Joint Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

Inquiry into Australia’s Relationship with ASEAN

29 August 2008
1. Executive Summary

This joint submission by the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and act for peace focuses on the first two terms of the Joint Standing Committee’s terms of reference:

- opportunities to improve Australia’s involvement in ASEAN
- opportunities to enhance regional security through Australian involvement.

The transformation of ASEAN signalled by its new Charter and progress on the move to a more ‘people-oriented’ (rather than strictly ‘state-oriented’) ASEAN focus creates significant opportunities for renewed Australian engagement and regional security. Consistent human security advocacy, such as by the ASEAN People’s Assembly, as well as a number of human security shocks, such as the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami, 2007 Saffron revolution and 2008 Cyclone Nargis have finally started to shift expectations about the role of ASEAN are shifting. Several member states and many civil society groups believe that ASEAN needs to play a leadership role in preventing and responding to humanitarian and other emergencies in the region. The current ASEAN principle of comprehensive security has come about by the addition of human security concerns (often referred to as non-traditional security) to state security concerns.

Strengthening the region’s capacity in this area will make a significant positive contribution to regional security. As preventive measures reduce the overall number of humanitarian emergencies, deeper cooperation will promote trust and reduce tensions, and effective humanitarian capacity will enhance human security. The international principle of the Responsibility to Protect has been endorsed by all of the region’s governments and thus provides a useful framework for engaging with ASEAN on strengthening the region’s capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies and promote regional security, within its notion of comprehensive security.

Our primary recommendation is that Australia works with ASEAN, its members and its people, to support, develop and realise the principle of the responsibility to protect.
To help achieve this we propose the following:

1. **Building consensus through dialogue:**
   a. Host a major regional conference to begin a process of dialogue on the scope and meaning of the R2P and the steps required to translate the principle from words into deeds.
   b. Support the establishment of a CSCAP Study Group to examine the impact of the R2P on the principle of non-interference and report to the ARF.
   c. Encourage and support on-going dialogue about the R2P within national and regional settings.
   d. Adopt a more activist stance on the role of the region’s ‘Friends of R2P’.

2. **Strengthening the capacity for prevention:**
   a. Strengthen the ARF’s Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy by supporting the restarting of the CSCAP Working Group on Preventive Diplomacy and encouraging the Group to deliver recommendations to the ARF.
   b. Encourage the ARF to host a conference on prevention focusing specifically on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
   c. Continue to emphasise the strengthening of state capacity in Southeast Asia as a priority in Australia’s development assistance.
   d. Carefully monitor progress towards the establishment of a human rights mechanism and actively seek opportunities to support the mechanism, potentially through the ARF process.
   e. Contribute to the region’s capacity to deploy peacekeepers in a preventive and cooperative manner by encouraging regional partnerships in the field.

3. **Improving the capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies:**
   a. Support the establishment of an ARF working group to maintain the ongoing development of standard operating procedures for disaster relief, provide the group with administrative and other forms of support, and encourage the participation of other interested organizations such as OCHA and the IFRC.
   b. Encourage the development of standard operating procedures, including a status of forces agreement to facilitate the deployment of foreign military assistance to affected areas.
   c. Conduct further desktop exercises to simulate responses to humanitarian emergencies.
   d. Support the conducting of full-scale exercises simulating multilateral responses to humanitarian emergencies.
e. Encourage the ARF to develop protocols on the issuing of visas for civilian humanitarian aid workers and standard operating procedures in order to enable the rapid deployment of humanitarian personnel during emergencies.

f. Encourage the ARF to take a proactive role in helping ASEAN to identify and fill critical capacity shortfalls in relation to disaster response.

g. Encourage governments to compile an inventory of potential constraints that might limit or delay humanitarian access during an emergency.

2. Background

2.1. About the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

The Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect is an Associate of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. With offices in Brisbane (Australia) and Yogyakarta (Indonesia), the Centre’s mission is to conduct research, policy work and engage in advocacy and outreach aimed at furthering acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect within the Asia-Pacific Region and worldwide. The Centre contributes to the development of concrete measures to fulfil the R2P by working in cooperation with the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the United Nations, regional and sub-regional organizations, government bodies and nongovernmental organizations to support and enhance understanding, consensus and practical initiatives.

2.2. About act for peace

act for peace (formerly known as Christian World Service) is the international aid agency of the National Council of Churches in Australia and works with partners mainly in conflict-affected areas to help:
- protect people-at-risk;
- resolve armed conflicts; and
- reduce poverty.

act for peace works with partners in conflict-affected regions in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific. act for peace is currently working with partners to protect and assist 260,000 displaced Burmese, 250,000 internally displaced Darfuris and over 70,000 displaced Sri Lankans. Within South East Asia, act for peace is currently working with partners in Burma, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia.

act for peace is the Australian member of newly formed ACT Development group whose 14,000 staff are working on development programs in 157 countries. act for peace has full AusAID accreditation.

2.3. About the Responsibility to Protect

In the past few years, the international community has united in insisting that all governments have a responsibility to protect people from atrocities. This consensus was made plain at the 2005 World Summit, when world leaders took the momentous step of declaring that all states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing and that when states manifestly fail in that duty, the international community has a responsibility to use
appropriate measures to protect endangered populations. This principle, the ‘responsibility to protect’ - or R2P for short - was unanimously reaffirmed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1674 (2006).

According to the UN Secretary-General, R2P rests on three pillars:

1. All states accept that they have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

2. The international community has a responsibility to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help states protect people from genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass atrocities and war crimes.

3. The UN Security Council stands ready to use the full range of its Chapter VII powers, with the cooperation of regional organizations where appropriate, in cases where peaceful solutions are inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

The current Australian government supports the doctrine of R2P, as did the previous government. The Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, on 19 August 2008 stated:

Australia supports the R2P principle and, in this critical early stage of its development, will support efforts to clarify the concept and consolidate its authority. Outreach and advocacy to advance and consolidate the World Summit consensus on R2P is a priority at this stage.

…The Government is also keen that Australia continue to support, develop and advocate the R2P principle.

…R2P remains an emerging area of normative growth and the Government is determined that Australia remains committed to making the principle central to conflict prevention and resolution.¹

Earlier in August 2008, the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade reported that:

The committee recognises that Australia has given strong support to the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. It notes, however, the call by Kofi Annan for the international community to do better and 'develop the responsibility to protect into a powerful international norm that is not only quoted but put into practice, whenever and wherever it is needed'. It believes that Australia’s role now is to help ensure that the doctrine extends beyond lofty rhetoric to action where required.²

The committee recommends that the Australian Government continue to support actively the R2P doctrine and, through its representations in the UN, ensure that international deliberations are informed by the doctrine.³

The requirements for protection should be reflected in a consistent manner in government policies and white papers on foreign policy, defence and aid.⁴

Recent shifts in ASEAN doctrine provide an excellent opportunity for Australia to work with the ASEAN Security Community to ensure that the R2P doctrine extends beyond lofty rhetoric to action in the region.
3. Developments in ASEAN policy

Traditionally, ASEAN’s approach has been prefaced on three key norms: (1) non-interference; (2) consensus-based decision making; (3) non-use of force (see Appendix 2: ‘The ASEAN Way’). Although the Association remains committed to consensus and the non-use of force, it has relaxed its principle of non-interference in all cases. ASEAN’s role in responding to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar earlier this year is a particularly instructive guide for gauging shifting attitudes in the region. Additional evidence of the transformation within ASEAN can be found in the new ASEAN Charter – which is likely to be ratified by all ten member states before the end of this year.

3.1. ASEAN Charter

The Charter comes with a pledge to establish a human rights body and regional security community. It also states that the purposes of ASEAN include (emphasis added):

7. To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN;

8. To respond effectively, in accordance with the principle of comprehensive security, to all forms of threats, transnational crimes and transboundary challenges;

11. To enhance the well-being and livelihood of the peoples of ASEAN by providing them with equitable access to opportunities for human development, social welfare and justice;

13. To promote a people-oriented ASEAN in which all sectors of society are encouraged to participate in, and benefit from, the process of ASEAN integration and community building;

Relevantly, the Charter also includes the principle of ‘Upholding the United Nations Charter and international law, including international humanitarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member States’.

This shift from being purely ‘state-centric’ to increasingly being ‘people-oriented’ is potentially very significant if Australia and others assist in making the shift real.

3.2. ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Partnership

The recent Joint Declaration on the ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Partnership includes the following relevant principles and objectives:

SHARING common values of justice, democracy, social equality, good governance, human rights and caring societies that are the foundation for lasting peace, stability, progress, and prosperity according to the Charter of the United Nations

ADHERING to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and other universally recognised principles of international law

1. Engage in dialogue and support efforts to realise the ASEAN Security Community in order to help promote peace, stability, security, development and prosperity in the region;

2. Promote closer cooperation in order to address, prevent and combat transnational crimes...;
It is vital that ‘crimes against humanity’ in region be considered one of these ‘other crimes’ to be addressed and that Australia work with ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum in addressing and preventing crimes against humanity.

3.3. ASEAN and Cyclone Nargis

Although it is still too early to evaluate fully, the joint UN-ASEAN response to the mounting humanitarian crisis in Myanmar was an important development and relatively effective. Not only did it prove the most effective way of securing the delivery of much needed aid to cyclone ravaged Myanmar, it also provided a framework for responding to and preventing the escalation of future humanitarian crisis if they arise. Although the Secretaries-General of ASEAN and the UN should be commended for their effort, ASEAN’s response was initially slow and ad hoc, highlighting the need for the Association to develop its institutional capacity to respond rapidly if it is to become the first port of call for galvanizing and coordinating regional relief efforts in the future. More broadly, ASEAN’s engagement with Cyclone Nargis points to two important facets of its recent transformation.

As mentioned, there has been a palpable shift in collective expectations about the role of ASEAN. Although this is most obvious among the region’s civil society groups, there is evidence that several ASEAN governments themselves have begun to adopt a broader view of ASEAN’s appropriate role in the region. Following the Association’s work on emergency relief in the wake of the Boxing Day tsunami and the development of a disaster response mechanism, there is a widening view that ASEAN should become the first port of call for responding to humanitarian and political crises in the region. This was made clear in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, when the governments of Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines in particular were strongly encouraged by their domestic constituents to marshal an effective humanitarian response. To a greater or lesser extent, all of these governments readily accepted the view that ASEAN should play a role in humanitarian relief and crisis diplomacy, even though the crisis was limited to the domestic affairs of a single member.

It is also important to acknowledge that the Association remains divided about its future direction. Myanmar, Viet Nam – and to a lesser extent Laos and Cambodia – are resisting this transformation. They argue that the Association should remain committed to its traditional principle of non-interference, which would forestall efforts to make ASEAN the first port of first call for responding to regional emergencies and efforts to build the institutional capacity needed to transform the Association’s Disaster Response Mechanism into a functional capacity capable of responding rapidly to new emergencies. Because ASEAN moves forward on the basis of consensus (see Appendix 2), this bloc of member states succeeded in winning important concession on issues such as the proposed human rights body. However, the process is moving forward, with a working group and high-level group charged with developing recommendations about its shape and structure. Among the proposals is a suggestion that ASEAN look to emulate the human rights system created by Europe in the wake of the Helsinki Accords and establish a consensus-based system similar to the OSCE.6

Given the on-going transformation of the Association and the internal tensions about its future direction, it is important that Australia’s engagement is measured and conducted in tandem with like-minded governments in the region. Rather than proposing entirely new initiatives, Australia should focus on lending support wherever possible to initiatives that emerge from within ASEAN itself. One important area where Australia can make an important contribution to ASEAN’s transformation and in
turn help strengthen regional security is by supporting efforts to develop the region’s capacity to respond in an effective and timely fashion to humanitarian emergencies and by working with other ‘Friends of the Responsibility to Protect’ (Singapore, Republic of Korea) to deepen the region’s commitment to the Responsibility to Protect principle.

Further details about ASEAN’s response to Cyclone Nargis are set out in Appendix 1 here.

4. ASEAN Members’ views on the Responsibility to Protect

It is often said that because of its traditional commitment to the principle of non-interference, the ASEAN region is the part of the world least open to the R2P and to the idea of the international community’s role in helping states protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic conflict and crimes against humanity. On closer inspection, however, there is a strong groundswell of opinion – amongst individuals, civil societies and governments in ASEAN – that genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing are matters that ought to be of concern to the international community. For example, at the 2005 World Summit, President Susilo Bambang Yudhuyono of Indonesia indicated his support for the Responsibility to Protect, arguing that: ‘We need a consensus on the responsibility to protect people from genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. To this end, force should only be used when all other means have failed’. A year earlier, the Philippines Ambassador to the UN Security Council had expressed his country’s support for the responsibility to protect even more clearly: ‘Sovereignty also entails the responsibility of a State to protect its people. If it is unable or unwilling to do so, the international community has the responsibility to help that State achieve such capacity and such will and, in extreme necessity, to assume such responsibility itself’.

4.1. Indonesia

ASEAN’s enduring support for the Responsibility to Protect principle was perhaps best exemplified, however, by the contribution of Indonesia and Viet Nam to the May 2008 meeting of the UN Security Council on the protection of civilians. Indonesia is a prominent member of ASEAN, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. It has also established a track record of receptiveness to the Responsibility to Protect though it shares the concerns of other Non-Aligned/G-77 States about the potential for the principle to be abused or misapplied. This view was clearly expressed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhuyono at the 2005 World Summit. The President welcomed the principle but called for limits to when force might be used in its name. According to the President, ‘we need a consensus on the responsibility to protect people from genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. To this end, force should only be used when all other means have failed’.

Indonesia used Responsibility to Protect language in its statement to reaffirm the responsibilities endowed upon the Security Council, regional organizations and international community more broadly. Thus, in a clear reference to the undertakings given at the 2005 World Summit and in Resolution 1674, Indonesia maintained that: ‘The [Security] Council has an imperative duty to stand for those who are defenceless and in need of protection in times of conflict’. The representative continued, ‘It is our shared responsibility to alleviate the suffering of victims wherever and whenever it occurs’.

In addition, Indonesia pointed to the role that regional organizations can play in enhancing the protection of civilians, especially by contributing to the prevention of war through the use of negotiation and dialogue. As Indonesia’s Permanent Representative put it: ‘Regional organizations have an
important role to play in the protection of civilians. It is important to remember that the best preventive medicine for war is fruitful negotiation and dialogue, which is often achieved by inviting the participation of regionally relevant players.°

Indonesia therefore plainly expressed its support for the basic idea underpinning the Responsibility to Protect – the international community, through the Security Council and regional organizations, has an imperative duty to protect the ‘defenceless’.

Finally, Indonesia ended by calling for the United Nations to focus on ‘maintaining momentum by strengthening the efforts of the United Nation system’ by Member States ‘working as a whole in a coordinated, coherent, comprehensive and cooperative manner’ – strongly suggesting that it is ready to consider proposals for translating the Responsibility to Protect from ‘words into deeds’ at the United Nations.

4.2. Viet Nam

Viet Nam is one of South-East Asia’s staunchest defenders of the principle of non-interference and has been highly sceptical of the Responsibility to Protect, raising fears that it could join the group of states arguing that world leaders did not make a commitment to the principle at the World Summit in 2005. However, at the May 2008 Security Council meeting on the Protection of Civilians, Viet Nam clearly indicated its support for the Responsibility to Protect.

‘Viet Nam’s view’, its Permanent Representative argued, is ‘that it is States that bear primary responsibility to protect their own civilians and to deal with violence against civilians as well as violations of international humanitarian law. In order to help States fulfil their responsibilities, the United Nations can help improve their national capacity, provide technical assistance and work with them to conduct other awareness-raising activities, for instance through training courses’. 10

Thus, Viet Nam indicated its endorsement for the first two steps of the responsibility to protect principle: the responsibility of all states to protect their own citizens and the international community’s responsibility to encourage and enable the development of protective capacities in a cooperative fashion. Importantly, Viet Nam singled out the prevention and peaceful resolution of armed conflict as ‘the best way to protect civilians in armed conflict’. 11

In relation to those aspects of the Responsibility to Protect that refer to the international community’s responsibility to protect endangered populations when the host state is manifestly failing in its responsibilities, Viet Nam insisted that ‘the Security Council should consider the issue of the protection of civilians on a case-by-case basis and in line with the approach endorsed in previous relevant resolutions’. Chief among those relevant resolutions is Resolution 1674 which set out the Security Council’s endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect.

In addition to this clear endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect envisioned by the 2005 World Summit, Viet Nam also indicated that it might be time to further consider proposals for translating the principle from ‘words into deeds’. At the very end of its statement to the Security Council, Viet Nam noted that:

‘Bearing that in mind [the aforementioned statement on the principle], we hold that the creation and application of any international mechanism should be thoroughly studied with a view to ensuring its efficient, effective and sustainable performance without resulting in an unnecessary financial burden for States’.
At the very least, this statement indicates Viet Nam’s willingness to consider appropriate mechanisms for enacting the Security Council’s commitment to the protection of civilians and Responsibility to Protect principle. Alongside Viet Nam’s support for the principle, this represents a significant strengthening of consensus and clearly indicates that Viet Nam shares the majority view on the principle.

The caution evident in Viet Nam’s statement reaffirms the view that the emerging consensus on the Responsibility to Protect in the Asia-Pacific region is based upon a shared understanding of the principle as agreed at the 2005 World Summit. For Viet Nam, the authority of the Security Council and appropriate application of the principle seem to be core elements of its decision to support the Responsibility to Protect and open up the potential for further discussion about translating the principle from words into deeds.

As an internationally agreed principle, the R2P provides a useful entry-point for engaging with ASEAN in the promotion of regional security. The key to harnessing this positive opinion is to develop ways in which the Responsibility to Protect can be translated from words into deeds by regional organizations and processes such as ASEAN and the ARF. The need for this was given renewed impetus by the response to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, in May 2008.

Although many governments in the region have real concerns about what R2P means for sovereignty and non-interference, and when it can be acted upon, there are good grounds for being optimistic that R2P provides a useful vehicle for engaging with ASEAN to strengthen regional security. Like other parts of the world, Southeast Asia has a strong history of regionalism and it was therefore no surprise that the region’s governments mentioned the positive role that regional organisations can play in preventing attacks on civilians, helping regional neighbours to exercise their responsibility to protect, and protecting vulnerable populations where necessary and consistent with the UN Charter. Much progress has been made on this within the European Union and African Union, but there remains much untapped potential for the role of regional organisations in many other parts of the world. The Asia-Pacific region is replete with regional organizations and arrangements such as ASEAN, ASEAN Plus Three, the ARF, APEC and the Pacific Islands Forum that are all very well placed to play a leading role.

In addition, there are two reasons for thinking that now is a particularly propitious time to engage with ASEAN on these issues.

First, ASEAN is undergoing a period of institutional renewal spearheaded by its new Charter that is foregrounding changing attitudes towards the relationship between sovereignty, non-interference and fundamental human rights. As we noted earlier, ASEAN is creating a Human Rights Mechanisms (HRM) and security community blueprint; some ASEAN members privately argue that the ‘spirit’ of Responsibility to Protect is evident in the new Charter and others are lobbying for the HRM to be strengthened; there is also the potential for an ‘ASEAN Peoples’ Charter’. Moreover, the region’s response to Cyclone Nargis highlights changing expectations about the role and function of ASEAN. For many in the region, ASEAN should be a first port of call when disaster strikes. This period of institutional renewal creates gateways for the Responsibility to Protect.

In Bali in 2003, ASEAN members formalized their intent to develop an ASEAN community with three different elements; political and security cooperation, economic cooperation and socio-cultural cooperation. The intent to develop an ASEAN Security Community was then reinforced in the ASEAN Charter in 2007. In moving towards a Security Community, ASEAN aims to achieve greater political
and security cooperation, and to strengthen mechanisms for conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict peace-building. ASEAN intends to do this by strengthening confidence building measures; carrying out preventive diplomacy; resolving outstanding regional issues; as well as enhancing cooperation on non-traditional security issues. For the development of the ASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Regional Forum will continue to be the primary forum for regional security dialogue. These goals are strongly in line with the principles of the R2P, sharing a focus on regional cooperation, conflict prevention mechanisms, and recognising the important role of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference. It is in this time of renewal that Australia can play a key role in supporting ASEAN in their shift towards taking a greater leadership role on security issues within the region.

Second, the Responsibility to Protect principle enjoys the support of many individuals, civil society groups and opinion shapers in the ASEAN region. In addition to the positive government attitudes set out above, the principle enjoys the support of key individuals such as the current ASEAN Secretary-General, Surin Pitsuwan, former President of the Philippines, Fidel Ramos, and co-chair of the working group created to prepare recommendations for the proposed ASEAN human rights body, Vitit Muntarbhorn. Indeed, Ramos and Muntarbhorn are Patrons of the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. It is also being adopted by many of the region’s civil society organizations. In March 2008, for example, a large civil society conference on the ‘Role of ASEAN Civil Society in Supporting Human Rights and Democracy in Burma’, which included major organizations such as FORUM ASIA issued the ‘Jakarta Declaration on Burma’, stating that: ‘In light of the SPDC’s [the government of Myanmar] inability to respond to the humanitarian crisis gripping the nation, we urge ASEAN nations and the broader international community to fulfil their responsibility to protect the affected people of Burma’. Likewise the Solidarity for Asian Peoples Advocacies (SAPA) Working Group on ASEAN submitted three submissions to the ASEAN Eminent Persons Group. They recommended that the ASEAN Charter be amended: “Article 2.2e needs to establish that states also have a ‘responsibility to protect’, that is, the responsibility to protect people from gross violations of human rights. All ASEAN heads of state and government accepted this concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’ at the UN World Summit in September 2005.

5. Opportunities for engagement

How, then, might Australia use the Responsibility to Protect principle in order to strengthen its engagement with ASEAN and contribute to regional security? There are three principle avenues that should pursued simultaneously:

1. Building consensus through dialogue:
Stimulating Track II dialogue on the meaning and scope of the R2P principle with a view to promoting regional ownership, embedding consensus and creating future opportunities for policy development.

2. Strengthening regional capacity for prevention:
Engaging with ASEAN on the prevention of armed conflict in general, and genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in particular.

3. Improving the capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies:
Continuing to support ASEAN in the development of its capacity to respond to major humanitarian crises in a timely and effective manner.
We will briefly explore each of these issues in turn.

1. **Building consensus through dialogue**

In order for the R2P principle to contribute to the strengthening of regional security, it is imperative that the region establish a consensus on the principle’s scope and meaning. Productive dialogue is best fostered through what has become known as Track II, which comprises government officials often working in a private capacity and civil society groups. This track is most suitable because it affords the opportunity for the frank and open exchange of views whilst maintaining a link to national governments. There are a number of activities that the Australian government could support in order to encourage dialogue about the R2P.

1. **Host a major regional conference to begin a process of dialogue on the scope and meaning of the R2P and the steps required to translate the principle from words into deeds.** In addition to embedding consensus about the meaning and scope of the R2P, the conference could be used as a catalyst for opening dialogue on its operationalization, in areas such as: preventive diplomacy, building state capacity, international law, the role of regional organizations and processes, the role of civil society organizations, the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities, peacebuilding, and regional peacekeeping capacity. The conference could establish a work plan, identifying areas of consensus and areas where further work is required, and follow-up mechanisms.

2. **Support the establishment of a CSCAP Study Group to examine the impact of the R2P on the principle of non-interference and report to the ARF.** One of the recommendations to emerge from the CSCAP Study Group on Preventive Diplomacy was the proposal that the council further examine the regional implications of the R2P and the ways in which the principle might reinvigorate the ARF.

3. **Encourage and support on-going dialogue about the R2P.** There are two different levels through which dialogue might be promoted. First, the promotion of dialogue within individual countries is an important precursor to regional dialogue and consensus. Australia could support initiatives that aim to foster research and dialogue within important neighbouring countries. Second, dialogue is fostered by supporting Track II initiatives (such as that proposed immediately above) that aim to build consensus about elements of the operationalization of the R2P, for example the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

4. **Adopt a more activist stance on the role of the region’s ‘Friends of R2P’.** Within the broad Asia-Pacific region there are three ‘friends of R2P’: Australia, Singapore and the Republic of Korea. This network offers an opportunity to work with key members of ASEAN and the ARF process to advance the R2P as a way of strengthening regional security. Australia could propose a series of meetings between the three ‘friends’ to coordinate policy positions where possible, share relevant information, and develop plans for advancing the principle within the region.

2. **Strengthening regional capacity for prevention**

There are a number of principled, practical and political reasons for thinking that engaging with ASEAN on the prevention of armed conflict in general, and of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in particular might contribute to regional peace and security. The best way to maintain peace and security and promote human security is to prevent armed conflict from erupting in the first place. Successful prevention lays the groundwork for deeper engagement on good governance, the rule of law, and economic development. The key practical issue is that even a comprehensive and proactive approach to prevention is cheaper and more politically prudent than
waiting for a crisis to erupt before marshalling a response. Politically, focusing on prevention would be knocking at an open door. ASEAN has already committed to prevention and has an enviable track record in this department. There are also tangible reforms and practices that organizations such as ASEAN can adopt to improve their capacity to prevent armed conflict, such as developing capacities for early warning and preventive diplomacy.

In general, key areas of engagement in the field of prevention have included:

a. Early warning and information

b. Assisting states and civil societies to build capacity (in areas such as law and order, security sector reform, local level conflict prevention, measures to mitigate hate speech and incitement to genocide/violence)

c. Diplomacy and mediation

d. Control in the trade of small arms

e. Human rights accountability

f. Capacity for preventive deployment at the request of the host government

In the past few years, ASEAN has taken steps in each of these areas, including through the use of extended dialogue through the ARF and ASEAN Plus Three, the UN-ASEAN Regional Seminar on Conflict Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding, and the proposed Human Rights Mechanism. Specific areas where Australia could make a contribution, deepening its engagement with ASEAN and strengthening regional security include:

1. Strengthen the ARF’s Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy by supporting the restarting of the CSCAP Working Group on Preventive Diplomacy and encouraging the Group to deliver recommendations to the ARF. In 2001, the ARF set out its Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy and in 2005, CSCAP created a working group to explore the Concept and Principles and make recommendations for their further strengthening which held a one-off conference in 2007. The chair of the working group is prepared to report later this year if the ARF indicates its willingness to accept a report. Australia should encourage publication of the report and its recommendations should provide impetus for progressing preventive diplomacy within the ARF context. Australia can contribute further by providing support to the working group, encouraging it to deliver tangible recommendations for advancing the ARF’s role in preventive diplomacy and standing ready to translate its recommendations into a policy stance at the ARF, in tandem with like-minded states.

2. Encourage the ARF to host a conference on prevention focusing specifically on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. A successful conference on prevention was held by the ARF in 2004 but not followed-up. The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document specifically identified prevention as a core priority. The ARF is well placed to address this priority by restarting its engagement with prevention issues and the R2P principle provides the potential for a more targeted approach to prevention, limited to the prevention of the four crimes specifically referred to by the World Summit Outcome Document.
3. Continue to emphasise the strengthening of state capacity in Southeast Asia as a priority of Australia's development aid assistance. Ultimately, as AusAID recognises, the backbone of conflict prevention is strong, legitimate, and capable states. Aid programmes that focus on building capacity therefore make a direct contribution to the prevention of armed conflict in the region and should be maintained. ASEAN members are united in arguing that achieving the Millennium Development Goals is an important component of building regional peace and security. Australia can play an important role by emphasising the relationship between economic development, capacity building and peace and security through AusAID.

4. Carefully monitor progress towards the establishment of a human rights mechanism and actively seek opportunities to support the mechanism, potentially through the ARF process. The proposed ASEAN human rights mechanism may make an important contribution to the prevention of conflict. A potential model in this regard is the OSCE, which is similarly based on the principle of consensus. Australia can encourage and strengthen conflict prevention by monitoring progress on the human rights mechanism and working with partners in the region to identify opportunities to provide support.

5. Contribute to the region's capacity to deploy peacekeepers in a preventive manner by encouraging regional cooperation in the field. Australia is well-placed to make a positive contribution to the region's potential capacity to deploy peacekeepers and has already established a good track record in this area. The Asia-Pacific Centre for Civil-Military Cooperation provides an excellent venue for developing joint training programs and planning exercises. This should be widened to include joint programs in the field of policing, developing the role that the AFP's International Deployment Group has already established in this area.

3. Improving the capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies

ASEAN has been engaged in disaster response since the 1970s and this interest has accelerated since the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami. As we noted earlier, responses among Southeast Asian civil society groups suggest that there are increasing demands for ASEAN to play a leadership role in marshalling humanitarian relief in the wake of emergencies in the region. Capacity exists within ASEAN to deal with disaster response, although at present it is still developing and is focused mainly on responding to natural disasters. Strengthening ASEAN’s capacity to respond to natural disasters will also improve the Association’s capacity to respond to other forms of humanitarian emergency.

The importance of disaster management was first formally recognised by ASEAN in February 1976, with the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. Eight principles were established, one of which stated that ‘natural disasters and major calamities can retard the pace of development of member states, therefore they shall extend, within their capabilities, assistance for relief of member states in distress’. Following this, the ASEAN Declaration of Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters was adopted in June 1976. This called on all members to make improvements in all aspects of disaster management, including effective communication with early warning, relief assistance and distribution of medical and other supplies, and a general sharing of expertise and information. At the Bali Concord II in 2003, these efforts were reprioritised, with calls for greater cooperation.

In early 2003, the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) was established and is currently building its programme according to the ‘ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management’. Its strategies can be seen in the list of goals in Appendix 2.
Currently, ACDM is engaged in a project aimed at improving information sharing, titled Disaster Information Sharing and Communications Network (DISCNet). The project aimed to create ‘a more effective “information clearinghouse” mechanism to promote collaboration and strengthen national capacities in disaster risk information dissemination’. It is hoped that greater information sharing will lead to integrated decision-making between member states, as well as more effective collaboration with international bodies.

Two other agreements are worth mentioning here. Following the 2004 Tsunami, a special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting was held in Jakarta on January 6, 2005. There they adopted the ‘Declaration to Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Prevention on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster of December 26, 2004’. The leaders agreed to create a regional instrument on disaster management and emergency response.

On July 26, 2005, ASEAN foreign ministers signed the ‘ASEAN Agreements on Disaster Management and Emergency Response’ which aimed to ‘jointly respond to disaster emergencies through concerted national efforts and intensified regional and international cooperation’. Included in this was a provision to set up an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance regarding disaster management. Referred to as the AHA centre, this and other measures in the Agreement will come into force upon ratification by all member states, a process which has yet been completed.

To facilitate implementation and cooperation, ACDM has a number of ‘focal points’, or management centres located in member states. In Myanmar, for example, the focal point is situated at the Ministry of Relief and Resettlement, which has its headquarters in the new capital, Naypyidaw City.

Based on the experience of Cyclone Nargis, it is clear that in order to strengthen ASEAN’s capacity in this area, several initiatives are needed.

- Member states should be encouraged to conduct contingency planning in order to fast-track visa processing for relief workers from member states.

- ASEAN should implement its decision to establish a standing emergency relief fund. Coordination with the UN might be useful in this area as the UN clearly showed in responding to Cyclone Nargis that it was able to raise significant funding in a short time.

- ASEAN should develop the institutional capacity to implement its agreements on disaster management more rapidly. In addition to the recommendations made above, this involves establishing a variety of capacities and guiding protocols, including: a capacity to provide early warning of humanitarian crises; a capacity to despatch trained assessment teams within twenty four hours of an emergency; a capacity to rapidly translate assessment reports into actionable strategies; a capacity to bring together Foreign Ministers or other decision-makers within a few days of a crisis erupting; and a capacity to rapidly source sufficient expertise for effective humanitarian responses from ASEAN member states and their partners.

What can Australia do to support these initiatives, deepen its engagement with ASEAN and thereby strengthen regional security? Australia has already been actively engaged in this area, for instance through the ARF Desktop Exercise on Disaster Relief conducted shortly before Cyclone Nargis (1-2 May 2008).
A useful starting point may be to follow-up and expand on some of the recommendations produced by that exercise, including:

1. **That Australia support the establishment of an ARF working group to maintain the ongoing development of standard operating procedures for disaster relief, provide the group with administrative and other forms of support, and encourage the participation of other interested organizations such as OCHA and the IFRC.**

2. **That the standard operating procedures include a status of forces agreement to facilitate the deployment of foreign military assistance to affected areas in the immediate aftermath of a humanitarian disaster.**

3. **That future desktop exercises be conducted.**
   Such exercises might widen the scope of the relevant scenarios to include broader humanitarian disasters involving the large-scale displacement of populations, simulate a host government reluctant to accept international assistance, and might incorporate tactical-level exercises focusing on the rapid delivery of assistance in a coordinated fashion and in a logistically problematic environment.

4. **That full-scale exercises be conducted.**
   Under US-Philippines leadership, there are plans to hold a full-scale humanitarian response exercise. This exercise should be supported and opportunities for future exercises explored.

The development of protocols and standard operating procedures, including the conducting of desktop exercises would help identify specific needs, establish important partnerships and contribute to lessons learnt. However, there are a number of broader diplomatic initiatives that Australia could consider adopting in order to strengthen its engagement with ASEAN in the field of disaster response. In particular:

1. **Australia should encourage the ARF to develop protocols on the issuing of visas for civilian humanitarian aid workers and standard operating procedures in order to enable the rapid deployment of humanitarian personnel during emergencies.**

2. **Australia should encourage the ARF to take a proactive role in helping ASEAN to identify and fill critical capacity shortfalls in relation to disaster response.** In particular, attention should be paid to those areas already identified as priorities by ASEAN. For example, strengthening ASEAN’s capacity to rapidly despatch assessment teams and reducing the amount of time it takes to translate the team’s findings into humanitarian action.

3. **Australia should encourage governments to compile an inventory of potential constraints that might limit or delay humanitarian access during an emergency.** Potential constraints may include climatic and environment limits, logistical issues, and administrative constraints. Such an inventory would make forward planning easier to achieve.
6. Conclusion

Foreign Minister Stephen Smith recently pledged Australia’s commitment to clarifying the R2P principle and prioritized outreach and advocacy to advance the 2005 World Summit agreement. As a leading proponent of the R2P in the region, Australia has the potential to play a key role in assisting ASEAN and its member states to devise policies, strengthen capacities and build institutions to ensure that the Asia-Pacific region is better enabled to protect populations in armed conflict, respond to humanitarian emergencies and advance human security. By fostering dialogue on the scope and meaning of the R2P, enhancing the regional capacity to prevent armed conflict and strengthening humanitarian relief protocols and delivery channels, Australia can play a pivotal role in consolidating and advance the R2P. In this capacity, Australia stands to make an important contribution to regional security.

Thank you for the opportunity of making this submission and we look forward to the opportunity to provide oral evidence to the Committee in due course.

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29 August 2008
Appendix 1: ASEAN and Cyclone Nargis

Cyclone Nargis struck the Irrawaddy Delta in south-western Myanmar on 2 May 2008. The official death toll published by the Government of Myanmar is 77,738 with an additional 55,917 people reported missing. Most estimates suggest that the death toll is close to 133,000. The United Nations estimates that Cyclone Nargis affected 2.4 million people and independent observers report that approximately 1.5 million people remain homeless. UNICEF projects that children accounted for forty percent of the most adversely affected population and are the most susceptible to disease in the Cyclone’s aftermath.

In response to the devastation of Cyclone Nargis, ASEAN released its first press statement on May 5 urging all member states to provide relief assistance to the victims. Singapore and the Philippines sent experts to join a UN Disaster Assessment Coordination team. The ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management ‘alerted all relevant ASEAN focal points to be on high alert’ and ready to mobilize whenever assistance was needed. Members of the ARF were also urged to ‘look into ways of mobilizing necessary resources’.

On May 12, there was a meeting of the ASEAN secretariat, World Bank and the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) regarding support for an ASEAN-led ‘coalition of mercy’ for relief in Myanmar, called for by the Association’s Secretary-General, Surin Pitsuwan. On May 13, it was declared that an ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT) would be sent to determine the needs of those affected by the cyclone. On 19 May ASEAN held a special foreign ministers meeting and established the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force for the Victims of Cyclone Nargis. The task force was intended to be an ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism for distributing aid effectively, which included deploying health and medical relief workers. The Humanitarian Task Force was headed by the ASEAN Secretary-General and consisted of senior officials and experts from ASEAN countries. Following the meeting, the government of Myanmar agreed to the immediate deployment of medical teams from all ASEAN countries and pledged that it was prepared to accept the assistance of international and regional experts. Dr. Surin followed up the 19 May meeting with a visit to Yangon on 20-21 May at the invitation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Myanmar. During his visit, Surin met with Prime Minister Thein Sein to set out in detail the necessary steps for implementing the 19 May agreements with the full endorsement and support of the Government of Myanmar.

Following the visit by the ASEAN Secretary-General, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Myanmar on 22 May. Ban met with Prime Minister Thein Sein, and stressed the urgent need for officials to accept international assistance. After Ban’s visit, there were no reported delays in issuing visas to UN staff.

On 25 May, representatives from 51 countries gathered in Yangon for an ASEAN-UN international pledging conference. Concerned officials and agencies formed the Tripartite Core Group (TCG), which comprised three representatives each from the government of Myanmar, ASEAN and the UN. The TCG was tasked with coordinating, facilitating and monitoring international assistance to cyclone-hit areas. Deputy Foreign Minister of Myanmar, Kyaw Thu chaired the TCG, with the goal of ensuring close coordination of the relief and recovery efforts. Kyaw liaised between ASEAN, the UN and multiple levels of the Government of Myanmar. The TCG was then tasked with carrying out a comprehensive joint assessment of recovery needs, led by the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) team of experts from ASEAN, the UN, the International Organization for Migration, World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The assessment report on relief, recovery and rehabilitation phases was released in late June. As Chairman of the ASEAN-Myanmar-UN TCG, Kyaw Thu dispatched 250 members of the joint assessment team on 9 June.
Appendix 2: The ‘ASEAN Way’

In order to understand ASEAN’s commitment to the principle of non-interference, it is worth reminding ourselves of Michael Leifer’s point made in relation to the formation of ASEAN that, ‘the prime object of the regional exercise was the promotion of a structure of relations which would serve to reinforce the domestic basis of conservative-minded governments by reducing external frictions between them’.14 ASEAN was formed in 1967 against a background of ongoing disputes about borders and regime legitimacy. The paramount concern of ASEAN leaders was the consolidation, legitimization and security of new states and ruling elites.15

The common glue that brought the state leaders together in 1967 lay not in shared history or culture but in their shared experiences of trying to govern fragile states. The leaders of the new ASEAN members recognized that regional peace and security depended on stability and security within states. Thus, at the first ASEAN summit at the heads of government level (held in Bali, 1976), the closing declaration maintained that, ‘the stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience’. ASEAN’s primary goal was therefore the promotion of regional peace and security through the collective legitimization of states and limited cooperation to protect the security of the region’s regimes from the internal challenges stemming from secessionist movements and communist groups. As well as providing mutual support for sovereigns in the region, ASEAN was also the framework for the establishment of a security community that has helped ensure that not once since ASEAN’s formation in 1967 have two members gone to war. Security communities are groups of states that have developed dependable expectations of peaceful change.

Under the auspices of ASEAN, Southeast Asian states have built a framework of norms known as the ‘ASEAN way’ to enhance regional security. According to Michael Haas, the norms that form the core of the ‘ASEAN way’ are based on a common cultural perspective on international relations that emphasizes the importance of Asian forms of knowledge, consensus based decision-making, incrementalism and the primacy of politics over institutions.16 However, one of the striking things about the norms that constitute the ‘ASEAN way’ is that there is little that is distinctively ‘Asian’ about them.17 The ‘ASEAN way’ was developed over a number of years from a concern to ease diplomatic tensions and permit member states to concentrate on state consolidation and economic development.

There have been several attempts to identify and isolate the basic ideas that constitute the ‘ASEAN way’. Amitav Acharya has identified three such ideas whilst Jurgen Haacke has identified six.18 We suggest that that there are three clusters of norms organized around procedural norms of informality and an aversion to institutionalism – which helps explain why ASEAN has not developed an institutional matrix comparative to Europe’s. Southeast Asian security diplomacy makes use of informal, non-official and bilateral relationships more than it uses grand summitry and formal meetings. In a very practical sense, this has helped create regional policy networks comprised of officials and experts who seal their relationships on the golf course. The three clusters of norms at the heart of the ‘ASEAN way’ and therefore at the centre of the pursuit of security between Southeast Asian states are: (1) non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states; (2) a consensus based style of decision-making; (3) the non-use of force to settle disputes.

The principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states is the cornerstone of the ‘ASEAN way’. The principle is restated in virtually every significant ASEAN document. The founding Bangkok declaration of 1967 gave the association the job of promoting co-operation in the spirit of sovereign equality laid down in the UN Charter. In a classic restatement of the pluralist conception of
international society, the subsequent ZOPFAN Declaration recognized the right of all states ‘to lead its national existence free from outside interference’. Paramount amongst the principles identified in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1976 were mutual respect for sovereign independence, territorial integrity, sovereign equality, national identity, and the freedom of every state to lead its own national existence. According to Acharya, the non-interference norm has four primary aspects:

- Refraining from criticizing other member governments in public;
- A commitment to criticizing states deemed to have breached the non-interference principle;
- Denying recognition, sanctuary or any other kind of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize a member state.
- The provision of political and material support to member states in their campaign against subversive rebel groups.

The centrality of the principle of non-interference is unsurprising given that the primary security goals of Southeast Asian elites were state consolidation and regime legitimization. As well as fulfilling the community’s internal purposes, the non-interference principle also contributed to the development of regional autonomy. The norm of non-interference provided a justification for the establishment and global recognition of the region. This recognition contributed to the external legitimization of the region’s states and regimes (because it contributed to establishing an image of independence) and made it more difficult for outside powers to interfere with the region’s states, whilst leaving open the possibility that Southeast Asian states might conduct bilateral security relationships with outside states.

The second set of norms at the heart of the ‘ASEAN way’ form a distinctive style of decision-making. This style of decision-making focuses on building consensus through extensive consultation. According to many writers on ASEAN and ASEAN leaders themselves, these norms were built on the traditional Javanese village practices of *musyawarah* (consultation) and *muafakat* (consensus). The best interpretation of the *musyawarah* process is that it is the practice of consultation ‘on the basis of equality, tolerance and understanding with overtones of kinship and common interests’. Such consultations ought to take place away from the gaze of the media and other states and in a non-hostile setting. This has two important effects. First, the prolonged nature of the negotiations has allowed officials from different states to get to know each other personally. Second, in cases where *musyawarah* is practiced, states proposing particular initiatives are able to be almost completely certain about what the reaction of other state leaders will be because of the extensive consultation and negotiation that precedes its development.

*Muafakat* involves taking decisions on the basis of consensus through a process of *musyawarah*. This consensus is arrived at through debate and deliberation wherein negotiators do not try to coerce others into consent but rather seek to find a compromise that all can agree on. As Acharya points out, the region’s proclivity for decision-making by consensus was not the product of abstract idealism but a reaction to the practical problems confronting the region at the time of ASEAN’s formation. *Muafakat* flows directly from the fact that the association was meant to legitimize the member states and create conditions conducive to state-led economic development. Rather than allowing one state to pursue its narrow self-interests at the expense of all others, *muafakat* demands that all participants in a debate search for common ground as the basis of agreement.

The third set of norms that underpin the ‘ASEAN way’ is the non-use, or threat, of force to settle international disputes—though the use of force to settle internal disputes has sometimes been encouraged. Since the organization’s genesis, against the background of *konfrontasi* and many other internal disputes, the non-use or threat of force to settle international disputes has been one of its guiding principles. Moreover, given this turbulent history, the fact that there have been no wars
between Southeast Asian states is undoubtedly one of the region’s greatest achievements. This principle, which like the principle of non-interference is reaffirmed in all the association’s key declarations, was an important component in asserting the independence and sovereignty of the region’s smallest states (particularly Singapore and Brunei), provided an important source of collective legitimization by freezing the region’s borders, and allowed state leaders to concentrate on internal consolidation. Along with the other key norms, the principle of the non-use of force has meant that territorial disputes over Sabah and in the South China Sea have been ‘shelved’. Moreover, the rejection of the use or threat of force extended to an explicit rejection, frequently reaffirmed, of the idea that the region should establish a collective defence organization. The principle of the non-use or threat of force, for instance, means that the Philippines is permitted to maintain its constitutional claim to Sabah but is not permitted to violate Malaysia’s territorial integrity. Moreover, the non-interference principle insists that the Philippines must also act against any indigenous groups seeking to violate Malaysia’s territorial integrity.
## Appendix 2: ARPDM Objectives and Components

Implementation period: 2004-2010

### OBJECTIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component 1: Establishment of ASEAN Regional Disaster Management Framework</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promote cooperation and collaboration among Member Countries in all areas of disaster management including joint projects, collaborative research and networking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUB-COMPONENTS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Establishment of the ASEAN Response Action Plan (RAP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Enhancing Quick Response Capacities of Member Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 ASEAN Joint Simulation Exercises for Disaster Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Technical Cooperation Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Earthquake Vulnerability Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Flash Flood, Landslide, Sea/ River Erosion Preparedness and Mitigation</td>
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<td>c. Dissemination of Flood Early Warning</td>
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<td>d. Safety of Children in Flood-Prone Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Typhoon and Cyclone Preparedness and Mitigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Early Warning System for Land and Forest Fire Management and Haze Preparedness</td>
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<th>Component 2: Capacity Building</th>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthen capacity building in areas of priority concern of Member Countries, and promote human resources development in disaster management in accordance with the needs of Member Countries</td>
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<td><strong>SUB-COMPONENTS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1 ASEAN Disaster Management Training Institutes Network</td>
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<td>2.2 Specialised Disaster Management Training</td>
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<td>a. Specialised Training in Risk, Damage and Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>b. Specialised Training in Collapsed Structure Search and Rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Specialised Training in Forest Fire Fighting</td>
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<td>d. Refresher Courses/ Expertise Development</td>
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<td>e. Training on the Management of Disaster Stress and Behaviour</td>
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<th>Component 3: Sharing of Information and Resources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promote sharing of information, expertise, best practices, and resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUB-COMPONENTS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 ASEAN Disaster Information Sharing and Communication Network (ASEAN DISCNet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Development of ACDM Website and NDMO Websites</td>
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<td>b. Establishing Effective Communication Systems</td>
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<td>c. Publication of ADMIN Newsletter</td>
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<td>d. ASEAN Inventory of Disaster Management Experts (Brain Bank) and Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. ASEAN Hazard and Vulnerability Mapping Project</td>
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<td>3.2 Research and Development and Dissemination of Good Practices</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.3 Improved Use of Climate and Weather Forecasting</td>
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<tr>
<th>Component 4: Promoting Collaboration and Strengthening Partnerships</th>
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<tr>
<td>Promote partnerships among various stakeholders (GOs, NGOs, and community based international organisations)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SUB-COMPONENTS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Supporting Community-Based Management Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Partnerships with Relevant Organisations and NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Mobilising Financial Support and Resources</td>
</tr>
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<th>Component 5: Public Education, Awareness and Advocacy</th>
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<td>Promote advocacy, public education and awareness programme related to disaster management</td>
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<td><strong>SUB-COMPONENTS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 ASEAN Day for Disaster Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Integration of Disaster Management in School Curricula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Enhancing Disaster Management Public Education and Awareness Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Mainstreaming Disaster Management into Development Plans of ASEAN Member Countries</td>
</tr>
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Appendix 4: List of Acronyms

ACDM - ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management
AFP – Australian Federal Police
AHA - ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance
APEC – Asia-Pacific Economic Community
ARF – ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN – Association of South-East Asian Nations
CSCAP – Council on Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
ERAT - ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team
HRM – Human Rights Mechanism (ASEAN)
IFRC – International Federation of the Red Cross/Crescent
OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PONJA - Post-Nargis Joint Assessment Team
R2P – Responsibility to Protect
SAPA – Solidarity for Asian Peoples’ Advocacies
TCG - Tripartite Core Group
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
Appendix 5: Patrons and advisory board of the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

Patrons

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Former Foreign Minister of Canada

John Dauth
High Commissioner of Australia in New Zealand

Gareth Evans
President of the International Crisis Group

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Executive Director, Security Council Report

Edward Luck
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The views expressed in this Submission reflect those of the Centre and not its Patrons of International Advisory Board members.
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