



REPUBLIC OF KOREA

UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF R2P IMPLEMENTATION 2022



Asia-Pacific Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect



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The following Updated Assessment Annex provides an overview of the Republic of Korea's efforts in implementing R2P as of 2022. For a full description of the methodology used in this study, see Part II of 'Implementing the Responsibility to Protect in the Asia Pacific: An Assessment of Progress and Challenges', available [here](#). For more information on R2P implementation in the Asia Pacific in 2022, see the updated assessment [here](#).

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) continues to perform strongly in implementing R2P.

The ROK performs strongest in terms of the implementation of existing international legal instruments, domestic implementation, and support for multilateral endeavours. Its robust and diverse civil society is amongst the most vibrant in the region, successive governments have ensured, for the most part, fair and equal access to judicial institutions, and civilian authorities maintain effective control over the security sector.

The ROK is amongst the strongest performers on the international dimensions of R2P as well, though many of its programs continue to be focused on problems associated with North Korea. Indeed, the ROK continues to have highly restrictive asylum policies, making a rare exception for Afghan civilians fleeing the Taliban that had helped South Korean troops during their deployment to Afghanistan.

The ROK continues to participate in debates around R2P and human rights protection, although it has, at the time of writing, stopped co-sponsoring UN resolutions on the human rights situation in the DPRK.

The ROK continues to make important contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping operations that have a protection of civilians mandate, and the country hosted the 2021 Peacekeeping Ministerial in Seoul.

While they continue to give large amounts of aid, including contributing global supplies of COVID-19 vaccines, there continues to be limited explicit engagement with atrocity prevention and R2P, despite broad support for the norm in international fora.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Assessment	Indicator
Very Strong	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Reduction of atrocity crime risks
	Appoint national R2P Focal Point
	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court
	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Participate in international peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the UN Human Rights Council
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Cultivate and protect and active, diverse and robust civil society
	Ensure a legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention
Strong	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on the elimination of discrimination
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Enact and implement laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Ensure the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets examples of inclusiveness
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging or ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
Fair	Dealing with past atrocities
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law

	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping operations (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
Very Weak	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Support the Kigali Principles

Republic of Korea 2022 Score: 73

Republic of Korea 2019 Score: 74

Difference: - 1 

The Republic of Korea was an early supporter of R2P and continues to be one of the Asia Pacific's principal supporters of the norm. It retains its focus on the human rights situation in the DPRK at the expense of wider regional engagement, although it maintains effective engagement with the international community through peacekeeping. A recent change of government may see a shift in some relevant policies, yet the country's support for R2P as a whole will likely remain strong.

Thematic Area	Indicator	Assessment	Notes
Basic Compliance	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes.	Very Strong Unchanged	South Korean citizens are adequately protected from atrocity crimes.
	Reduction of atrocity crime risks.	Very Strong Unchanged	Strong institutions, a relatively free and active media landscape and civil society, and responsible security institutions combine to reduce the risks of atrocity crimes in South Korea considerably.
	Dealing with past atrocities.	Fair Unchanged	South Korea continues to deny its troops committed war crimes while deployed during the Vietnam War. Vietnamese survivors of massacres, with aid from South Korean civil society groups, have begun a lawsuit against the Korean government. ¹ Despite the existence of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that was relaunched in 2020 ² to investigate atrocities on the Korean peninsula, many records of war crimes and other atrocities remain unresolved. ³
Policy Mechanisms	Appoint national R2P Focal Point.	Very Strong Unchanged	South Korea maintains its national Focal Point. ⁴
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships.	Fair Unchanged	The <i>North Korean Human Rights Act</i> of 2016 is South Korea's principal instrument of legal and institutional protection of human rights in North Korea, and thus its prime method of atrocity prevention. However, the human rights situation in North Korea has in recent years moved to the background as the government under President Moon Jae-in stopped pressing the North on human rights abuses in an effort to open dialogue between the two countries. ⁵
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect.	Very Weak Unchanged	No updated evidence could be found of South Korea establishing domestic mechanisms related to R2P.
International Human Rights Obligations	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law.	Very Strong Unchanged	South Korea maintains its full ratification of all twelve instruments of international human rights law most relevant to R2P.
	Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court.	Very Strong Unchanged	South Korea remains a member State of the <i>Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court</i> .

¹ The New York Times, 2021. 'South Koreans face up to atrocities in Vietnam War'. *The Bangkok Post*, 22 August. Available at: <https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/2169323/south-koreans-face-up-to-atrocities-in-vietnam-war>; Kwok, Andre, Nathaneal Kwon, 2022. *Politics of denial: South Korean war crimes in Vietnam*, <https://www.newmandala.org/politics-of-denial-south-korean-war-crimes-in-vietnam/>; Do, Hoang, 2020. 'The Forgotten History of South Korean Massacres in Vietnam'. *The Diplomat*, 15 May. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/the-forgotten-history-of-south-korean-massacres-in-vietnam/>.

² Truth and Reconciliation Commission Republic of Korea, 2020. *About the Commission*, <http://www.jinsil.go.kr/en/bbm/bbs/selectBoardArticleView.do?nttId=23429#:~:text=The%20Truth%20and%20Reconciliation%20Commission%20was%20established%20as%20an%20independent,authoritarian%20rule%20and%20killings%20by.>

³ Kuzmarov, Jeremy, n.d. *The Korean War: Barbarism Unleashed*, <http://peacehistory-usfp.org/korean-war/>.

⁴ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), 2020. *Members of the Global Network of R2P Focal Points*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/members-of-the-global-network-of-r2p-focal-points/>.

⁵ Mackenzie, Jean, 2022. 'From handshakes to hostilities: How dangerous is the situation in North Korea?'. *BBC News*, 9 May. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61331859>; King, Robert, 2022. *North Korea Human Rights and South Korea's Upcoming Presidential Election*, <https://keia.org/the-peninsula/north-korea-human-rights-and-south-koreas-upcoming-presidential-election/>. See also: Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2022. *South Korea: Events of 2021*, 'Policy on Human Rights in North Korea', <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/south-korea#8cf655>.

Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles.	Very Strong Unchanged	South Korea's National Human Rights Commission retains its 'A' rating with GANHRI, ⁶ signifying full compliance with the Paris Principles.
Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on the elimination of discrimination.	Strong Unchanged	South Korea is widely regarded as an open and free democratic country, with strong protections of civil, social, political and economic rights. Yet there is the presence of chronic discrimination against women in South Korea, as well as foreigners, migrants and those in the LGBTIQ+ community. The freedom of expression, while generally upheld, is threatened by strong anti-defamation laws that punishes those that publish statements deemed to be libel or slanderous. ⁷
Participate in international peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the UN Human Rights Council.	Very Strong Unchanged	South Korea will hold its next UPR in 2023, and the deadline for the national report for the next session is in October 2022. ⁸ It currently has no overdue reports, with all nine of the treaties that have reporting procedures, that South Korea has ratified, up to date. ⁹
Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations.	Very Strong Unchanged	South Korea maintains an open invitation for UN mandate holders to visit the country. The majority of visits have been completed and reported upon or have the final report forthcoming. ¹⁰
Ensure equal access to justice.	Strong Decrease	There are widespread reports of political corruption at all levels in South Korea, and this has at times implicated members of the judiciary. Asylum seekers, including those from North Korea, do not always have access to basic services and suffer discrimination in interacting with government processes, including their initial application process for asylum. ¹¹
Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.	Strong Unchanged	The <i>Act on Punishment of Crimes Under Jurisdiction Of The International Criminal Court</i> criminalises genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes domestically within South Korea. ¹² Ethnic cleansing and the crime of aggression ¹³ are not specifically referenced in any legislation.

⁶ Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions, 2022. *Chart of The Status of National Institutions Accredited By The Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions*, p. 3, https://ganhri.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/StatusAccreditationChartNHRIs_27April2022.pdf.

⁷ U.S Department of State, 2022. *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Korea*, 'Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media; Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses', <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-korea/>; Amnesty International, 2022. *South Korea 2021*, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/south-korea/report-korea-republic-of/>; HRW, 2022. *South Korea: Events of 2021*.

⁸ UPR-Info, 2022. *Korea (Republic of) Timeline for UPR engagement in the current cycle*, <https://www.upr-info.org/en/review/korea-republic>.

⁹ United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, n.d. *List of States parties without overdue reports*, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/LateReporting.aspx.

¹⁰ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNOHCHR), n.d. *View Country visits of Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council since 1998*, <https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewCountryVisits.aspx?visitType=all&country=KOR&Lang=en>.

¹¹ U.S Department of State, 2022. *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Korea*, 'Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: f. Protection of Refugees; Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government'; Freedom House, 2022. *Freedom in the World 2022: South Korea*, 'F. Rule of Law', <https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2022>.

¹² International Criminal Court Project, 2022. *South Korea: Overview*, <https://www.aba-icc.org/country/south-korea/>. See also: Republic of Korea. 'Act on the Punishment of Crime within Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court'. (12 April 2011). https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=24229&type=part&key=9.

¹³ Coalition for the International Criminal Court, n.d. *Republic of Korea*, <https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/country/republic-korea>.

	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism.	Strong Unchanged	South Korea has remained strongly committed to international counter terrorism activities, despite not suffering a recent terrorist attack within its borders. ¹⁴ Their most recent evaluation by the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering found the country had a good understanding of money laundering and terrorism financing risks, and made good use of financial intelligence. ¹⁵
	Enact and implement laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence.	Strong Unchanged	<p>There are effective laws in South Korea regarding rape, domestic violence and sexual assault, yet the narrowness of some legal definitions and the widespread discrimination ingrained in South Korean society, means instances of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) are likely underreported and under prosecuted.¹⁶</p> <p>SGBV in the military is an ongoing problem, with cases of members committing suicide after alleging sexual assault and little action coming from the allegations. This also extends to discrimination against transgender persons. Digital sex crimes are also a problem, and there have been some positive steps towards effectively criminalising it.¹⁷ Further changes in the future under the new president Yoon Suk-yeol may occur, who in the past has advocated for men's rights, and this may undermine efforts to further gender equality in South Korea.¹⁸</p>
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law.	Fair Unchanged	<p>South Korea remains a country that has a small refugee intake and an ambiguous refugee policy. The country recently took 390 Afghan civilians and their families, who had been employed by South Korea during its deployment in Afghanistan, as "persons of special merit". While they were effectively refugees, the term was not used so as to bypass Koreans' antagonism towards refugees and migrants in general.¹⁹</p> <p>While South Korea grants automatic citizenship to defectors from North Korea, these refugees face widespread discrimination in society, housing and employment. These adverse conditions are politicised by the North, and defectors returning to North Korea, while rare, are not unheard of.²⁰</p>

¹⁴ United Nations, 2020. *Statement by Ms. Hyunseung Lee (1st Secretary) Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (Agenda 114)*, https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/75/pdfs/statements/int_terrorism/03mtg_repopkorea.pdf.

¹⁵ Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, 2020. *Korea Mutual Evaluation Report 2020*, p. 4 – 5, <http://www.apgml.org/members-and-observers/members/member-documents.aspx?m=b9d16e34-607e-4850-8c92-3a6cdfa70254>.

¹⁶ U.S Department of State, 2022. *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Korea*, 'Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses: Women'.

¹⁷ Ibid., Freedom House, 2022. *Freedom in the World 2022: South Korea*, 'F. Rule of Law'; Amnesty International, 2022. *South Korea 2021*, 'Women's and girls' rights'; HRW, 2022. *South Korea: Events of 2021*, 'Women and Girls' Rights'.

¹⁸ Draudt, Darcie, 2022. 'What President Yoon Suk-yeol's Election Means for South Korean Democracy'. *The Diplomat*, 23 March. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/what-president-yoon-suk-yeols-election-means-for-south-korean-democracy/>.

¹⁹ Rashid, Raphael, 2021. 'South Korea designates arriving Afghans as "persons of special merit"'. *The Guardian*, 26 August. Available at: [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/26/south-korea-designates-afghan-arrivals-as-persons-of-special-merit#:~:text=South%20Korea%20has%20a%20lukewarm,according%20to%20the%20justice%20ministry.](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/26/south-korea-designates-afghan-arrivals-as-persons-of-special-merit#:~:text=South%20Korea%20has%20a%20lukewarm,according%20to%20the%20justice%20ministry.;); Lee, Seoho, Natalia Slavney, 2021. 'Afghanistan Crisis Reignites South Korea's Refugee Debate'. *The Diplomat*, 2 October. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/afghanistan-crisis-reignites-south-koreas-refugee-debate/>. See also: U.S Department of State, 2022. *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Korea*, 'Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: f. Protection of Refugees'.

²⁰ Bluth, Christopher, 2022. 'The North Korean who went home: many defectors struggle against discrimination in the South'. *The Conversation*, 8 January. Available at: <https://theconversation.com/the-north-korean-who-went-home-many-defectors-struggle-against-discrimination-in-the-south-174366>; Williams, Sophie, 2021. 'North Korean defectors: What happens when they get to the

Domestic Implementation	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience.	Very Weak Unchanged	No national assessment has been conducted.
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society.	Very Strong Unchanged	The civil society sector remains strong in South Korea, and it is widely considered a liberal democracy that respects the rights of its people and has robust institutions. While there are some concerns about media freedom due to hindering laws regarding defamation and other issues, ²¹ there is generally a good amount of media diversity within the country with an open public sphere. ²²
	Ensure a legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector.	Very Strong Unchanged	South Korea maintains national conscription, with male citizens needing to complete a compulsory 18-21 months of military service. Objectors have been traditionally prosecuted and sent to prison, yet there is now an alternative national service option. ²³ Civilian authorities maintain control over the armed forces, and abuses are addressed through effective mechanisms.
	Ensure the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets examples of inclusiveness.	Strong Unchanged	South Korea maintains an effective education system, with compulsory education covering six years of primary school and three years of middle school. ²⁴ South Koreans have a generally high appetite for learning and tertiary education, although women do not always receive the same amount of education as men, due to traditional societal biases remaining. ²⁵
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas.	Very Strong Unchanged	No update could be found regarding this Indicator. South Korea effectively prevents nationals from committing atrocities overseas.
Bilateral and Multilateral Relations	Participate in international, regional, and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P.	Strong Decrease	The South Korean delegation gave a statement at the 2021 discussion in the UN about the adoption of R2P onto the General Assembly's annual agenda. The statement supported mainstreaming R2P in the UN and highlighted that prevention of atrocities was the primary responsibility of the State. ²⁶
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect.	Strong Unchanged	South Korea has been in favour of all General Assembly resolutions referencing atrocity crimes. UN General Assembly Resolutions: ²⁷ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2018: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions A/RES/73/172: yes.

South?' *BBC News*, 16 February. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49346262>; King, Robert, 2021. *Number of North Korean Defectors Drops to Lowest Level in Two Decades*, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/number-north-korean-defectors-drops-lowest-level-two-decades>.

²¹ There is also the recent criminalisation of sending leaflets and other South Korean media across the border into the North. This was enacted in an effort to bring the North closer to a dialogue after a drop in negotiations following the COVID-19 pandemic, and protect the people who live close to both sides of the border from retaliations by Northern authorities. Yet, human rights advocates see this as an infringement on freedom of expression. U.S Department of State, 2022. *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Korea*, 'Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: A. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media';

²² Freedom House, 2022. *Freedom in the World 2022: South Korea*, 'Civil Liberties D. Freedom of Expression and Belief'; Amnesty International, 2022. *South Korea 2021*, 'Freedom of expression, association and assembly'; Reporters Without Borders, 2022. *South Korea*, <https://rsf.org/en/country/south-korea>.

²³ U.S Department of State, 2022. *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Korea*, 'Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person'.

²⁴ Study in Korea, 2021. *Higher Education in Korea*, https://www.studyinkorea.go.kr/en/overseas_info/allnew_higherEducation.do.

²⁵ Education Encyclopedia, 2022. *South Korea Education System – overview*, <https://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1400/South-Korea-EDUCATIONAL-SYSTEM-OVERVIEW.html>.

²⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, Speakers Differ over Implementation of 'Responsibility to Protect' Principle, as General Assembly Considers Draft Resolution on Atrocity Crime Prevention, 17 May 2021, GA/12323.

²⁷ GCR2P, 2021. *UN General Assembly Resolutions Referencing R2P*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/un-general-assembly-resolutions-referencing-r2p-2/>. (Voting records for each resolution were accessed using the UN's Digital Library: General Assembly of the United Nations, n.d. *Voting Records*, <https://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/voting.asp>.)

- 2018: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea A/RES/73/180: **adopted without vote**.
- 2018: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/RES/73/182: **yes**.
- 2019: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea A/RES/74/166: **adopted without vote**.
- 2019: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/RES/74/169: **yes**.
- 2020: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea A/RES/75/190: **adopted without vote**.
- 2020: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions A/RES/75/189: **yes**.
- 2020: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/RES/75/193: **yes**.
- 2021: Promoting a culture of peace and tolerance to safeguard religious sites A/RES/75/258: **adopted without vote**.
- 2021: The responsibility to protect and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity A/RES/75/277: **yes**.

Yet, as of 2019, they have failed to co-sponsor resolutions regarding the human rights situation in North Korea, halting a record of co-sponsorship the country began in 2008.²⁸

Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging and ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy.	Strong Unchanged	South Korea, due to mobilisation of its civil society sector, has condemned the Tatmadaw’s coup in Myanmar, and has extended the visas of thousands of Myanmar nationals in the wake of the violence. Yet, there remains some concern over the actions of South Korean corporations in Myanmar that could be supporting the regime through their mutual business interests. ²⁹
Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention.	Fair Decrease	Members of the Asia Pacific Forum (APF) reached out to the Korean National Human Rights Commission to discuss support during the pandemic. ³⁰ While the previous president’s New Southern Policy sought to deepen ties with ASEAN nations, most of these efforts focused on economic development and defence cooperation, to mitigate any potential fallout of conflict between the US and China. ³¹
Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations.	Fair Unchanged	As mentioned in the above Indicator, any strengthening of ties between South Korea and Asia

²⁸ Choi, Ji-Sun, 2021. ‘S. Korea declines to co-sponsor UN resolution on NK human rights violations’. *The Dong-A Ilbo*, 23 March. Available at: <https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20210323/2520448/1>; HRW, 2020. *South Korea: Promote Human Rights in North Korea*, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/15/south-korea-promote-human-rights-north-korea>; Lynch, Colum, 2019. *South Korea Declines to Co-Sponsor North Korea Human Rights Resolution for First Time Since 2008*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/15/south-korea-declines-cosponsor-north-korea-human-rights-un-resolution-first-time-since-2008/>.

²⁹ Kim, Sea Young (Sarah), 2021. ‘Amplifying South Korea’s response to the Myanmar coup’. *East Asia Forum*, 15 April. Available at: <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/04/15/amplifying-south-koreas-response-to-the-myanmar-coup/>. Cf. Na, Hyun-Phil, 2022. ‘Will South Korea stop bankrolling Myanmar’s military’. *Korea Exposé*, 2 May. Available at: <https://koreaexpose.com/will-south-korea-stop-bankrolling-myanmar-military/>; Park, Sinmyung, 2021. ‘How a South Korean Gas Project Got Caught up in the Myanmar Coup’. *The Diplomat*, 29 June. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/how-a-south-korean-gas-project-got-caught-up-in-the-myanmar-coup/>.

³⁰ APF, 2022. *APF meets with Korean Commission*, <https://www.asiapacificforum.net/news/apf-meets-korean-commission/>.

³¹ Parameswaran, Prashanth, 2022. ‘What’s Next for ASEAN-South Korea Security Ties?’ *The Diplomat*, 6 January. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/whats-next-for-asean-south-korea-security-ties/>; Botto, Kathryn, 2021. *South Korea Beyond Northeast Asia: How Seoul Is Deepening Ties With India and ASEAN*, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/19/south-korea-beyond-northeast-asia-how-seoul-is-deepening-ties-with-india-and-asean-pub-85572>.

			Pacific countries is mostly undertaken through the rubric of mitigating any fallout of US-China competition on South Korea, rather than explicit atrocity prevention measures.
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities.	Fair Unchanged	South Korea hosted a conference with delegates throughout the region and beyond on tackling online hate speech and discrimination in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. ³² They also maintain the ASEAN-Korea Cooperation Fund, which strengthens ties between the two entities through projects that support a variety of measures that contribute to structural atrocity prevention. ³³
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships.	Fair Unchanged	South Korea is the 14 th highest donor of development assistance in the world, a ranking all the more remarkable given it was originally a receiver of aid following the devastation of the Korean War. ³⁴ The current priorities of South Korea aid see a strong emphasis on health and medicine following the COVID-19 pandemic, including donating US\$200 million to the COVAX Advance Market Commitment to provide vaccines to low-income countries. ³⁵ While useful, these priorities do not specifically take into account atrocity prevention.
United Nations, prevention, Peacekeeping, and assistance	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P.	Strong Unchanged	No updated information could be found for this Indicator. Given South Korea's continued support for R2P at the UN and its voting record in the General Assembly, it can be confidently surmised South Korea supports the work of the Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P.
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system.	Strong Decrease	South Korea's failure to uphold its record of co-sponsoring resolutions over human rights in North Korea is a clear reduction in its support of human rights in a UN context. Things may change under the new presidency of Yoon Suk-yeol. However, South Korea's continued support for the norm to be mainstreamed in UN systems shows the country maintains broad support for R2P and human rights more generally.
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes.	Very Strong Unchanged	Despite a lack in volume of discussions about R2P, it can be surmised by South Korea's comments at UN debates (see earlier Indicator) that the country remains supportive of the norm and that prevention begins with the State. Their efforts in delivering development assistance show they remain committed to the structural prevention of atrocity crimes.
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping operations (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate).	Fair Unchanged	South Korea maintains a sizable contribution of peacekeepers abroad, who are present in four missions. The majority of their personnel are deployed as part of UNMISS, which holds a protection of civilians mandate. ³⁶
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection,	Very Strong Increase	South Korea held the 2021 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial in Seoul, with the intention of

³² APF, 2020. *Tackling hate and promoting inclusion*, <https://www.asiapacificforum.net/news/tackling-hate-and-promoting-inclusion/>.

³³ Including peacebuilding initiatives and improving basic education. ASEAN-Korea Cooperation Fund, 2022. *Our Works*, <https://www.aseanrofund.com/our-works>.

³⁴ Ferro, Manuela V., Akihiko Nishio, 2021. 'From aid recipient to donor: Korea's inspirational development path'. *World Bank Blogs*, 2 December. Available at: <https://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/aid-recipient-donor-korea-inspirational-development-path>.

³⁵ Donor Tracker, 2022. *South Korea*, 'Strategic Priorities', <https://donortracker.org/country/south-korea>.

³⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, 2022. *Korea's Participation in UN Activities*, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_5460/contents.do.

	including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping.		strengthening peacekeeping operations in a number of areas, specifically the Action for Peacekeeping initiative. ³⁷
	Support the Kigali Principles.	Very Weak Unchanged	South Korea does not support the Kigali Principles.
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention.	Very Strong Unchanged	South Korea remains a supporter of both the French/Mexican initiative on suspending veto in the case of mass atrocities, ³⁸ as well as the ACT Code of Conduct regarding atrocity crimes. ³⁹

³⁷ United Nations Peacekeeping, 2021. *2021 Seoul UN Peacekeeping Ministerial*, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/2021-seoul-un-peacekeeping-ministerial#:~:text=The%202021%20Seoul%20UN%20Peacekeeping,Ministerial%20held%20in%20New%20York.>; United Nations, 2021. *Note to Correspondents: 2021 Seoul UN Peacekeeping Ministerial concludes with 62 countries making new pledges for UN peacekeeping operations*, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2021-12-08/note-correspondents-2021-seoul-un-peacekeeping-ministerial-concludes-62-countries-making-new-pledges-for-un-peacekeeping-operations>.

³⁸ GCR2P, 2022. *List of Supporters of the Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/list-of-supporters-of-the-political-declaration-on-suspension-of-veto/>.

³⁹ GCR2P, 2019. *List of Signatories to the ACT Code of Conduct*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/list-of-signatories-to-the-act-code-of-conduct/>.