



CHINA

UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF R2P IMPLEMENTATION 2022



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The following Updated Assessment Annex provides an overview of China's efforts in implementing R2P as of 2022. For a full description of the methodology used in this study, see Part II of 'Implementing the Responsibility to Protect in the Asia Pacific: An Assessment of Progress and Challenges', available [here](#). For more information on R2P implementation in the Asia Pacific in 2022, see the updated assessment [here](#).

CHINA

A trend showing a decline in effective atrocity prevention and human rights protection continues in China for its 2022 assessment. Over the past few decades, China has made significant progress in reducing the incidence and risk of atrocity crimes, but it continues to perform weakly in relation to human rights, civil society, and accountability. Like many other states in the region, China performs most poorly ('Very Weak') with respect to the adoption of R2P specific policy mechanisms due to the fact that it has not yet appointed an R2P Focal Point, nor does it appear to incorporate atrocity specific analysis into its foreign aid and defence policies. China also confronts significant challenges with respect to its national resilience to atrocity crimes. In particular, it performs poorly with respect to human rights and the protection of civil society freedoms. Of particular concern is evidence of declining media and civil society freedom and the arbitrary detention of up to one million Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang province and continued authoritarian measures in Tibet and Hong Kong.

China's international record continues to be mixed. On the positive side, it is an increasingly important contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping missions, including missions with robust protection of civilians mandates, but it has yet to support the Kigali Principles. China is amongst the world's top financial contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations, having significantly increased support for peacebuilding over the last decade through the adoption of 'developmental peacebuilding'. China provides troops, police and advisors to numerous peacekeeping operations with a protection of civilian mandate and is in the top contributors of female police peacekeepers.

It is an active participant in international debates on R2P, both in the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and Security Council, although it has mostly opposed issues regarding R2P.

China remains unwilling to support prevention and protection measures that do not enjoy the support of the host state. It blocked collective action to fulfil R2P in Syria and Myanmar, and delayed the imposition of an arms embargo on South Sudan by a number of years, contributing significantly to the international community's failures in those cases. It has looked to limit the scope of the Human Rights Council's work, especially on country situations and including those where atrocity crimes are committed. China has not yet adopted specific R2P or atrocity prevention measures.

CHINA

Assessment	Indicator
Strong	Participate in international peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the UN Human Rights Council
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping operations (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate)
Fair	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes
	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law
	Ensure a legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector
	Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas
	Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P
	Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping
Weak	Reduction of atrocity crime risks
	Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on the elimination of discrimination
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations
	Ensure equal access to justice
	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism
	Enact and implement laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence
	Ensure the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets examples of inclusiveness
	Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect
	Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging and ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy
	Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention
	Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships
	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P
	Very Weak
Appoint national R2P Focal Point	
Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships	
Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect	
Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court	

	Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity
	Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law
	Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience
	Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society
	Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes
	Support the Kigali Principles
	Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention

China 2022 Score: 22

China 2019 Score: 29 (28.5)

Difference: - 7 

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has special international responsibilities in addition to the responsibilities held by other States. Despite initial misgivings, it has displayed an openness to R2P but has looked to limit and sometimes outright block its implementation. On the domestic front, significant challenges continue to stymie the protection and promotion of human rights, civil society, and accountability. Atrocity risks remain a concern under the current leadership of Xi Jinping, especially in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong.

Thematic Area	Indicator	Assessment	Notes
Basic Compliance	Protection of populations from atrocity crimes.	Fair Decrease	The majority of Chinese citizens are protected from atrocity crimes. There are, however, significant exceptions to this. Those living in Tibet, Xinjiang, or Hong Kong are subject to severe limitations and violations of their human rights. In Xinjiang, these violations amount to crimes against humanity and perhaps genocide.
	Reduction of atrocity crime risks.	Weak Decrease	The risk of atrocity crimes occurring or continuing in China is substantial. The security and judicial services can act with impunity, and general social repression has been maintained under Xi Jinping's rule. The areas of Xinjiang ¹ and Hong Kong ² possess a higher risk of atrocity crimes occurring than the rest of the country.
	Dealing with past atrocities.	Very Weak Unchanged	China maintains no official recognition or commemoration of past atrocities. Government narratives are tightly controlled, and those who do not follow the Party line and bring attention to them do so at risks of reprisals from the security services.
Policy Mechanisms	Appoint national R2P Focal Point.	Very Weak Unchanged	China has still yet to appoint a national R2P Focal Point. ³
	Incorporate atrocity crime risks and dynamics into conflict analysis and/or development partnerships.	Very Weak Unchanged	China released its most recent white paper on development assistance in early 2021, entitled 'China's International Development Cooperation in the New Era'. ⁴ Within this document can be found the rationale for how and why China embarks on its development assistance, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The principles of this assistance include 'Respecting each other as equals', 'Focusing on development and improving people's lives', and 'Providing the means for independent development'. There is however, no mention of atrocity prevention within the white paper.
	Establish domestic mechanisms to hold the government accountable for upholding its responsibility to protect.	Very Weak Unchanged	As an authoritarian one-party State, there are no domestic mechanisms within China to hold the government accountable in upholding its responsibility to protect.
International Human Rights Obligations	Sign, ratify and implement relevant instruments of international law.	Fair Unchanged	China maintains ratification of nine of the 12 international human rights treaties that are most relevant to R2P. It also has signed, but not ratified, another, the <i>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</i> . It remains the only permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) not to have done so. It has neither signed nor ratified the <i>Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court</i> . ⁵

¹ Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (APR2P), 2020. *Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity in Xinjiang? Applying the Legal Tests*, https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/5818/applying_legal_tests_xinjiang_nov2020.pdf.

² APR2P, 2021. *Atrocity Crimes Risk Assessment Series: Hong Kong*, https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/7589/Risk_Assessment_hongkong_vol18_november2021.pdf.

³ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), 2020. *Members of the Global Network of R2P Focal Points*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/members-of-the-global-network-of-r2p-focal-points/>.

⁴ A full text of it can be found here: China Daily Global, 2021 'China's International Development Cooperation in the New Era'. *China Daily*, 11 January. Available at: <http://epaper.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202101/11/WS5ffb7d83a31099a23435323b.html>.

⁵ International Criminal Court, n.d. *The States Parties to the Rome Statute*, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx#C.

		China has, as of 6 July 2020, acceded to the <i>Arms Trade Treaty</i> , but only to the Special Administrative Regions of Macau and Hong Kong. ⁶
Sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and cooperate fully with the Court.	Very Weak Unchanged	China remains a non-signatory of the <i>Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court</i> .
Establish and maintain National Human Rights Institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles.	Very Weak Unchanged	There is no independent national human rights institution within China. There is the Equal Opportunities Commission in Hong Kong, and this maintains a 'C' rating by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions. ⁷
Ensure domestic promotion and protection of human rights, focusing on the elimination of discrimination.	Weak Unchanged	On 1 January 2021, <i>The Civil Code of the People's Republic of China</i> came into effect. The <i>Civil Code</i> is the first time a unified civil law framework has been created in China, setting out the purposes of protecting the lawful rights and interests of persons within China, in accordance with the country's constitution. ⁸ While the new code ensures the "...lawful rights and interests of women, minors, the elderly, and persons with disabilities are protected", ⁹ there remains no specific definition of discrimination in either the new code or the constitution. Furthermore, 'discrimination' as a word has been imported into China, and many Chinese confuse it with subjective feelings of prejudice or contempt, making the concept vague and open to interpretation, and therefore, abuse. ¹⁰
		There are widespread criticisms of China's curtailment of human rights within the country, particularly in certain areas and against certain groups within society. Acts and systematic policies of religious, racial, ethnic, disability and gender-based discrimination, including violence, have all been documented by observers, other countries and NGOs. Most notable are the actions of the Chinese government in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, where government policies have discriminated against and severely curtailed the human rights of ethnic and cultural minorities. ¹¹ In the case of Xinjiang, the incarceration of the Uighur population and other Muslim minorities in camps where human rights abuses occur, most likely constitute crimes against humanity and potentially genocide. ¹²

⁶ United Nations Treaty Collection, n.d. 8. *Arms Trade Treaty*, 'China', https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-8&chapter=26#EndDec.

⁷ Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), 2021. *Chart of the Status of National Institutions: Accreditation status as of 3 August 2021*, p. 12, <https://ganhri.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/StatusAccreditationChartNHRIs.pdf>.

⁸ The document can be read here: People's Republic of China, 2020. *Civil Code of the People's Republic of China*, <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/c23934/202012/f627aa3a4651475db936899d69419d1e/files/47c16489e186437eab3244495cb47d66.pdf>.

⁹ Ibid., p. 189.

¹⁰ Yiyang, Fan, 2017. *China Lacks Anti-Discrimination Law With Teeth*, <https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1772/china-lacks-anti-discrimination-law-with-teeth>.

¹¹ For example: U.S Department of State, 2020. *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)*, 'Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons', <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/>; Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2021. *China: Events of 2020*, 'Freedom of Expression', 'Freedom of Religion', 'Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity', <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/china-and-tibet#e81181>; Amnesty International, 2021. *China 2020*, 'Autonomous regions: Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia', <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china/report-china/>.

¹² APR2P, 2020. *Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity in Xinjiang? Applying the Legal Tests*; O'Connell, Giavanna, 2020. *How China is Violating Human Rights Treaties and its own Constitution in Xinjiang*, <https://www.justsecurity.org/72074/how-china-is-violating-human-rights-treaties-and-its-own-constitution-in-xinjiang/>.

	Participate in international peer review processes, including the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the UN Human Rights Council.	Strong Unchanged	China continues to participate in peer review processes, including the UPR. Its next review is scheduled for November 2023. ¹³ There remain two reports that China has not yet delivered upon (for the CRC and CAT). Hong Kong and Macau also have overdue reports, CAT and CEDAW for Hong Kong, and CAT, CEDAW and CRC for Macau. ¹⁴
	Cooperate fully with UN Human Rights mandate holders and those of relevant regional organisations.	Weak Unchanged	There remains no standing invitation from China to allow UN mandate holders and Special Rapporteurs to visit the country. The majority of country visits by mandate holders remain unfulfilled. ¹⁵ A report on a visit to China by the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights in 2016 noted that China held a position at odds with the long-established principles of UN mandate holders. While the China's government allowed and facilitated the visit of the Special Rapporteur, both the Special Rapporteur and those he spoke with were subject to restrictions that meant "...the Special Rapporteur was unable to meet with a great majority of civil society actors with any degree of freedom or confidentiality". ¹⁶
	Ensure equal access to justice.	Weak Decrease	The Chinese constitution ensures equality before the law, but the judicial system in China has widely been seen as flawed for a long time. There is little to no independence and separation between the judiciary and the wider government is non-existent. ¹⁷ While there have been moves at reforms, judicial independence is largely sacrificed for consolidation of political power. ¹⁸ This has resulted in a swathe of abuses by the wider justice system and the police, especially against minorities and those deemed problems for the regime, including arbitrary arrest, disappearances, denial of fair public trials and harsh treatment of prisoners. ¹⁹
	Criminalise incitement to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.	Very Weak Decrease	There remains no provision within the <i>Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China</i> to criminalise atrocity crimes. ²⁰

¹³ UPR-Info, 2021. *China*, <https://www.upr-info.org/en/review/China>.

¹⁴ United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, n.d. *Late and non-reporting States*, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/LateReporting.aspx.

¹⁵ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNOHCHR), n.d. *View Country visits of Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council since 1998*, <https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewCountryVisits.aspx?visitType=all&country=CHN&Lang=en>.

¹⁶ United Nations, General Assembly (HRC), Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights on his mission to China, 28 March 2017, A/HRC/35/26/Add.2, p. 3-4.

¹⁷ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2000. *Judicial Independence in the PRC*, <https://www.cecc.gov/judicial-independence-in-the-prc>.

¹⁸ Zhu, Melissa, 2021. 'Jury still out on China's legal reform and judicial independence'. *South China Morning Post*, 3 April. Available at: <https://www.scmp.com/economy/article/3128422/jury-still-out-chinas-legal-reform-and-judicial-independence>; Gao, Charlotte, 2019. 'Xi: China Must never Adopt Constitutionalism, Separation of Powers, or Judicial Independence'. *The Diplomat*, 19 February. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/xi-china-must-never-adopt-constitutionalism-separation-of-powers-or-judicial-independence/>.

¹⁹ U.S Department of State, 2020. *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)*, 'Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:'.

²⁰ Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and other International Organisations in Vienna, n.d. *Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China*, <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgvienna/eng/dbtyw/jdwt/crimelaw/t209043.htm>.

	Take measures to counter and prevent violent extremism.	Weak Decrease	<p>Much of China's measures to combat terrorism and violent extremism centre on Xinjiang and Muslim extremists within that region, following attacks committed in 2013 and 2014.²¹ Extremist Muslim organisations from Xinjiang, due to these measures in China, have been able to forge ties with groups and affiliates of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS in Pakistan and throughout Central Asia. There is also evidence of a small number of Chinese citizens fighting in Syria and Iraq.²²</p> <p>These circumstances are the basis for the government's systematic repression of Muslims within Xinjiang, including widespread and sophisticated surveillance and the establishment of camps meant for re-education and deradicalization in an attempt at 'Sinicization' of the region.²³ This includes the destruction of Uighur and Islamic sites of worship within China, so as to eliminate Islamic religious extremism at the cost of Uighur identity.²⁴ China has defended these measures, citing they are in line with global counterterrorism strategies and are designed "...to safeguard China's national sovereignty, independence, and unity, and to protect the right of people of all ethnic groups to live and work in peace and security."²⁵</p> <p>As mentioned in a previous Indicator, these measures imposed by the Chinese government, particularly the camps which enable the commission of human rights abuses in ways that could be considered atrocity crimes, are against the principle of R2P. While China's counterterrorism strategy is, by some measures, effective in curbing violent extremism and terrorism, the disproportionate methods used result in the erasure of Uighur identity, including a potential genocide of the Uighur people.</p>
	Enact and implement laws protecting vulnerable groups, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence.	Weak Decrease	Due to China's consistently poor human rights record, minorities and disadvantaged communities within China remain vulnerable to abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Domestic violence and violence against women in general remains widespread and laws remain largely ineffective, despite efforts by civil society

²¹ Rizvi, Alina, 2020. *Uighur Crisis Highlights Flawed Structure of UN Security Council*,

<https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/07/alina-rizvi-unscc-reform-uyghurs/>; Murphy, Dawn, 2017. *China's Approach to International Terrorism*, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20167?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

²² Counter Extremism Project, 2021. *China: Extremism and Terrorism*, 'Overview', 'Radicalization and Foreign Fighters', <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/china>; Clarke, Colin, Paul Rexton Kan, 2017. 'Uighur Foreign Fighters: An Underexamined Jihadist Challenge'. *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies*, vol. 8, no. 5,

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321220045_Uighur_Foreign_Fighters_An_Underexamined_Jihadist_Challenge.

²³ Greitens, Sheena Chestnut, Myunghye Lee and Emir Yazici, 2020. *Understanding China's 'preventive repression' in Xinjiang*, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/04/understanding-chinas-preventive-repression-in-xinjiang/>; Stroup,

David R., 2019. 'Why Xi Jinping's Xinjiang policy is a major change in China's ethnic politics'. *The Washington Post*, 19 November. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/11/19/why-xi-jinpings-xinjiang-policy-is-major-change-chinas-ethnic-politics/>; Feng, Emily, 2021. 'China is removing domes from mosques as part of a push to make them more

'Chinese'. *NPR*, 24 October. Available at: <https://www.npr.org/2021/10/24/1047054983/china-muslims-sinicization>; United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2021. *"To Make Us Slowly Disappear": The Chinese Government's Assault on the Uyghurs*, https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/November_2021_Uyghur_Report.pdf.

²⁴ See: Ruser, Nathan, Dr James Leibold, Kelsey Munro and Tilla Hoja, 2020. *Cultural erasure: Tracing the destruction of Uyghur and Islamic spaces in Xinjiang*, <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure>.

²⁵ Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and other International Organisations in Switzerland, 2020. *Statement at the International Webinar: "Counter-terrorism, De-radicalization, and Human Rights Protection"*, <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cegy/eng/dbtxwx/t1816218.htm>.

actors to curb these acts.²⁶ Sexual assault and sexual harassment has become more visible in the public discourse in recent years, but women’s rights remain lacklustre. China’s government “...is reluctant to up-end a patriarchal social order in which women are routinely treated as sex objects, subservient to men.”²⁷ In regard to ethnic minority women such as those in Xinjiang, there is evidence they are being subject to forced sterilisation and other acts of sexual violence with the full knowledge of authorities.²⁸

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, rates of domestic violence in China rose by an estimated 30 percent due to families in lockdown, and circumstances arising from the pandemic have increased gender inequality in China and throughout the Asia Pacific.²⁹

Protect individuals and groups fleeing atrocity crimes and their risk, in accordance with International Refugee Law.

Very Weak
Unchanged

China’s treatment of refugees remains dismal. Many refugees within China are from Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) and have lived in China for decades or are fleeing from North Korea. The government leaves the treatment of Southeast Asian refugees to the UNHCR and bans all access to North Korean refugees along its border regions.

China continues to send refugees from North Korea back to where they came from, in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement and the *1951 Refugee Convention*, of which China is a State party.³⁰

Domestic Implementation

Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience.

Very Weak
Unchanged

There is no evidence of a national assessment of risk and resilience for atrocity crime risk within China. However, it should be noted that many observers, including APR2P, consider China to be at high risk of further atrocity crimes.³¹

Cultivate and protect an active, diverse and robust civil society.

Very Weak
Unchanged

China remains one of the world’s most restrictive and repressive countries when it comes to civil liberties and the effective workings of civil society. During the pandemic, this trend was reinforced under Xi Jinping and there continues to be a process of centralising power and heightening the powers of the State in the everyday lives of Chinese citizens.³²

²⁶ HRW, 2020. *China: Events of 2020*, ‘Women’s and Girls’ Rights’; U.S Department of State, 2020. *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)*, ‘Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses and Trafficking in Persons: Women’.

²⁷ The Economist, 2021. ‘The long wait: A row about toilets reveals a lot about women’s place in China’. *The Economist*, 5 November, vol. 441, no. 9269.

²⁸ Hill, Matthew, David Campanale and Joel Gunter, 2021. ‘Their goal is to destroy everyone’: Uighur camp detainees allege systematic rape’. *BBC News*, 2 February. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071>.

²⁹ World Bank, 2021. *Leading the Way in China: Li Ying*, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/03/02/li-ying>; Letch, Jess, 2021. *Beyond the data: Time for violence against women and children to end*, <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/beyond-data-time-violence-against-women-and-children-end>.

³⁰ U.S Department of State, 2020. *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)*, ‘Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: f. Protection of Refugees’; Song, Lili, 2021. *Anywhere but here? China’s response to refugee protection during COVID-19*, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/pandemic-border/anywhere-but-here-chinas-response-to-refugee-protection-during-covid-19/>.

³¹ For example: GCR2P, 2021. *Populations at Risk*, <https://www.global2p.org/populations-at-risk/>; United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2020. *Countries at Risk for Mass Killings 2020-21: Early Warning Project Statistical Risk Assessment Results*, <https://earlywarningproject.ushmm.org/reports/countries-at-risk-for-mass-killings-2020-2021-early-warning-project-statistical-risk-assessment-results>.

³² See: Reporters Without Borders, 2021. *China*, <https://rsf.org/en/china>; U.S Department of State, 2020. *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)*, ‘Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: a.

NGOs are still required by law to register with the government, and many causes of a politically sensitive nature are subject to restrictions. NGOs face intense scrutiny by security forces, including property searches and harassment of personnel. Peaceful assembly is also curtailed, and academic freedom is increasingly restricted, with teachers and academics facing harassment and censoring if found to be challenging or doubting the government's narrative, including issues around COVID-19. Educators are required to aid what is effectively political indoctrination and the spread of "Xi Jinping Thought" throughout all levels of education.

Media freedom in China remains non-existent, and even tightened to stop alternative reporting of the spread of COVID-19 in the country. The government maintains tight control of all forms of media within the country, including foreign social media and online new sites, which remain banned in China. Users on Chinese websites and social networks are also monitored for posts and content that could be deemed to be contravening official narratives. Reporters Without Borders maintains China's ranking of 177 out of 180 in terms of press freedom, citing a society "...based on control of news and information and online surveillance of its citizens."³³

Ensure a legitimate, effective and civilian controlled security sector.

Fair
Decrease

Due to the opaque nature of China's government, the exact nature and number of abuses of power within the security sector and wider government remain unknown. While the security services are under the control of the People's Armed Police and the Ministries of State Security and Public Security, these entities are utilised to further control and abuse Chinese citizens, particularly minority ethnic groups. These are abuses are carried out with impunity.³⁴

Ensure the education system reflects the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of society, and sets examples of inclusiveness.

Weak
Unchanged

Purges within the Communist Party and the wider Chinese government have been launched since 2012 when Xi Jinping came to power, in an effort to curb corruption. This sweeping campaign is accused of also solidifying Xi's power, as there is doubt about how many of those arrested for corruption and other crimes are actually guilty of said crimes, instead of being too independent of the Party.³⁵

Like much of Chinese society, the education sector is subject to the whims of the ruling government. China's lucrative private tutoring sector was forced to become non-profit, to ease the burden on families and attempt to reverse the country's

Freedom of Expression, Including for the Press'; Freedom House, 2021. *Freedom in the World 2021: China*, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2021>; HRW, 2020. *China: Events of 2020*.

³³ Reporters Without Borders, 2021. *China*.

³⁴ U.S Department of State, 2020. *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)*; Freedom House, 2021. *Freedom in the World 2021: China*, 'C. Functioning of Government'.

³⁵ ; Skidmore, David, 2017. 'Understanding Chinese President Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign'. *The Conversation*, 27 October. Available at: <https://theconversation.com/understanding-chinese-president-xis-anti-corruption-campaign-86396>; Feng, Emily, 2021. 'How China's Massive Corruption Crackdown Snares Entrepreneurs Across The Country'. *NPR*, 4 March. Available at: <https://www.npr.org/2021/03/04/947943087/how-chinas-massive-corruption-crackdown-snares-entrepreneurs-across-the-country>.

	<p>Prevent nationals committing atrocity crimes overseas.</p>	<p>Fair Unchanged</p>	<p>population decline, as well as lessen the competitiveness of Chinese children gaining entrance to top universities.³⁶</p> <p>In 2020 the government introduced a new policy for schools in Inner Mongolia, to conduct three core elementary classes in Mandarin Chinese rather than traditional Mongolian. Protests against the decision were shut down and Mongolian social media was closed. In a similar way to those minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet, ethnic Mongolians feel their traditions and lifestyles are being replaced with mainstream Chinese conventions.³⁷</p> <p>China remains a non-signatory of the <i>Rome Statute</i>, despite cases of Uighur and other Turkic citizens fighting in areas such as Iraq, Syria, and Southeast Asia. The repressive policies in Xinjiang have likely increased extremist tendencies amongst the ethnic Muslim minorities of the province, giving them cause to carry out violent attacks both in and outside of China's borders.³⁸</p> <p>China has made moves to limit the movements and activities of foreign-based jihadists by engaging with the new Taliban regime following their takeover of Afghanistan.³⁹</p>
<p>Bilateral and Multilateral Relations</p>	<p>Participate in international, regional, and national discussions on the further advancement of R2P.</p> <p>Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions (including regional and sub-regional organisations) to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to protect.</p>	<p>Fair Decrease</p> <p>Weak Unchanged</p>	<p>China participated in another regional dialogue with Australia in 2020, discussing R2P and the Secretary-General's most recent report.⁴⁰</p> <p>China is the only Asia Pacific country that is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. As such, it has voted on resolutions put forward by that body relating to R2P.</p> <p>UN Security Council Resolutions:⁴¹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2017: S/RES/2349: yes. • 2017: S/RES/2360: yes. • 2017: S/RES/2363: yes. • 2017: S/RES/2364: yes. • 2017: S/RES/2374: yes. • 2017: S/RES/2385: abstained. • 2017: S/RES/2387: yes. • 2017: S/RES/2389: yes.

³⁶ Zaagman, Elliott, 2021. 'The casualties of China's education crackdown'. *Tech Crunch*, 23 September. Available at: <https://techcrunch.com/2021/09/22/the-casualties-of-chinas-education-crackdown/>; Chau, David, Joyce Cheng and Jason Fang, 2021. 'China tries to spark baby boom by destroying its \$140 billion tutoring sector'. *ABC News*, 20 August. Available at: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-08-20/china-crackdown-private-tutoring/100392352>.

³⁷ HRW, 2020. *China: Mongolian Mother-Tongue Classes Curtailed*, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/04/china-mongolian-mother-tongue-classes-curtailed>; Long, Qiao, 2020. *China Moves to Replace Ethnic Mongolians in Education Sector With Han Chinese*, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/mongolia-education-12292020083238.html>; Jargalsaikhan, Mendee, 2020. *Mongolia's Response to China's New Educational Policy in Inner Mongolia*, <https://theasanforum.org/mongolias-response-to-chinas-new-educational-policy-in-inner-mongolia/>; Amnesty International, 2021. *China 2020*, 'Autonomous regions: Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia'.

³⁸ Clarke, Colin, Paul Rexton Kan, 2017. 'Uighur Foreign Fighters: An Underexamined Jihadist Challenge'.

³⁹ Standish, Reid, 2021. 'Taliban "Removing" Uyghur Militants From Afghanistan's Border With China'. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 5 October. Available at: <https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-uyghurs-china/31494226.html>.

⁴⁰ This dialogue was undertaken virtually with representatives from Chinese academia and government, and members of APR2P.

⁴¹ Details of these resolutions can be found here: GCR2P, 2021. *UN Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements Referencing R2P*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/un-security-council-resolutions-and-presidential-statements-referencing-r2p/>. (Voting records for each resolution were accessed using the UN's Digital Library: United Nations Digital Library, n.d. *Voting Data*, https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?ln=en&cc=Voting%20Data&p=&f=&rm=&ln=en&sf=&so=d&rg=50&c=Voting%20Data&c=&of=hb&fti=0&fti=0&fct_2=Security%20Council.)

- 2017: S/RES/2393: **abstained.**
- 2018: S/RES/2399: **yes.**
- 2018: S/RES/2409: **yes.**
- 2018: S/RES/2417: **yes.**
- 2018: S/RES/2419: **yes.**
- 2018: S/RES/2428: **abstained.**
- 2018: S/RES/2429: **yes.**
- 2018: S/RES/2439: **yes.**
- 2018: S/RES/2444: **yes.**
- 2018: S/RES/2449: **abstained.**
- 2019: S/RES/2457: **yes.**
- 2019: S/RES/2459: **yes.**
- 2019: S/RES/2463: **yes.**
- 2019: S/RES/2499: **yes.**
- 2019: S/RES/2502: **yes.**
- 2020: S/RES/2514: **yes.**
- 2020: S/RES/2552: **yes.**
- 2020: S/RES/2556: **yes.**
- 2021: S/RES/2567: **yes.**
- 2021: S/RES/2573: **yes.**
- 2021: S/RES/2577: **yes.**

In the UN General Assembly, China's support for R2P has been lacklustre, either abstaining or voting against those resolutions that reference the norm.

UN General Assembly Resolutions:⁴²

- 2018: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions A/RES/73/172: **abstained.**
- 2018: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea A/RES/73/180: **adopted without vote.**
- 2018: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/RES/73/182: **no.**
- 2019: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea A/RES/74/166: **adopted without vote.**
- 2019: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/RES/74/169: **no.**
- 2020: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea A/RES/75/190: **adopted without vote.**
- 2020: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions A/RES/75/189: **abstained.**
- 2020: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/RES/75/193: **no.**
- 2021: Promoting a culture of peace and tolerance to safeguard religious sites A/RES/75/258: **adopted without vote.**
- 2021: The responsibility to protect and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity A/RES/75/277: **no.**

China was again elected to the Human Rights Council on 13 October 2020.⁴³ During this tenure in 2021, it has mostly voted against the following resolutions that reference R2P:

⁴² GCR2P, 2021. *UN General Assembly Resolutions Referencing R2P*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/un-general-assembly-resolutions-referencing-r2p-2/>. (Voting records for each resolution were accessed using the UN's Digital Library: General Assembly of the United Nations, n.d. *Voting Records*, <https://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/voting.asp>.)

⁴³ United Nations, 2020. *Election of the Human Rights Council (13 October 2020)*, <https://www.un.org/en/ga/75/meetings/elections/hrc.shtml>.

UN Human Rights Council Resolutions:⁴⁴

- Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea A/HRC/RES/46/17: **adopted by consensus.**
- Situation of human rights in Syria A/HRC/RES/46/22: **against.**
- Situation of human rights in South Sudan A/HRC/RES/46/23: **against.**
- Technical assistance and capacity building for South Sudan A/HRC/RES/46/29: **adopted by consensus.**
- Situation of human rights in Tigray region of Ethiopia A/HRC/RES/47/13: **against.**
- Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic A/HRC/RES/47/18: **against.**

Encourage and assist States to fulfil their R2P in situations of emerging and ongoing crisis, such as good offices and preventive diplomacy.

Weak
Decrease

China has done little to assist States facing crisis in recent years, at least from the perspective of R2P. It has provided development aid and investment to both the Taliban following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan,⁴⁵ and the Tatmadaw, following the coup in Myanmar.⁴⁶ Both countries possess a land border with China, and China gives aid to them through the lens of ensuring economic opportunities in both countries are stable and have the potential for future growth.

There is no evidence atrocity prevention measures and the norm of R2P is considered in this assistance.

Strengthen regional and international networks for atrocity crime prevention.

Weak
Unchanged

There is growing concern amongst human rights observers that China's membership, and in particular its chairmanship, of certain UN bodies is eroding long-established norms around building consensus over human rights issues. China is using the influence these positions give, as well as diplomatic leverage with many countries that receive its development aid, to align these international bodies to fit its own methods of international relations.⁴⁷ It has criticised UN special rapporteurs that raise concerns of human rights in

⁴⁴ GCR2P, 2021. *UN Human Rights Council Resolutions Referencing R2P*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/un-human-rights-council-resolutions-referencing-r2p/>. Voting records for China during its sessions can be found by using the appropriate filters here: Universal Rights Group Geneva, 2021. *Country Voting History Portal: China*, <https://www.universal-rights.org/country-voting-history-portal/country/?country=China>.

⁴⁵ Fazl-e-Haider, Syed, 2021. *Opportunities and Challenges for China's Plans in Afghanistan*, <https://jamestown.org/program/opportunities-and-challenges-for-chinas-plans-in-afghanistan/>.

⁴⁶ Bloomberg News, 2021. 'China Boosts Support for Myanmar Army, Countering U.S. Sanctions'. *Bloomberg*, 9 June. Available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-09/china-boosts-support-for-myanmar-army-countering-u-s-sanctions>; Myers, Lucas, 2021. *China Is Hedging Its Bets in Myanmar*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/10/china-myanmar-coup-national-league-for-democracy/>;

⁴⁷ International Federation for Human Rights (fidh), 2021. *At UN Human Rights Council, China manoeuvres to ensure its own impunity*, <https://www.fidh.org/en/international-advocacy/united-nations/human-rights-council/at-un-human-rights-council-china-manoevres-to-ensure-its-own>; Piccone, Ted, 2021. *UN Human Rights Council: As the US returns, it will have to deal with China and its friends*, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/02/25/un-human-rights-council-as-the-us-returns-it-will-have-to-deal-with-china-and-its-friends/>; Gegout, Catherine, Shogo Suzuki, 2020. 'China, Responsibility to Protect, and the Case of Syria'. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, vol. 26, no. 3, https://brill.com/view/journals/gg/26/3/article-p379_3.xml?language=en. Furthermore, for a greater overview and timeline of China's participation and influence in global governance mechanisms, see: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021. *China's Approach to Global Governance*, <https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/>.

China for being political and having an anti-China agenda.⁴⁸

This has enabled China to dodge and shutdown criticism of its own human rights violations (in Xinjiang and elsewhere) and further its influence in international bodies to ensure its own political dominance. Atrocity prevention does not seem to factor into any of its actions within these networks. Indeed, given its voting preferences in the previous Indicator, China's actions in international networks seem to give priority to ensuring state sovereignty and principles of non-intervention over atrocity crime prevention.

Strengthen the role and capacity of regional organisations.

Fair
Unchanged

China continues to support the growing capacity of regional organisations and partnerships between regional powers. Similar to its actions in UN and international bodies (see previous Indicator), this support is given for pragmatic reasons so as to benefit China's domestic development and ensure stable economic growth in its surrounding region.⁴⁹ The formation and growth of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, formerly known as the Shanghai Five)⁵⁰ and China's signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership,⁵¹ further cement China's desire to be a major power in, and influencer of, Asia Pacific relations.

Analytical consensus is China's cooperation at a regional level is based around economic and security concerns, and rivalry with the United States. There remains no specific evidence for China strengthening atrocity prevention in the regional organisations it supports.

Support the development and work of regional human rights and other preventive capacities.

Very Weak
Unchanged

There remains no evidence that China promotes human rights within its sphere of influence. Instead, especially through its Belt and Road Initiative, economic development is given priority to those countries who receive aid. Human rights issues and other atrocity prevention measures are not accounted for in the bilateral deals China undertakes.

Support atrocity prevention through development and assistance partnerships.

Weak
Unchanged

China continues to be an aid giver, and in particular favours "south-south" cooperation with the taglines of "mutually beneficial" and "win-win" cooperation in economic and human rights development.⁵² It

⁴⁸ Richardson, Sophie, 2021. *China's "Slanders and Smears" at UN Human Rights Council*, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/11/chinas-slanders-and-smears-un-human-rights-council>.

⁴⁹ For an overview of Chinese intentions and views regarding issues in the Asia Pacific, see: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2017. *China's Policies on Asia Pacific Security Cooperation*, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1429771.shtml.

⁵⁰ One reason proposed for China's strengthening of this organisation is its pursuit of institutional balancing against the US. See: Aksu, Aylin, 2017. 'China's Growing Role in Regional Institutions: Application of institutional realism to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)'. *The Maastricht Journal of Liberal Arts*, vol. 8, no. 3, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319983828_CHINA'S_GROWING_ROLE_IN_REGIONAL_INSTITUTIONS_Application_of_institutional_realism_to_the_Shanghai_Cooperation_Organization_SCO.

⁵¹ ASEAN Secretariat, 2019. *RCEP*, <https://rcepsec.org/>; Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2021. *Regional Economic Comprehensive Partnership*, <https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/rcep>.

⁵² For example: Xinhua, 2021. 'Xinhua Headlines: China champions win-win cooperation in advancing global human rights cause'. *Xinhuanet*, 24 March. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-03/24/c_139832741.htm; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2021. *H.E. Ambassador Chen Xu in Introducing Draft Resolution "Promoting Mutually Beneficial Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights" at the 46th Session of the Human Rights Council*, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwb_d_665378/t1863543.shtml. This sort of rhetoric present in previous declarations has been criticised: Kothari, Miloon, 2018. 'China's Trojan Horse Human Rights Resolution'. *The Diplomat*, 22 March. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/chinas-trojan-horse-human-rights-resolution/>.

			increased its aid to Pacific countries in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, ⁵³ where it was already the third-largest contributor to the region as of 2017. ⁵⁴ China's aid focuses on issues relevant to atrocity prevention, such as education, health and humanitarian aid, but there is no specific mention of awareness or prevention of atrocity crime risks. ⁵⁵
United Nations, prevention, Peacekeeping, and assistance	Support the early warning and capacity building efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P.	Weak Unchanged	China retains a broad support for the Office and R2P, at least in concept. ⁵⁶ It has shown support for Pillars I and II of R2P in the past and maintains a focus on multilateralism and respect for state sovereignty when it comes to Pillar III. ⁵⁷ No recent information could be found regarding China's support for the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P.
	Support the strengthening of the UN's capacity for atrocity prevention, including through the UN Human Rights system.	Very Weak Unchanged	China has shown little to no support for strengthening UN capacity in this area. Indeed, as mentioned in a previous Indicator, China's actions in international fora and UN bodies suggest the country is seeking to undermine the processes that uphold human rights to garner greater influence and dodge criticism levelled against it.
	Support preventive actions on atrocity crimes.	Very Weak Unchanged	It could be argued that China, under its doctrines of mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference, has neglected to propose or undertake preventive actions in the region.
	Contribute to United Nations peacekeeping operations (especially those with a protection of civilians mandate).	Strong Unchanged	As of September 2021, China had 2,248 active personnel on peacekeeping missions. Over 1000 of these are deployed as part of UNMISS, which has a protection of civilians mandate. ⁵⁸ It remains committed to peacekeeping missions, providing the more peacekeepers than the other P5 members combined. ⁵⁹
	Develop the capacities needed to support civilian protection, including through the training of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping.	Fair Unchanged	As well as continuing to deploy peacekeepers, China continues to train those of other countries and fund deployments, seeing it a part of its overall foreign policy goals. ⁶⁰ It is the second largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, and recently held its first multinational peacekeeping exercise. ⁶¹
			While there is much mention of China investing in capacity building and the interoperability of

⁵³ Zhang, Denghua, 2020. *China's COVID-19 Pacific diplomacy*, <https://devpolicy.org/chinas-coronavirus-covid-19-diplomacy-in-the-pacific-20200527-1/>.

⁵⁴ Pryke, Jonathan, 2020. *The risks of China's ambitions in the South Pacific*, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-risks-of-chinas-ambitions-in-the-south-pacific/>.

⁵⁵ The dynamics of China's aid to specific Pacific countries can be found using the filters here: Lowy Institute, 2021. *Pacific Aid Map*, <https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/>.

⁵⁶ Fung, Courtney, J., 2016. *China and the Responsibility to Protect: From Opposition to Advocacy*, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/06/china-and-responsibility-protect-opposition-advocacy>.

⁵⁷ Dahl-Eriksen, Tor, 2021. *Responsibility to Protect and Rising Asian Powers*, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0976399621989464>.

⁵⁸ UN Peacekeeping, 2021. *Troop and Police Contributors: China*, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>; Ibid., *UNMISS Fact Sheet*, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmiss>.

⁵⁹ Gowan, Richard, 2020. *China's pragmatic approach to UN peacekeeping*, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-pragmatic-approach-to-un-peacekeeping/>.

⁶⁰ Ibid., Savkov, Nikita, 2020. *China's Discourse and Interests Related to its Role in U.N. Peacekeeping*, <https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-discourse-and-interests-related-to-its-role-in-u-n-peacekeeping/>; Dyrenforth, Thomas, 2021. *Beijing's Blue Helmets: What to Make of China's Role in UN Peacekeeping in Africa*, <https://mwi.usma.edu/beijings-blue-helmets-what-to-make-of-chinas-role-in-un-peacekeeping-in-africa/>.

⁶¹ Tian, Yew Lun, 2021. 'China shows off defence diplomacy with multinational peacekeeping drill'. *Reuters*, 15 September. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-shows-off-defence-diplomacy-with-multinational-peacekeeping-drill-2021-09-15/>.



Support the Kigali Principles.	Very Weak Unchanged	peacekeeping forces, there is no specific mention of civilian protection or atrocity prevention. China has still not signed the Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians.
Support UN Security Council veto restraint on issues relating to atrocity prevention.	Very Weak Unchanged	China remains a non-signatory of both the ACT Code of Conduct and the French/Mexican initiative on veto restraint. ⁶²

⁶² GCR2P, 2019. *List of Signatories to the ACT Code of Conduct*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/list-of-signatories-to-the-act-code-of-conduct/>; GCR2P, 2020. *List of Supporters of the Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto*, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/list-of-supporters-of-the-political-declaration-on-suspension-of-veto/>.