



Asia-Pacific Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect

China and the Responsibility to Protect

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Executive Summary

This report explores in detail China's position on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and a range of policy issues relating to R2P to highlight China's firm, but cautious, support for the principle. China has twice endorsed R2P at the UN, first at the World Summit in 2005 and later in Security Council Resolution 1674. Since then, China has clearly and consistently affirmed the R2P principle and issued corresponding statements in favor of bolstering the UN's capacity to avert mass atrocity. It is important to note, however, that China remains persistently averse to non-consensual force and is reticent to apply sanctions, particularly when these measures are not fully backed by relevant regional organisations. Despite these reservations, China is not altogether opposed to the use of force with a civilian protection mandate. China acknowledges that force may be a necessary last resort to protect populations from mass atrocities, provided that the Security Council is the authorising body and troops are deployed after the consent of the host state has been secured. China's interpretation of and support for R2P is therefore grounded primarily in building the capacity within states to prevent mass atrocities, and strengthening the UN's ability to assist states mitigate mass atrocities through humanitarian, diplomatic and other peaceful means. This report locates China's policy preferences on R2P and R2P-related initiatives within the four programmatic dimensions for translating R2P from principle to practice identified by the UN Secretary-General's Special Adviser – capacity-building and rebuilding, early warning and assessment, timely and decisive response, and collaboration with regional and subregional arrangements. In doing so, it provides insight into China's potential to contribute to exercising the Responsibility to Protect. Insofar as China's interpretation of R2P is representative of the views of similarly cautious, yet engaged, states, this report provides insight into deepening consensus on R2P and offers recommendations for building momentum for translating the Responsibility to Protect from words to deeds.

Translating the Responsibility to Protect from Words to Deeds

Mass killing and forced displacement is an all too frequently recurring phenomenon. Those who think that tragedies like the Rwandan and Srebrenica genocides at the end of the last century are a thing of the past need only look to Darfur today to see the durability of humanity's capacity for acts of conscience shocking inhumanity. In the past few years, the world has united in insisting that all states have a responsibility to protect their populations from such grave abuses and that the international community should assist states in fulfilling their responsibilities and, if the state manifestly fails, take measures to protect vulnerable populations. World leaders unanimously adopted the Responsibility to Protect at the United Nations World Summit in 2005. Paragraphs 138-140 of the Summit's Outcome Document declared that:

138. Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to help protect populations from war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.

140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.

The following year, the Responsibility to Protect was unanimously reaffirmed by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1674, which stated the Council's determination to protect civilians.

According to the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, the Responsibility to Protect rests on three pillars:

- 1) The responsibility of each state to protect its own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement.
- 2) The commitment of the international community to assist states in meeting these obligations.
- 3) The responsibility of United Nations Member States to respond in a timely and decisive manner, using Chapters VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace), and VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN Charter as appropriate, when a state is manifestly failing to provide such protection.

The Secretary-General has pledged to make recommendations to ‘operationalise’ the Responsibility to Protect and translate the principle from ‘words to deeds’. He indicated that his support for what he describes as the ‘concept’ of the Responsibility to Protect is ‘deep and enduring’ but recognised that is not yet a policy or reality. The Secretary-General also recognises the ‘controversy and doubts’ that surround the Responsibility to Protect.¹

In 2007, the Secretary-General appointed Edward Luck as his Special Adviser to work alongside Francis Deng, his Special Representative on the Prevention of Genocide, in a single office dedicated to the prevention of genocide and the Responsibility to Protect. Edward Luck was charged with consulting with Member States on the Responsibility to Protect and making recommendations for its operationalisation within the UN system. The Special Adviser is scheduled to submit a report to the Secretary-General later this month. After further consultations with Member States, the Secretary-General will submit a report on the Responsibility to Protect in late 2008, which is likely to be debated by the 63rd General Assembly in early 2009.

The Special Adviser of the Secretary-General argues that the R2P ‘represents the application of human security perspectives to a specific area of public policy that has long vexed publics and policymakers alike’.² He has identified four main programmatic dimensions to the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect’s core prevention and protection goals: (1) capacity building and rebuilding; (2) early warning and assessment; (3) timely and decisive response; (4) collaboration with regional and subregional arrangements.³

Capacity building and rebuilding: in relation to R2P, capacity building ‘means strengthening the ability of individuals, institutions and societies to prevent or diminish the threat of the four crimes and violations and/or to respond when such atrocities do occur and to rebuild afterwards’.⁴ Relevant measures include using the Peacebuilding Commission, development entities and bilateral arrangements to strengthen good governance and effective public administration. This would involve closer collaboration between headquarters and field missions, and between UN agencies and various partners.⁵

Early warning and assessment: paragraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome Document specifically pledged support for the establishment of a UN early warning capability. The challenge lays less in collecting the relevant information than in analysing and disseminating it. Member States have traditionally been reluctant to grant the UN the capacity to report affairs within individual states in this manner and there are also concerns about institutional overlap. Plans are afoot to consolidate the analysis and sharing of information under the single UN office for the Prevention of Genocide and the R2P.⁶

Timely and decisive response: the R2P calls for timely and decisive responses to the four crimes, especially in cases where national authorities are ‘manifestly failing’ in the responsibility to protect their populations. Such responses should be consistent with Chapters VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace), and VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN Charter. Measures under discussion to strengthen the UN’s capacity in this area involve improving the Secretary-General’s good offices functions, clarifying the role of the secretariat in advocating particular action by the Security Council and bringing matters to the Council’s attention, improving the transparency of the Council’s deliberations, securing the appropriate resources for peace operations, and developing appropriate doctrine for the protection of civilians.⁷

Collaboration with regional and subregional arrangements: the R2P can strengthen the UN’s efforts to improve its collaboration with regional and subregional arrangements. Such collaboration should focus on ways in which the UN might help build regional capacity, including regional and subregional organisations in prevention and protection efforts, and information sharing. The establishment of a UN Office for West Africa in Dakar might provide a useful model.⁸

In order to make progress in implementing these four programmatic dimensions, the Secretary-General will need to persuade Member States of their value and assuage concerns about the potential encroachment of the UN into areas traditionally seen as lying within the domestic jurisdiction of states and the concerns of those who worry about the duplication of mandates and attendant organisational inefficiencies. With the opening of the 63rd General Assembly in September 2008, now is a useful time to consider where states in the Asia-Pacific region stand in relation to both the R2P principle and proposals for its actualisation. This Report examines the perspective of the Chinese government and sets out its views on the R2P principle, the four programmatic dimensions outlined above, and other issues related to the R2P. It concludes by identifying policy initiatives developed or supported by China which might contribute to translating the R2P from words to deeds.

The Responsibility to Protect in Chinese Foreign Policy

As one of the most outspoken champions of traditional interpretations of sovereignty and non-interference, China might be expected to take issue with a principle that shifts the emphasis from sovereign rights to responsibilities and holds that a state's right to conduct its internal affairs without external interference does not override a population's right to fundamental human rights protection. Indeed, Chinese foreign policy is grounded in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which enshrine non-interference as a cornerstone of China's international engagement.⁹ At a rally commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the principles in June 2004, Premier Wen Jiabao affirmed China's continuing allegiance to the Five Principles and declared that China stands prepared to work with other countries to carry the principles forward.¹⁰ Premier Wen emphasized that '[n]o country has the right to impose its will on others, nor can it undermine or deny other countries' sovereignty under whatever excuse'.¹¹ A steadfast commitment to non-interference is further articulated in China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace, which declares that countries should not interfere in each other's internal affairs 'under any pretext', nor should they resort to the use or threat of force to resolve disputes.¹² The principles guiding China's foreign policy, therefore, appear to reject two of the core assertions associated with R2P: that the norm of non-interference does not provide cover for genocide and mass atrocity crimes, and force may be a necessary last resort to protect besieged populations. However, there are indications that Chinese thinking on, and practical engagement in, collective security are undergoing a process of transition, which creates opportunities for China to contribute to operationalising R2P.¹³

Contrary to China's formal commitment to sovereignty and vehement arguments against interference in the internal affairs of states, even some of the more conservative members of China's foreign policy elite allow that the commission of mass atrocities is not a sovereign's prerogative and that the international community can, and at times should, address extreme humanitarian crises through multilateral channels.¹⁴ China concedes that certain isolated and severe situations such as state failure, uncontrolled domestic violence or the systematic killing of a population may necessitate international military intervention.¹⁵ Although China maintains that collective security initiatives should conform to the UN Charter and occur only after the consent of the host nation has been secured, it notably affirms a humanitarian imperative that compels and even obliges the United Nations to assist states to end excessive violence. By way of example, in his statement at a 2007 UN Security Council High-Level Meeting on Africa, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi remarked that, 'it is necessary to make comprehensive efforts at the national, regional and global levels to achieve peace...The international community, on its part, has a pressing need and more importantly, the moral obligation to help Africa'.¹⁶ Such a view was reaffirmed by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, who maintained that '[t]he Security Council bears a responsibility it cannot shirk regarding the maintenance of peace and security in Africa'.¹⁷ Thus, China supports key R2P precepts by highlighting the need for parallel efforts at the national, regional and global level, and acknowledging the UN's moral obligation and abiding responsibility to maintain and promote peace.

China's engagement in UN peace operations indicates that its support for UN efforts to address humanitarian crises is more than just idle talk. Throughout the 1990s,

Beijing consistently acquiesced to UN peacekeeping missions in intrastate conflicts, some of which were authorized to use force for civilian protection purposes and were involved in interfering in the internal affairs of the host states to an unprecedented extent.¹⁸ Although such peacekeeping missions are justified as a Security Council response to threats to international peace and security, the impetus and the mandates suggest that peacekeepers are deployed in large part to secure humanitarian objectives. Since 2000, China has matched its personnel contribution to its voting record; it has strengthened its commitment to send soldiers and police under the UN banner regardless that some missions are authorized to use force and are intricately involved in the administration and reconstruction of the host state. In August 2008, China was contributing more military and civilian police personnel to UN peacekeeping missions than any other permanent member of the Security Council. China ranked twelfth among UN troop contributing nations as a whole, with 2,132 active personnel, which comprised 194 police, 54 military observers, and 1,884 troops in 10 missions.¹⁹ China's endorsement of complex peace operations demonstrates that Beijing practices a degree of flexibility on the cases it considers for intervention, the acceptable limits on the use of force and the objectives that justify the deployment of UN peacekeepers.²⁰ In sum, China's willingness to comply with and at times proactively support the UN's response to violent conflict, mass atrocities and other grave human rights violations within member states indicates that Beijing's practical engagement in collective security is more nuanced than its declaratory statements espousing a firm allegiance to non-interference suggest.

In principle, China's acceptance of a moral imperative and pressing obligation to assist states in averting extreme violence augurs well for its contribution to translating R2P from words to deeds. Yet China continues to hinder attempts to persuade the Security Council to censure state authorities that sponsor or condone brutal acts of violence against civilian populations. This obstructionism seems to indicate very limited support for R2P, and on account of China's veto power, equally limited opportunity for R2P to have a practical impact when exigency requires the Security Council to authorise coercive measures. However, it should be noted that even in cases where China waters down and refuses to endorse Council resolutions, it has taken strides to prod state leaders to practice greater restraint and has sought political solutions to the mounting crises. For example, despite China's resistance to a Council resolution to that same end, US Special Envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that China's UN Ambassador Wang Guangya 'played a vital and constructive role' in Addis Ababa in November 2006 to help broker the 'Annan Plan', which outlined a three-phase plan for deploying UN peacekeepers to Darfur.²¹ Although China vetoed a resolution on the situation in Myanmar/Burma and claimed that the matter was primarily the internal concern of a sovereign state, in October 2007 Beijing played a pivotal role in securing UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari a visa to Myanmar and ensuring that he could meet top leaders in Yangon.²² Likewise, China has outwardly objected to applying sanctions to address the situation in Darfur, yet in January of this year Chinese Special Envoy to Sudan, Zhai Jun is reported to have warned Sudan's Foreign Minister Deng Alor that 'the world is running out of patience over what's going on in Darfur' and appealed to Sudan 'not to do things that will cause the international community to impose sanctions on them'.²³ These are illustrative but by no means comprehensive examples of China's willingness to use its leverage to influence regimes on affairs it previously considered the indisputably exclusive terrain of a sovereign state. These trends

suggest that rather than adhering to an unyielding and static concept of sovereignty, China accepts some of the conceptual and normative underpinnings of the Responsibility to Protect and could be instrumental in developing measures to protect populations from mass atrocities.

As further evidence of its support, China has twice specifically endorsed R2P at the UN. It joined heads of state and government in their unanimous endorsement of R2P at the 2005 World Summit. China reinforced that support in its Position Paper on UN Reform in 2005 which noted that: 'When a massive humanitarian crisis occurs, it is the legitimate concern of the international community to ease and defuse the crisis'.²⁴ An even more noteworthy example of China's support for R2P was its endorsement of Security Council Resolution 1674. In November 2005 Secretary General Annan petitioned the Security Council to strengthen the General Assembly's commitment to R2P set out in the World Summit Outcome Document with a new resolution on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (POC).²⁵ Members were unable to reach an agreement in December, largely due to reluctance on the part of China, Algeria and Russia to include R2P in a Council resolution.²⁶ The British delegation spearheaded bilateral negotiations with conservative states, and in early 2006 China agreed to change its position provided the Council resolution contained the same language as the World Summit outcome document.²⁷ The UK used China's moderate position to isolate Russia as the sole permanent member with veto power who remained opposed to including R2P in the resolution. The tactic proved successful, and in April the Council under Chinese presidency unanimously endorsed Resolution 1674 with a specific reference to the international community's responsibility to protect imperiled populations.²⁸ Thus, momentous headway in support of R2P was initially made possible through China's willingness to reaffirm the General Assembly's endorsement of R2P in a Security Council resolution.

Since passing Resolution 1674, China has voiced concerns about the application and interpretation of R2P in Security Council open debates on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (POC debates). In June 2006, China noted that Resolution 1674 only reaffirmed the World Summit's R2P commitment, in which the international community agreed that the Responsibility to Protect applies specifically to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Chinese ambassador Liu Zhenmin commented, 'China believes that that is not the same as the simple concept of the responsibility to protect, about which many countries continue to have concerns'.²⁹ In the following debate in December 2006 Liu cautioned that the World Summit Outcome Document 'gave an extensive and very cautious representation of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity'.³⁰ Liu later contended that China believes that 'it is not appropriate to expand, wilfully to interpret or even abuse this concept'.³¹

China voiced even stronger words of caution in subsequent POC debates. Whereas the majority of states pledged their commitment to operationalise the World Summit agreement, in the June 2007 POC debate the Chinese delegation argued that the Security Council should 'refrain from invoking the concept of the responsibility to protect' due to 'differing understandings and interpretations of this concept among Member States'.³² China further cautioned that the principle should not be 'misused', and called for the General Assembly to discuss the

concept in order to reach a broad consensus on its application.³³ In the POC debate in November 2007, Liu acknowledged that governments have the responsibility to protect their civilians, but reaffirmed the familiar line that the UN should respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country concerned. Liu noted that '[e]ven when outside support is necessary, the will of the country concerned must be fully respected and forcible intervention avoided'. He later reiterated China's view that the Council 'should not be the forum for extrapolating this concept or engaging in similar legislative activities', and once again stated that any further development of R2P should be discussed in the General Assembly rather than the Security Council.³⁴ That position was somewhat tempered but little changed in the May 2008 debate, in which the Chinese ambassador proclaimed that '[t]he Security Council is in no position to interpret or expand the concept of the responsibility to protect at will, much less to abuse it'.³⁵

Although China's statements on POC suggest that it continues to approach the responsibility to protect with caution, on the whole, China has matched arguments against the Security Council expanding or elaborating on the concept with statements firmly supporting the World Summit's endorsement of R2P. In every POC debate since the 2005 World Summit, China has consistently acknowledged that each state has a responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In addition to specifically reaffirming the outcome document language, China has espoused core R2P principles in its Security Council statements. China has avowed that the primary responsibility to protect populations lies with the governments concerned, stressed the need for the Security Council to strengthen its efforts to prevent and address humanitarian crises, and pledged its support for implementing Resolution 1674 on the ground. In the May 2008 debate, China reiterated its commitment to protect civilians in armed conflict, and referred to Resolution 1674 as the 'legal framework within which the Security Council may address the [protection of civilians in armed conflict]'.³⁶ China has likewise repeatedly emphasised the vital role that the Security Council, Member States and various organs of the UN play in helping states prevent and mitigate armed conflict.

Considering that world leaders agreed that states bear a responsibility to prevent the four crimes and their incitement, China supports a key component of R2P by asserting that conflict prevention and capacity building are essential to enhancing civilian protection. China argues that the best form of protection is prevention, which is an appraisal echoed by the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General. Edward Luck stresses that the primary focus for effectively implementing the Responsibility to Protect should be preventing mass atrocities in the first instance.³⁷ In a similar vein, China argues that the 'failure effectively to respond to outbreak of conflict [sic] will render any ex-post-facto protective measures, however ingenious, virtually ineffectual vis-à-vis the sudden onslaught of violence and conflict. The best way to protect civilians is to provide them with safe and predictable living environments by actively exploring ways of preventing conflicts and effectively resolving ongoing conflicts'.³⁸ China maintains that creating a 'secure environment for civilians' is the most effective protection, and calls for intensified efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts, which includes augmenting peacebuilding efforts.³⁹ China further argues that civilian protection is not solely the charge of the Security Council, but also requires a greater

contribution on the part of the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Human Rights Council, UN Development Programme, World Bank, regional organisations and non-governmental organisations.⁴⁰ China's emphasis on enhancing the role of various international bodies to assist states to develop the requisite institutional capacity and conflict prevention strategies to protect civilians directly aligns with efforts to actualise R2P.

China's cautious but at times constructive statements on R2P in POC debates points to five key conclusions.

1. China's interpretation of and commitment to R2P is specifically grounded in the World Summit agreement to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and China believes that the Security Council does not have sufficient mandate to interpret R2P beyond the scope of that commitment.
2. China is wary of competing interpretations of R2P, and resists attempts to expand R2P and initiatives to 'invoke' R2P in Council proceedings.
3. China maintains that the R2P principle and the terms of its application should be a matter that the General Assembly takes up for further clarification and to build consensus.
4. China's endorsement of R2P does not signify a radical shift in its non-interference policy, nor does it override its rhetorical commitment to sovereignty and the corollary requirement of host state consent.
5. China maintains that protection is best achieved through prevention, and maintains that this undertaking is not the sole remit of the Security Council but requires integrated strategies across various UN bodies and international organisations.

China's Policy Priorities

What lessons can be drawn from China's stance on the responsibility to protect? First and foremost, China's commitment to R2P reflects an evolution—not revolution—in Chinese foreign policy. Beijing remains persistently averse to non-consensual force and is reticent to apply sanctions, particularly when they are not fully backed by regional organisations. However, resistance on some of the most contentious issues should not obviate recommendations for China to contribute to less controversial but nevertheless important practical efforts to enhance civilian protection. China's evolving standards of responsible and responsive international engagement, clear and consistent affirmation of R2P and statements in favor of bolstering the UN's conflict prevention capacity provide a basis for Beijing to play a constructive role in preventing and responding to mass atrocities.

Particular areas in which China has expressed support for efforts to translate the responsibility to protect from words to deeds include:

- The prevention of armed conflict
- Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding
- The role of regional organisations

The following section provides an overview of potential avenues for China to contribute to actualising the responsibility to protect. The issue areas outlined should be considered entry points rather than an exhaustive list of policy recommendations.

Prevention of Armed Conflict

China calls on the UN to 'gradually emerge from playing a reactive role as firefighters' and endeavor to leverage its capabilities to prevent conflict from escalating to extreme violence.⁴¹ China expresses support for enhancing both operational and structural preventive capacities. In terms of operational prevention, China places particular emphasis on the mediation and good offices of the Secretary General, DPA and regional organizations. China takes a similar stance to other countries in the region on structural prevention, and argues that greater attention should be paid to the root economic and social causes of violent conflict. On that basis China calls for an 'integrative approach' to conflict prevention that combines direct prevention with broader, long term preventive efforts geared at development, in particular poverty reduction.⁴²

Specifically, China maintains that preventing mass atrocities requires (1) strengthening regulation of the trade in small arms and light weapons, and (2) bolstering the Good Offices of the UN and regional organizations.

1. Curbing the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons

The presence of Chinese-manufactured small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a perennial problem in conflict zones. Efforts to ramp up China's regulatory framework for controlling the illicit SALW trade is therefore integral to averting mass atrocities, and China has made headway on that front. In August 2007 China issued new regulations for SALW markings to conform to the requirements of the UN

Firearms Protocol (2001) and the International Tracing Instrument (2005).⁴³ China's new regulations specify that all small arms, spare parts and accessories and packing containers must bear unique stamps with codes of the country, weapon-category, factory, year of manufacture, and serial number. In addition, any imported or exported SALW is required to be stamped with the exporting/importing country and the year of export/import. As of May 2006, all Chinese arms trading companies have been required to register information on SALW exports, including importing country, end user, shipper, transporter, means of transport, number of shipments, shipping manifest, product model, quantity and label numbers.⁴⁴ The Information System for Firearms Regulation is maintained by a national coordination body under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, within which the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament is the national point of contact for implementing the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument.⁴⁵ China has launched special law enforcement campaigns to strengthen firearms regulation, and law enforcement agencies have developed a Database for Firearms Regulation. These initiatives indicate that China has taken concrete steps to fulfill its obligations under the Firearms Protocol.⁴⁶

China maintains that it strictly adheres to UN arms embargos by immediately dispatching notices that inform relevant agencies of sanctions and request their compliance to them and, more generally, refusing to sell weapons to non-state actors.⁴⁷ However, neither of these initiatives addresses the problem that many of the Chinese-manufactured conventional weapons in conflict zones are not illicit as such, as they were initially procured through purportedly legitimate channels. China acknowledges that legally manufactured and transferred SALW can end up in illicit networks, but steadfastly holds that states should retain rights to a legal arms trade. To tackle the problem of misappropriated weapons, China instead recommends that more effective export-control mechanisms be established that enhance export license and end-user certificate systems.⁴⁸ China recommends that the UN should take a leading role in assisting states and regions to delineate priorities and coordinate actions, and proposes enhanced cooperation among law enforcement agencies such as police and customs and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).⁴⁹ For their part, developed nations should assist through training personnel and building mechanisms to curb the illicit trade in SALW. As with the protection of civilians, China advises that an effective strategy to eradicate the illicit trade in SALW requires that the international community adopt a comprehensive approach that addresses both the symptoms and root causes, such as poverty reduction, economic development and political and social stability.⁵⁰ However, swifter and more meaningful progress would be possible if China were to (1) ratify the Firearms Protocol, (2) enhance transparency, reporting and monitoring, and (3) carry through on its plans to conduct exchanges with other countries on the experience and challenges of implementing China's SALW control policies.

China's recommendations, however constructive, do not sufficiently address the problems associated with the legal SALW trade as the burden of arms control on exporting countries is not matched by mechanisms to hold importing countries to account. In other words, the regulations do not offer a solution for the importing state's incapacity or unwillingness to institute adequate arms control measures. China's recommendations do not (1) deter perpetrators from commandeering legally imported arms, or (2) account for cases in which state leaders act in collusion with the perpetrators of mass atrocities, which is particularly problematic in light of China's

resistance to placing embargos on entities or individuals acting in an official capacity. With that in mind, the well-documented cases of non-state entities and individuals using Chinese-manufactured SALW to carry out crimes against humanity in Darfur indicates that China's policy may align with the specific directives of an arms embargo, but not the intent behind it.⁵¹ Additionally, the Chinese regulations do not control existing Chinese-manufactured arms present in conflict environments that were exported prior to the date of new national regulations or the imposition of UN arms embargos.

Addressing the prevalence of Chinese weapons in conflict environments is without doubt a complicated issue. Nevertheless, innovations in existing practices that build on the recommendations China devised under its national plan could offer some remedies. Given China's commitment to conducting joint military training exercises in countries experiencing ongoing violence, a valuable initiative would be for China to include arms control and stockpile management best practices as part of these exchanges.⁵² Such initiatives could fall under the rubric of capacity building and information sharing under China's own policy recommendations for strengthening mechanisms to control the SALW trade.

The de-mining training course that China sponsored for Sudan could serve as an initial model for further exchanges geared at enhancing SALW control mechanisms.⁵³ High-ranking officials in the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representatives from the Ministry of Defense and Sudanese Ambassador Mirhgani Mohamed Salih launched the course, which lasted six weeks and trained twenty Sudanese nationals—ten each from the north and south of Sudan. After completing the training, the Chinese government pledged to donate mine detection and de-mining equipment to Sudan.⁵⁴ While training and stockpile management programs are admittedly not ambitious enough to address the multitude of obstacles to controlling Chinese-manufactured SALW in conflict zones, they would be a step in the right direction and could be augmented by UN-led capacity building and training measures within individual states and regional organizations, in line with Chinese recommendations. Likewise, involving Chinese peacekeepers in disarmament and demobilization tasks would bolster the culture of arms control within the People's Liberation Army and Ministry of Defense, under which the Chinese Department of Peacekeeping Affairs sits. Acting on these modest yet promising measures would improve China's capacity to uphold its Responsibility to Protect as well as contribute to collective efforts to help states meet their protection and prevention obligations.

2. Enhancing Preventive Diplomacy and Good Offices

In line with its Independent Foreign Policy of Peace, China maintains that disputes should be settled through dialogue and consultation rather than the use or threat of force.⁵⁵ Accordingly, China attaches great importance to preventive diplomacy and the Good Offices of the UN Secretary-General and has offered constructive recommendations for enhancing that role. As evidence of its support, as early as December 2004 China pledged US\$400,000 to aid African Union mediation efforts on Darfur, and more recently China was reported to have backed its 'firm support' for the efforts of the Secretary-General's Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim with US\$500,000 to fund their activities.⁵⁶ China's suggestions

for improving the Good Offices role include proposals for the Secretariat to adopt a multi-track approach in which it draws on the relevant expertise and experience of the Security Council, ECOSOC, Peacebuilding Commission and General Assembly.⁵⁷ China holds that these organs should, in turn, seek to enhance communication and exchanges specifically geared at strengthening the Secretary-General's Good Offices. In terms of reforming the UN's Department of Political Affairs, China favors strengthening the Department through using an integrated approach in collaboration with regional organisations rather than a country-by-country approach, to prevent duplication and resource waste. Given the value China places in Good Offices, China might be expected to endorse options for secure and reliable funding schemes to ensure the effective and rapid deployment of envoys and mediation teams.

China could likewise respond favorably to recommendations to further develop preventive diplomacy capacities at home and abroad. In terms of China's own contribution, the appointment of Ambassador Liu Guijin as China's Special Envoy to Darfur was the first of its kind. Liu has served as the primary point of contact on China's policy on Darfur, met with representatives from the US, Britain, France and the EU, and visited Sudan on four separate occasions since his appointment.⁵⁸ Liu embarked on his most recent trip with the aim 'to push for a settlement' for deployment of AU/UN hybrid peace operation and 'persuade parties to exercise the maximum restraint', and concluded the trip with a stopover in Chad to assist in quelling rising tensions between Khartoum and N'Djamena.⁵⁹ Liu's appointment was an ad hoc position created in response to popular outcry over perceptions of China's callous disregard to suffering in Darfur, and is yet to be institutionalised in China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. China could be encouraged to replicate this position across various R2P-related issue areas, with a well-coordinated team of dedicated envoys in Beijing. This would enhance China's own burgeoning Good Offices, and create institutional memory of best practices akin to the UN Peacemaker Program within the Department of Political Affairs. Similar initiatives could be pursued to strengthen the Good Offices of regional organisations, which may include exploring options for stand-by mediation teams comprised of regional experts. Such developments would bolster the UN Secretariat's engagement with China and relevant regional organisations, and make the most of the unique leverage China has in many countries struggling to prevent or mitigate mass atrocities. Importantly, it follows through on Chinese-generated recommendations for information and experience sharing among national, regional and global actors and agencies, and centers on a political solution to disputes that coheres with China's foreign policy principles.

Strengthening the Operational Capacity of UN Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

In addition to tapping into areas where changes in China's national regulations could have an impact on preventing or diminishing the threat of mass atrocities on a bilateral level, there are likewise areas where China could contribute to filling gaps in the UN system's ability to assist states to operationalise R2P. One area that stands out is China's increasing capacity and willingness to support UN peace operations. Dai Shao'an, Vice-Director of the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of Defense, has avowed that China stands ready to send as many peacekeeping troops as possible to UN missions to end violence and assist in post-conflict reconstruction. In a mid-2007 interview with reporters from China Daily, Dai remarked that, '[i]f requested by the United Nations, and if we find that sending peacekeeping forces will

be conducive to the peace and development of local people, we will be glad to play a role in saving people from suffering. And China will continue to strengthen its peacekeeping efforts'.⁶⁰

In line with its pledge to support UN peacekeeping operations, in April 2007 China committed to send a 315-strong multi-functional army engineering unit to Darfur. The initial advance troop deployment took place in November 2007, which marked the first non-African batch of UN-AU peacekeepers in Darfur. The second deployment took place in July 2008, and Chinese-committed troops are now fully deployed. Chinese engineering troops have been particularly adept at completing Quick Impact Projects to build infrastructure and facilities, which have included digging wells and constructing pipelines in order to address water shortages in the region.⁶¹ The engineers have also assisted in constructing a helipad in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur and building a base camp to facilitate the deployment of AU-UN troops. Across the board, the majority of Chinese peacekeepers are engaged in engineering, transportation and medical services. In addition to enhancing these roles, there is value in exploring China's potential to contribute greater human resources (e.g. civilian police) and operational capacity to missions, which could include much-needed ground transport equipment and logistical support.

Although China is firmly committed to supporting UN peacekeeping missions, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun asserts that, '[i]t needs to be emphasized that we should not rely totally on peacekeeping operations for conflict resolution. Priority should be given to eliminating root causes of conflicts, economic development, and capacity and institution building in particular'.⁶² As previously noted, China maintains that the Security Council is not the sole purveyor of protection strategies and initiatives, and encourages taking full advantage of the core competencies of the General Assembly, ECOSOC, the Human Rights Council, United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, regional organisations and non-governmental organisations.⁶³ The role these bodies play in enhancing a state's resistance to and resilience from mass atrocities merits further attention, as do proposals for China's constructive contribution to that end.

In addition to firm support for UN peace operations, China expresses strong appreciation for the achievements of the Peacebuilding Commission, and calls for efforts to improve the coordination of its operations and increase the mobilization of funding for reconstruction programs.⁶⁴ These programs, China maintains, should be catered to the ultimate purpose of peacebuilding, which is 'to build a modern State that is peaceful and stable, with economic development, respect for human rights and the rule of law'.⁶⁵ China steadfastly maintains that the 'local people are the foundation of peacebuilding efforts', and asserts that programs must acknowledge that the primary responsibility for peacebuilding lies with the country concerned.⁶⁶ As such, China calls for the Peacebuilding Commission to strike a careful balance between partnership and ownership, which China maintains is only made possible through the eliciting the participation of the government concerned and actively seeking the support of the local population.

China offers a series of recommendations to enhance the efficacy of the Peacebuilding Commission. In order to ensure a timely and adequate response to situations on the Commission's agenda, China endorses the establishment of a civilian rapid

deployment capacity with expertise in security, the rule of law, development and human rights.⁶⁷ According to China, the various personnel comprising the civilian rapid deployment capacity should be tasked with helping to build local expertise in their respective areas.⁶⁸

In terms of efficiency, China cautions that efforts need to be taken in order to prevent waste or duplication between the Peacebuilding Commission and other UN funds and programs. With that goal in mind, China calls for the Peacebuilding Commission to further define its role as an advisory body and to clearly delineate its relationships with other UN organs, such as the General Assembly, Security Council and Economic and Social Council.⁶⁹ The role of the UN Secretary-General, according to the Chinese position, is to ensure that the Peacebuilding Commission is more transparent and to ensure that resources are allocated to the area of highest priority.⁷⁰

China has also offered proposals to improve the working methods of the Peacebuilding Commission. Noting that facilitators of the Commission have briefed the Council and submitted recommendations to fill gaps in the work of the Council, and that the Security Council in turn has provided political support to the Commission through issuing documents, China recommends further steps to open communication and facilitate cooperation between the two bodies. Chinese delegates encourage the Council to (1) institutionalize the communication between the Council and Commission, with periodic consultations with the Chairman of the Commission to share experience and compare priorities; (2) take Commission reports and expert recommendations into consideration when making decisions, in a similar fashion to reports from the Office of the Secretary-General; and (3) work closely with the Commission to determine when and how to place new countries on its agenda.⁷¹

Strengthening the Role and Capacity of Regional Organisations

While pressure from Western countries has compelled China to reevaluate some of its policies, it relies heavily on the views of regional organisations to justify its stance on humanitarian crises in the Council.⁷² China's willingness to block Security Council resolutions that threatened stronger measures against the governments of Myanmar/Burma and Zimbabwe suggest that it is much easier for China to exercise its veto when measures lack the support of leaders in the region or relevant regional organisations. It stands to reason that if the resolve of regional organisations to address humanitarian crises in their member states were greater, there would be increased impetus for China to calibrate its position to that regional consensus. This is not to overstate the influence that either the AU or ASEAN, for example, have on Chinese foreign policy, but to suggest that consolidating support for R2P in regional organisations invariably has a ripple effect on China's position, insofar as it steadfastly maintains that the views of regional leaders should be given full consideration in Security Council decision-making.

Consolidating regional support occurs through the two mutually reinforcing routes: (1) strengthening the normative purchase of R2P in regional organizations; (2) developing the capacity of regional organisations to prevent mass atrocities in member states. China has adamantly supported the latter, and argues that enhancing crisis response capacity at the regional level is the most effective approach to halting or preventing mass atrocities.⁷³ China has called on the Security Council to place high

priority on the provision of assistance to regional organisations in capacity building, particularly in the form of personnel training, institution building, information and experience sharing, resource management, logistical assistance, material supplies and funding, and support for regional peace operations.⁷⁴ China has likewise emphasised the need for the UN Security Council, Peacebuilding Commission, and Secretariat to build and strengthen coordination and consultation mechanisms with the African Union, and supports the implementation of the Declaration on Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union.⁷⁵ For example, China has pushed for greater participation by regional organisations in the Peacebuilding Commission⁷⁶ and voices support for enhanced coordination between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council, with particular emphasis on utilising the AU's early warning mechanism and peacekeeping capacity.⁷⁷ China could be expected to support these initiatives, as well as options for greater coordination between the Department of Political Affairs and counterparts in regional organisations, such as the desk-to-desk exercises carried out between Department of Political Affairs and AU staff. Although specific recommendations are less forthcoming for consolidating support and building capacity in ASEAN, many of the Chinese proposals outlined above could also apply in that context.

Enhancing China's Support for R2P

Despite repeated assertions that R2P is not solely or primarily focused on military intervention, misconceptions persist among both supporters and sceptics, such that China continues to be wary of the principle. The paper trail of the manner in which R2P has been presented to China's foreign policy elite does little to assuage erstwhile reservations. For example, the ICISS roundtable consultations in Beijing in 2001 addressed three issue areas: (1) when should external military intervention be considered and why? (2) When not to intervene and why? (3) Alternatives to military intervention and the impact of military intervention.⁷⁸ Unsurprisingly, the ensuing discussion focused almost exclusively on extolling sovereignty and eschewing non-consensual force, and omitted entirely any discussion on alternatives to military intervention that focused on conflict prevention or capacity building. Although the questions discussed in the ICISS roundtables are understandable in light of the commission's mandate, they do not reflect the current tenor of thinking on the core conceptual and practical implications of R2P. The scant initiatives to follow up on the World Summit agreement with think tanks and policy advisors in Beijing have not matched the rigour with which that consensus was pursued. A valuable initiative would be to make determined efforts to move R2P from a principle espoused in New York to policy recommendations generated in Beijing, starting with roundtables focused on eliciting Chinese input on preventive and capacity building measures. This initiative would be informed by China's ongoing efforts and aimed at building on the forthcoming recommendations of the Secretary General to translate R2P from principle to action. This seems to be the area in which R2P enjoys the strongest normative traction, and the platform from which China stands to proactively make the greatest contribution.

Conclusion: Next Steps

China is a cautious supporter of R2P. China has twice endorsed the principle at the UN, first at the World Summit in 2005 and later in Security Council Resolution 1674. Since then, China has issued statements indicating that when alerted to the occurrence or imminence of mass atrocity, the United Nations bears the responsibility to be seized by the situation and deploy appropriate measures to assist states in developing strategies to protect targeted populations. China prefers political rather than coercive solutions, and accepts the use of force for civilian protection purposes only as a last resort and after the consent of the parties to the conflict has been secured. To be clear, China's endorsement of R2P is not tantamount to an endorsement of humanitarian intervention; Beijing is adamantly averse to non-consensual military intervention, even when state leaders abet or are themselves the perpetrators of mass atrocities. The greatest flexibility Beijing demonstrates on this stance occurs when relevant regional organisations and leaders take a firm, unified position in support of enhanced UN/regional intervention. Therefore, although China's R2P endorsement it is not the panacea for some of the most controversial sticking points for averting mass atrocities, China's clear affirmation of the World Summit's endorsement of R2P provides a basis for galvanising Beijing to contribute to the wide range of preventive and capacity building measures necessary to ensure that states and the international community carry through on their responsibility to halt genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

The most logical starting point for deepening China's support for R2P is to recognise and foster proposals that China has generated or endorsed which cohere with efforts to prevent the four R2P crimes and their incitement. China offers a series of proposals for the UN to assist states develop the necessary capacity to avert mass atrocity. While China focuses more on prevention and capacity building, it also offers recommendations to ensure a timely and decisive response when a state is manifestly failing to protect its population. The following list of policy recommendations is situated within the four program-oriented areas identified by the UN Secretary-General's Special Adviser. These policy recommendations reflect initiatives that China has initiated or endorsed, and therefore stand to enjoy China's support. Given the resonance between these recommendations and China's own policy preferences, they offer clear avenues for mobilising Chinese leaders to contribute to the global effort to prevent and mitigate mass atrocities.

Capacity Building and Rebuilding

China places particular emphasis on building the requisite capacity for states to prevent widespread, systematic attacks against civilian populations. China supports initiatives to help states address the underlying root causes of extreme violence, which China asserts can be traced predominately to poverty and small arms proliferation. China insists that security and development are intrinsically linked, and is adamant that poverty reduction and development are essential to build the long term capacity to prevent conflict. However, China also supports specific policy-oriented strategies to bolster the capacity to assist states in preventing mass atrocity. In particular, China has demonstrated support for:

1. Bolstering the state's capacity to prevent conflict through strengthening regulation on the trade in small arms and light weapons.

Measures that enjoy China's support include:

- a. Developing a programme for South-South cooperation in which states who have implemented the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons conduct lessons-learned exchanges with other developing countries on the experience and challenges of implementation
- b. Establishing a network of national and regional working groups dedicated to information exchanges, and charged with mapping out priorities and coordinating actions for SALW control on a regional level
- c. Providing financial and technical assistance for states to enhance export license and end-user certificate systems to prevent legally manufactured SALW from ending up in illegal channels
- d. Training local personnel in SALW management best practices, and providing material and technical assistance to register, confiscate, and destroy SALW
- e. Incorporating stockpile management training as part Security Sector Reform in peacebuilding programs
- f. Enhancing cooperation among law enforcement agencies such as police and customs and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to enforce SALW control mechanisms

In terms of China's specific contribution to diminishing the impact of SALW in conflict zones, China could be encouraged to contribute to building the capacity to control SALW by:

- a. Incorporating stockpile management and landmine clearance training as key components of bilateral Joint Military Exchanges, particularly with states on the Security Council's agenda
- b. Contributing Chinese personnel to DDR programs in peacekeeping operations
- c. Instituting a waiting period for SALW transfers in cases of suspected state-sponsored violence until such a point as the Council has deliberated on reports from fact-finding missions

2. Strengthening the Peacebuilding Commission's ability to enhance a state's resilience to mass atrocity by:
 - a. Establishing a civilian rapid deployment capacity with expertise in security, the rule of law, development and human rights, and entrusting this force with the task of building local expertise in these areas
 - b. Enhancing cooperation between the Security Council and Peacebuilding Commission by
 - i. creating opportunities to share experience and compare priorities through institutionalizing the communication between the SC and PC
 - ii. scheduling periodic Security Council consultations with the Chairman of the Commission

- c. Establishing a protocol for the Security Council to work jointly with the Peacebuilding Commission to determine when and how to transfer countries from the Security Council's agenda to the Commission's agenda

China likewise maintains that an integral aspect of capacity building is increasing the number of positions allocated to countries that are under-represented in certain issue areas, such as the UN human rights area, specifically in the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.⁷⁹ China calls for greater geographic distribution of high-level positions, which it asserts will enhance the Office's ability to devise effective and appropriate policies.⁸⁰ China also calls for measures that directly address concerns over the under-representation of developing regions in high level positions by:

1. Eradicating the barriers to equitable geographic representation in the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN recruitment system through implementing the recommendations of the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) on human resource management⁸¹
2. Building the capacity of NGOs in developing countries and supporting their enhanced involvement in international human rights activities.⁸²

Early Warning and Assessment

Although world leaders pledged their support for the United Nations to establish an early warning capability at the World Summit, various political and institutional barriers have impeded efforts to implement that framework. In particular, some member states interpret early warning monitoring as an unjustifiable encroachment in their domestic affairs.⁸³ Insofar as China is particularly sensitive to or itself makes these arguments, China's recommendation for the Security Council to utilise and enhance regional early warning capabilities is noteworthy. Despite any reservations it may have in fully backing a UN early warning system, China endorses early warning systems at the regional level.

As approximately sixty percent of the Council's agenda is dedicated to peace and security in Africa, China places particular emphasis on utilising the AU's early warning and assessment mechanism. China supports the operationalisation of the Continental Early Warning System, which includes recommendations for:

1. Building the regional capacity to collect, verify and analyse early warning data
2. Institutionalising communication channels to ensure that early warning reports reach appropriate decision makers, and that the Security Council is briefed in a timely manner by regional experts
3. Informing relevant bodies of situations likely to escalate into violent conflict in the immediate future, situations of ongoing crises and post-conflict situations
4. Strengthening the human, financial and technical capacity of regional and subregional organisations to build relevant early warning collection, compilation, management and distribution systems

Timely and Decisive Response

China's record of stalling and watering down Security Council resolutions that are intended to address manifest failures to protect populations is detrimental to exercising the Responsibility to Protect in a timely and decisive manner. China's aversion to coercive measures is a perennial sticking point in Council debates. There is little indication that China is willing to veer from this policy and endorse sanctions regimes or acquiesce to peace operations without the formal consent of the host state. However, China is increasingly open to participating in political dialogue and mediation efforts to coax state leaders to consent to international involvement. As opposed to immediately denying coercive measures on principled grounds, Chinese delegates have also demonstrated a willingness to engage with debates over the function and efficacy of sanctions. This is an understated but important shift in China's engagement in collective security, as it opens space for meaningful dialogue over actions that constitute an 'appropriate' response, and could lead to alternative strategies for the Security Council to exercise its responsibility in a timely and decisive manner.

The subtle shift in China's engagement could be rendered more meaningful by enhancing the ability of the UN to address on-going or imminently apprehended crises through diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means as envisioned in Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter. Relevant policies that enjoy China's support include:

1. Following through on recommendations from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for Strengthening the Department of Political Affairs by:
 - a. Enhancing coordination and cooperation between the Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations to avoid duplication of tasks and ensure complementarity, with priority on (1) clearly delineating the working relationship between the two departments, (2) ensuring that Political Affairs personnel adequately liaise with peacekeeping personnel.
 - b. Further developing the communication between the Department of Field Support and the Department of Political Affairs to ensure support for special political missions
 - c. Improving human resourcing of Department of Political Affairs in order to staff the department with requisite professional competencies, including linguistic training and necessary research skills for up-to-date, in-depth political analysis
 - d. Soliciting the views of member states in the region to devise strategies for restructuring regional divisions of the Department of Political Affairs, with a focus on the coordination of regional and UN peacekeeping operations, and collaboration between regional and UN special envoys and UN development agencies
2. Embedding civilian protection more deeply in the work of the Security Council, particularly when devising mandates, by:
 - a. Clarifying the Council's POC mandate by expounding on Resolution 1674 as the legal framework for civilian protection

- b. Providing opportunities for NGOs and analysts with expertise and experience in civilian protection to brief the Council
- 3. Enhancing the ability of UN peacekeepers to carry out civilian protection mandates by:
 - a. Delineating tasks associated with civilian protection, prioritizing tasks in relation to resources, and directly training peacekeepers on the associated civilian protection tasks and priorities
 - b. Reinforcing civilian protection as a key component of peace operations by ensuring that peacekeeping personnel have the appropriate skills and knowledge base to carry out civilian protection tasks by:
 - i. limiting troop rotations to ensure that peacekeeping personnel have understanding of the historical and political dynamic of the conflict
 - ii. permanently assigning Civil and Political Affairs officers to field sites to provide real-time, socially and culturally sensitive analysis to peacekeeping personnel
- 4. Enhancing China's involvement in UN peace operations through:
 - a. Exploring options to increase China's contribution of personnel to peace operations
 - b. Expanding the role of Chinese peacekeepers, particularly in disarmament and demobilization tasks
 - c. Establishing a Chinese standby arrangement for Chinese military engineers to rapidly deploy to carry out Quick Impact Projects
 - d. Holding a regional peacekeeping training program at China's Langfang Police Peacekeeper Training Centre to share China's experience in training specialized and professional units, such as anti-riot police

Collaboration with Regional and Subregional Arrangements

China voices firm support for strengthening the role of regional organizations and enhancing the collaboration between the UN and regional and subregional arrangements. China supports efforts geared at:

1. Assisting regional organisations in capacity building, particularly in the form of personnel training, institution building, information and experience sharing, resource management, logistical assistance, material supplies and funding.
2. Implementing the Declaration on Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union
3. Enhancing the participation of regional organisations in the Peacebuilding Commission
4. Strengthening coordination between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council
5. Strengthening regional support for Security Council initiatives by institutionalising a channel of communication with regional organisations to facilitate early consultations on draft resolutions on countries in the region

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- ⁷² It should be noted that China does not only draw attention to the consensus of the region to validate its conservative stance, but has even voted for more proactive and coercive measures based on the opinion of regional or subregional organizations. For example, as early as 1997 China joined Council members in unanimously endorsing Resolution 1132, which established a sanctions committee in Sierra Leone to oversee the arms embargo, targeted travel ban, and petroleum sanctions contained therein.

Qualifying its vote, China noted that ‘China has always taken a cautious approach to sanctions’ but later noted that ‘acting out of respect for the African countries and their wish that an early settlement be found in the question of Sierra Leone, China will vote in favour of the draft resolution.’ See S/PV.3822, ‘Sanctions in Sierra Leone’, UN Security Council Verbatim Record, 8 October 1997., p. 14.

⁷³ S/PV.5529, ‘Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations in Maintaining International Peace and Security’, UN Security Council Verbatim Record, 20 September 2006., p. 6.

⁷⁴ S/PV.5868, ‘Peace and Security in Africa’, UN Security Council Verbatim Record, 16 April 2008. p 11-12.; S/PV.5749, ‘Peace and Security in Africa’, UN Security Council Verbatim Record, 25 September 2007., p. 13.

⁷⁵ S/PV.5868, ‘Peace and Security in Africa’, UN Security Council Verbatim Record, 16 April 2008., p. 12.

⁷⁶ S/PV.5529, ‘Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations in Maintaining International Peace and Security’, UN Security Council Verbatim Record, 20 September 2006., p. 6.

⁷⁷ S/PV.5735, ‘Peace and Security in Africa’, UN Security Council Verbatim Record, 28 August 2007., p. 18.

⁷⁸ *The Responsibility to Protect, Background Report*, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: 2001)., p. 391.

⁷⁹ ‘Statement of H.E. Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, a the Third Committee of the 63rd Session of the General Assembly under items on Human Rights’, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, 28 October 2008.

⁸⁰ ‘Statement of H.E. Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, a the Third Committee of the 63rd Session of the General Assembly under items on Human Rights’, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, 28 October 2008.

⁸¹ For details see JIU/REP/2007/8, ‘Funding and Staffing of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’, Report by the Joint Inspection Unit 2007., p. 12.

⁸² ‘Statement of H.E. Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, a the Third Committee of the 63rd Session of the General Assembly under items on Human Rights’, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, 28 October 2008.

⁸³ Alex J. Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009).



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