations Security Council, France is fully engaged on the international scene, in accordance with its interests and its values.” In other words, although France progressively lost its Empire and its status in the world evolved considerably over time, there is an obsession to argue that France is more than a middle-sized power and that it matters. Consequently, more than a means to an end, it has become an end in itself.
for France’s foreign policy today and is seen as an integral part of France’s identity. This obsession with France’s status combined with its commitment to human rights led France to play a central role in human protection over the years since being a strong advocate of human rights and participating to humanitarian-aimed military interventions allowed France to fulfill its perceived duty, while showcasing its image and military power.

Consequently, arguing that Hollande’s foreign policy constitutes a key shift would be undermining the history of France, and more specifically, its commitment to being a key supporter of human rights and human protection norms over time.

A norm consolidator but not a norm entrepreneur

In light of the fact that France has co-drafted every UN Security Council’s resolutions on R2P since August 2006 except two, has intervened militarily at several occasions to support the norm, and is now pushing for a restrained use of the veto power by the P5 in mass atrocities situations, it can be argued that France is a norm consolidator. Its diplomatic action is indeed strongly contributing to the development and reinforcement of R2P and therefore has helped it become an international norm rather than a simple principle.

France has not, however, been engaged as a full norm entrepreneur since no French personality took part in the work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) that developed the concept of R2P and like the rest of the world, France discovered the project when it was done. Because France had been a norm entrepreneur of a devoir d’ingérence and humanitarian intervention since the 1980s, this lack of normative contribution stands out. It can be explained in two ways. First, it can be argued that not including France at the negotiating table on R2P was a deliberate choice by the ICISS in order to signal to the rest of the international community that R2P was not going to be a covered up version of the idea of a right or duty of ingérence promoted by the French since the 1980s. Back in France, there was also the idea that the norm of humanitarian intervention as it existed was not the problem, but rather how it was being implemented. Consequently, as this norm was seen as the product of France’s diplomacy, there was a will to defend it.

These factors meant that until August 2006, France, like most of the international community, was a passive supporter of the norm and simply settled for voting in favour of the resolutions mentioning R2P. It also meant that during the first years of the existence of the norm, the French executive supported the norm while also promoting key distinctions in the way it was understood which contrasted with wider international understandings.
A strong support marked by some key distinctions in understanding

Understanding that the French executive is a strong supporter of R2P is not enough considering that there can be different interpretations of the norm. As Bellamy explains, many states comprehend it as “persuading states to fulfil their protection responsibilities and providing mutual assistance on a consensual basis,” while only a small minority sees it in a stricter way, “as a response to the dilemmas of humanitarian intervention.”

Like a large majority of the international community, the French executive agreed with the three pillar approach put forward by the UN Secretary General in his 2009 report. In 2012, in front of the General Assembly, the French representative reminded that “the three pillars are of equal importance, without which the concept would be incomplete and unbalanced.”

It is interesting to note that even though the World Summit Outcome Document did not refer to R2P as containing three responsibilities like the original ICISS report did, the French executive has embraced the ICISS definition. For instance, the 2008 Livre Blanc on France’s foreign policy explained that R2P “entails a triple dimension: responsibility to prevent, responsibility to intervene, if need be through armed forces, and the responsibility to reconstruct.”

Beyond this somewhat traditional understanding of R2P, the real distinction in France’s understanding of the principle lies in how the French executive has defined the scope and roots of the norm. It attempted to promote a broad understanding by including emergencies that emerged from natural disasters and by arguing that the roots of the norm can be found in France’s diplomatic efforts during the 1990s.

It is important to note that these distinctions were mainly promoted by Sarkozy’s administration and have not been endorsed since Hollande came in power. Nevertheless, they remain important to keep in mind since even though Hollande’s executive has not embraced them explicitly, it also has not contested them and they remain broadly accepted by the public opinion (especially the association of R2P to France’s work during the 1990s). It thus does not seem farfetched to consider that they could re-emerge should the circumstances be right.

The scope of R2P

A key difference in how France understood the scope of R2P compared to the rest of the international community emerged in 2008 when Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar/Burma and left a large part of the region under water. Despite the fact that 2.5 million were affected by the
cyclone, the government of Myanmar/Burma imposed restrictions on the delivery of international humanitarian aid,\textsuperscript{33} for instance by limiting the issuing of visas for foreign aid workers and UN personnel.\textsuperscript{34}

On 7 May, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner\textsuperscript{35} suggested the UN Security Council used the principle of R2P in order to force the Burma junta to allow access to international assistance by arguing that the refusal of the junta to humanitarian assistance was a crime against humanity.\textsuperscript{36} This idea had originally been suggested in the ICISS report,\textsuperscript{37} but was not used in the World Summit Outcome, since the latter explained that R2P could be called upon in four cases and four cases only: genocide, ethnic cleaning, war crimes and crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{38}

In 2008, R2P was still a considerably new principle and therefore negotiations on what it entailed and excluded were still taking place. Consequently, Kouchner’s call received some support. For instance, as Barber explains, “Australia’s former Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, argued that ‘the concept of responsibility to protect needs to be extended to humanitarian assistance,’ while Canada’s Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, said that the fundamental message of responsibility to protect is that there is no moral difference between an innocent person being killed by machete or AK-47 and starving to death or dying in a cholera epidemic that could have been avoided by proper international response”.\textsuperscript{39} Nevertheless, before international lawyers could agree on the matter, the idea that natural disasters could be used to call on R2P was flatly rejected by Security Council members, in particular China.\textsuperscript{40} They were supported by key international figures on R2P, including the Special Adviser to the Secretary General on the Responsibility to Protect Edward Luck, who were concerned about damaging the international principle.\textsuperscript{41}

Despite the fact that Kouchner’s proposal was rejected in 2008, the idea that humanitarian crises emerging from natural disaster could be part of R2P kept being promoted by Sarkozy’s administration. For instance, in 2009, the French UN Representative reminded the General Assembly that, the [UN secretary General’s] report proposes an approach that is both targeted and in-depth, strictly confining the responsibility to protect to four crimes enumerated by the 2005 Final Document, namely, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. France will also remain vigilant to ensure that natural disasters, when combined with deliberate inaction on the part of a Government that refuses to provide assistance to its population in distress or to
ask the international community for aid, do not lead to human tragedies in which the international community can only look on helplessly.\(^{42}\)

Even though the French administration and Kouchner in particular, were concerned by the situation in Myanmar/Burma, it can be argued that to a certain extent, trying to include crises emerging from natural disasters in the scope of R2P was an attempt to promote the French understanding that had informed France’s foreign policy and diplomatic action throughout the 1990s and to show that France’s voice still mattered.\(^{43}\) This attempt was not well received and ended up threatening the future of the principle by weakening the international consensus around it. No similar declarations have been made under Hollande’s mandate on this matter, but his executive has emphasised the need to not look for excuses to not react to mass atrocities situations. As French Representative to the UN Delattre explained, “when mass atrocities are being perpetrated, the council must not add the failure of inaction to the one of prevention,”\(^{44}\) and this is why the executive has been pushing for the regulation of the use of the veto power.

**The historical roots of R2P**

In addition to this specific understanding of the scope of R2P, Sarkozy’s executive promoted a broad understanding of its historical roots. It indeed rejected the idea that the principle was new and argued that it had French roots by associating it with the concept of *devoir d’ingérence* that had been promoted by Kouchner and Bettati to the UN at the end of the 1980s.

As mentioned previously, this understanding can be contested by the fact that no French personality was invited to take part in the ICISS’ work since at the end of the 1990s, there was a will to move forward the idea of a right to intervene. Additionally, key distinctions between the principle of R2P and the concept of *devoir d’ingérence* can be emphasised. The most important one lies in the definition of sovereignty since the *devoir d’ingérence* relies on a Westphalian conception of sovereignty since it necessitates its violation in order to intervene, while R2P is based on ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ which puts “sovereignty and human rights are two sides of the same coin, and not opposing principles locked in interminable struggle.”\(^{45}\) Additionally, R2P is a broader concept than the *devoir d’ingérence* since it is not only about reacting militarily to a humanitarian crisis.\(^{46}\) Finally, as we discussed in the previous section, R2P is meant to cover exclusively four categories of crimes: genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Despite these key distinctions, Sarkozy’s executive advocated that R2P and the *devoir d’ingérence* were strongly interconnected, if not similar, by arguing that the idea that the
international community has a ‘duty’ to intervene in case of humanitarian crisis has been promoted by the French since the end of the 1980s. In fact, except for De Villepin’s speech in 2005 which insinuated that R2P was a new principle by declaring “new principles are needed, such as the responsibility to protect,” the declarations made by Sarkozy’s executive thereafter often linked the two concepts, or at the very least, argued that R2P had French roots.

Once again, to a certain extent, it can be argued that this definitional distinction was an attempt by Sarkozy’s executive to repossess the debate on human protection. Considering that the French did not take part in the work of ICISS on R2P, the latter became seen as potentially endangering France’s status and identity since it appeared to be excluding the French from the human rights arena. France’s image of promoter of human rights and human protection norms having been a key part of France’s identity and diplomatic strategy, taking the risk to lose this role was seen as a threat to the promotion of France’s rank and as an impingement on France’s legacy. Consequently, Sarkozy’s executive adopted a broad understanding of the historical roots of R2P. Even though Hollande’s administration has not made explicit declarations on the matter (some will argue because of its focus on the regulation of the veto power), this understanding of R2P is still found among the public opinion and the French press.

**Conclusion**

Today, France can be seen as a norm consolidator of R2P and as such, its effort to promote the norm should be monitored. In particular, its work to encourage the regulation of the use of the veto in mass atrocities situations deserves our attention. France’s position on the situation in Syria should also be monitored since it is seen by the executive as an outrage and is largely driving France’s will to restrain the use of the veto. In light of its historical commitment to promote human protection norms since the 1980s, and the implications this commitment has for France’s identity, one thing can be sure, France will remain committed to human protection and R2P more specifically. This can be seen by the fact that Hollande did not hesitate to intervene in Mali and CAR, even though these interventions initially generated doubts and divisions within France considering how sudden they were, and in light of the fact that they were mainly unilateral and taking place in Africa.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Eglantine Staunton is a PhD candidate at the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland and is affiliated to the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Her current research focus is on France’s foreign policy and more specifically, on ‘France and Human Protection over time.’

The R2P Ideas in Brief series is produced as part of the activities of the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (AP R2P) [DFAT Agreement 63684]. The AP R2P wish to acknowledge the funding support provided by the Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

REFERENCES

1 This report determines France’s goals and strategy in terms of defence and foreign policy.
3 Only two resolutions on R2P were not co-drafted by France: 2109 and 2228 on Sudan.


The devoir d’ingérence is often translated as duty to intervene, duty of intervention, or duty to interfere. Nevertheless, since none of these expressions captures completely the concept, the French term is used.


Kouchner is the creator of Médecins Sans Frontières and Professor Mario Bettati is a distinguished international legal scholar and administrator of the Faculty of South-Paris. In light of their role in the promotion of the devoir d’ingérence, Kouchner was appointed Secretary of State for Humanitarian Action in 1988, which he remained for four years before becoming Minister of Public Health and Humanitarian Action from 1992 to 1993. Bettati became Kouchner’s legal adviser.


In Guéhenno and Ministère de la Défense, "Livre Blanc 2013: Défense Et Sécurité Nationale" 7.

Entrepreneurs usually take part in the creation and emergence of the final product. In other words, the difference made here between entrepreneur and consolidator lies in the timeline of the support.


The ICISS report used the term ‘responsibility to react’ to avoid any confusion about the need to intervene militarily.


Kouchner played a central role in the emergence of the concept of devoir d’ingérence and in the promotion of humanitarian intervention internationally. Although he is socialist, he was Sarkozy’s foreign minister from 2007 to 2010 as part of Sarkozy’s ouverture to the left-wing.

Natalie Nougayrède, Philippe Bolopion, and Thomas Ferenczi, "Birmanie : Vif Débat Sur La "Responsabilité De Protéger," http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/cgi-


Barber, "The Responsibility to Protect the Survivors of Natural Disaster: Cyclone Nargis, a Case Study," 33.

China argued that "the situation in Myanmar/Burma is a natural disaster and not a matter of 'international peace and security', which places the crisis outside the remit of the Security Council." APR2P, "Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect, Myanmar/Burma Briefing No. 2" 9.

See for instance Thakur in Barber, "The Responsibility to Protect the Survivors of Natural Disaster: Cyclone Nargis, a Case Study," 4; Luck in APR2P, "Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect, Myanmar/Burma Briefing No. 2." 8.


